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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Research and  
Development Voluntary Disclosure: UK Evidence 
Research and development (R&D) activities are characterised by unique features and 
limited mandated accounting disclosure. Hence, R&D investment is one of the most 
confidential activities creating information asymmetry. Consequently, firms that are 
involved in R&D activities may try to introduce more voluntary disclosure in order 
to reduce the information asymmetry and enhance their transparency. 
Corporate disclosure has been examined in a large number of prior studies over the 
years. Recently, small numbers of studies have considered research and development 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports.  
The current study seeks to introduce helpful insights into the R&D disclosure 
practices in annual reports. Moreover, it examines the impact of corporate 
governance on R&D voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the UK non-
financial firms with intensive R&D investments. 
The sample consists of 505 firm-year observations of the UK non-financial listed 
firms, which are considered among the high spenders on R&D activities in the UK 
according to the R&D scoreboards, as published by the Department of Business 
Innovations and Skills (BIS). 
Using content analysis, the R&D disclosure score is measured by self-constructed 
disclosure index. The current study employs two techniques to examine the 
relationship between the R&D voluntary disclosure and the independent variables: 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), and Censored Regression (Tobit). 
In terms of the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports, the findings reveal that, in 
average the UK firms introduce about 30% of the examined R&D disclosure index 
items. Moreover, the deviations in R&D disclosure score according to the industry 
type are significant. The results also show that, overall R&D disclosure is positively 
associated with board size and audit committee quality. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND  
Research and development activities (R&D hereafter) are economic investments, 
which play an important role in improving products, create values that may benefit 
the company over many years and are a valuable source of the world economic 
growth (Zhao, 2002; Gelb, 2002). R&D activities are an essential part of intellectual 
capital, which is not recognized in financial statements, raises the call for enhancing 
the reporting model to meet the information needs of the market by introducing the 
fundamental information required for a firm’s transparency (Beattie et al., 2004). 
Consequently, investigating corporate disclosure and enhancing firms’ transparency 
regarding intellectual capital and specially R&D activities is a rich and productive 
research area.  
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the corporate disclosure in 
annual reports (e.g. Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Ahmed & Courtis, 
1999; Mak,1991; Gray et al., 2001; Watson et al., 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Huafang 
& Jianguo, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta 2010, Samaha 
et al., 2015), and many studies have examined the voluntary disclosure of intellectual 
capital in annual reports (e.g. Carbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Hidalgo 
et al., 2011; Li et al., 2012). 
In general, the findings of these studies indicate that the variation in some firm 
characteristics could explain the differences in voluntary disclosure among firms. 
They also provide evidence that certain corporate governance attributes affect 
significantly the discretionary information introduced by firms. However, the 
 - 3 - 
 
findings of these studies are not necessarily extending to R&D activities disclosure 
practices. Considering the type of information is an important element in the 
development hypotheses, so the findings from specific disclosure may not be suitable 
for generalisation (Merkly, 2014). Moreover, the disaggregation of intellectual 
capital reporting into distinct categories of information including R&D activities may 
introduce valuable supplementary insights into the disclosure practices of intellectual 
capital as a whole (La Rosa and Liberatore, 2014). 
Notwithstanding the importance of R&D activities as a major driver of growth, 
investors have difficulty in effectively assessing the firm’s R&D efforts (Lev & 
Zarowin, 1999; Lev, 1999). Two main reasons could explain this problem. The first 
reason is due to the unique and risky nature of R&D activities: these have been 
highlighted by many researchers (e.g. Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Aboody and Lev, 
2000; Munari et al., 2010). The second reason is the insufficient information required 
by the accounting regulations: this has been emphasised by others (e.g. Lev and 
Zarowin, 1999 and Lev, 1999). A similar conclusion is put forward by Merkly 
(2014) who argues that the inadequate mandatory disclosure requirements of R&D 
activities, and its accounting measures do not reflect the performance of R&D 
activities. 
Furthermore, Lev and Zarowin (1999) find a decline in the value relevance of 
earnings as a consequence of the increased R&D intensity, suggesting that the 
reporting of R&D activities does not effectively reveal the value and economic 
consequences of R&D investments.  Lev (1999) argues that the financial statements 
of R&D intensive firms fail to introduce adequate information about the valuation of 
the performance as well as growth, and for the assessment of the risk. Amir and Lev 
 - 4 - 
 
(1996) document that non-financial indicators of performance in the wireless 
telecommunication sector have a significant association with stock prices. They 
argue that the inadequate accounting treatment of intangibles causes firms with a 
significant level of intangibles to employ non-financial information to supplement 
their financial statement information.  
Consequently, outside investors who are interested in evaluating the economic 
performance of firms and potential future benefits from innovation projects are 
forced to look beyond the financial statements (Healy and Palepu, 2001). So, firms 
with high levels of R&D expenditure and with insufficient disclosure according to 
GAAP will probably turn to other forms of disclosure (Gelb, 2002). 
From the previous discussion, it can be concluded that, the information problem 
regarding R&D activities may create a demand for more information beyond the 
financial statements and encourage management to introduce this kind of valuable 
information. Therefore, firms may use other communicating tools to improve 
investors understanding of their R&D activities: these include, annual reports, press 
releases, announcements, conference calls and websites. Consequently, the 
complementarily between limited mandated disclosure and the voluntary disclosure 
of R&D activities may enhance the ability of assessing the R&D performance, risk, 
and value. For this reason, the information problems surrounding R&D activities 
raise the call for more research on the R&D voluntary disclosure (e.g. Cazavan-Jeny 
and Jeanjean, 2006; Nekhili et al., 2010; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013). 
The present study focuses on the R&D voluntary disclosure provided in firms’ 
annual reports rather than other narrative information tools. Annual reports are 
considered the most common tools of communication used by firms to reach 
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different internal and external stakeholders (Guthrie & Petty, 2000). Currently, there 
is insufficient evidence regarding the R&D disclosure in annual reports.  
This chapter is structured as follows: section (2), outlines the research objectives, 
section (3) explains the motivations for conducting the current study, the research 
questions are presented in section (4), followed by the research hypotheses in section 
(5), section (6) summarises the research methodology, section (7) explains the 
contributions of the current study. Finally, section (8) introduces the description of 
the thesis’s organisation. 
1.2.  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
The main aim of the current study is to provide a deep insight into the R&D narrative 
disclosure practices in annual reports. It also seeks to investigate the drivers of the 
level of R&D disclosure, particularly in relation to the impact of corporate 
governance on R&D voluntary disclosure. To achieve these goals, the current study 
seeks to address three main objectives: 
First, to explore the R&D voluntary disclosure practices in the UK non-financial 
firms’ annual reports. This deep investigation leads to identifying the types of R&D-
related information introduced discretionarily by firms in annual reports. Second, to 
assess the extent and trend of R&D-related information introduced discretionarily by 
UK firms in annual reports. Third, to investigate the determinants of R&D voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports by examining the role of corporate governance, which 
has not had the expected attention in prior studies, and by controlling for the most 
other R&D disclosure drivers that have been addressed by the literature. 
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1.3.  THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to achieve the objectives of the current study, the following research 
questions have been addressed: 
 What type of R&D information do the UK non-financial listed firms disclose 
in their annual reports? 
 To what extent do the UK non-financial listed firms introduce discretionary 
information related to their R&D activities in their annual reports? 
 How do R&D disclosure practices in the annual reports of the UK non-
financial listed firms change over time? 
 Does corporate governance have any influence on managers’ incentives to 
disclose information regarding R&D activities in the annual reports of the UK 
non-financial listed firms? 
1.4.  THE RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS 
This study is motivated by the importance of R&D activities for the future of 
companies and the world economy, and by three main factors: 
First, there is a lack of studies, which have investigated the determinants of R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Furthermore, the few studies that have 
examined the drivers of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports has considered 
only firm characteristics (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007; Merkley, 2014; La Rosa 
and Liberator, 2014), with limited evidence regarding the corporate governance 
variables (e.g. Nor et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 
2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
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Second, the difference across countries regarding the voluntary disclosure practices 
of R&D is another motivation for introducing helpful insights into R&D disclosure 
practices in the annual reports of the UK firms. Furthermore, this study investigates 
the association between corporate governance and R&D narrative disclosure for a 
sample of R&D intensive firms in the UK, specifically, to the best of my knowledge, 
the studies that examine R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports conducted in 
many countries such as Canada, US, Malaysia and France. However, the UK context 
is only examined by a recent working paper introduced by Abdelbadie and 
Elshandidy (2013). 
Third, this study is considered to be a response to the call for more research to 
examine the R&D voluntary disclosure (e.g. Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 2006; 
Nekhili et al., 2010; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013). 
1.5. THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
The first three questions are answered by applying a descriptive analysis of R&D 
disclosure practices in annual reports. To answer the fourth question, seven 
hypotheses related to corporate governance variables are developed depending on the 
theoretical ground and prior empirical studies. These hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the board size and the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the role duality and the level of 
R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports.  
H3: There is a positive relationship between the board independence and the 
level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
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H4: There is a positive relationship between the number of board meetings and 
the level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
H5: There is a negative relationship between the level of management ownership 
and the level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
H6: There is a negative relationship between the level of ownership concentration 
and the level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
H7: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee quality and the 
level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
1.6. THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The current study investigates the R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports for a 
sample of the R&D intensive UK firms over a three-year time period. The sample 
comprised 505 firm year observations across three years: 2007, 2008, and 2009 from 
nine industries. 
The study employs manual content analysis to identify the R&D-related information 
introduced in the narrative section in the annual reports. A self constructed disclosure 
index is established to measure the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
The disclosure index employed in this study consists of 26 R&D information items, 
grouped into four categories (general, input, output, and financial information). Each 
item in the disclosure index is scored without weighting. Binary scoring is used, so 
the disclosure of an item in the annual report is coded (1), and the absence of an item 
in the annual report is coded (0).   
To explore the R&D disclosure practices and to assess the R&D disclosure extent in 
the annual reports, a descriptive analysis is applied for the total R&D voluntary 
 - 9 - 
 
disclosure, its categories (general, input, output, and financial information), and its 
types (financial and non-financial information) and for each item of R&D 
information presented in the annual reports. To evaluate the R&D disclosure trend, 
the level of R&D disclosure is tracked over the three-year period of the study, and a 
statistical test is employed to examine whether there is a significant change in the 
extent of R&D disclosure practices over the period of the study.  
To examine the relationship between corporate governance and R&D voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports, two main models are specified. The first model 
examines the association between the levels of R&D disclosure and both corporate 
governance and firm characteristics. The second model examines the same 
relationship considering the year and industry effects. Two main methods are used: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and Tobit regression. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between research objectives, research 
questions, research techniques and research hypotheses:  
The first objective of the current study is to explore the R&D voluntary disclosure 
practices in annual reports. This objective is achieved by answering the first research 
question of the current study which is what type of R&D information does the UK 
firms disclose in annual reports?. To find the answer for this question, the current 
study conducted a manual content analysis using a self constructed disclosure index 
to collect the R&D-related information from annual reports. Following this, a 
descriptive analysis is applied for the overall R&D disclosure, its categories, its 
types, and for each item of R&D-related information. 
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The second objective of the current study is to assess the extent and trend of R&D- 
related information introduced discretionarily by the UK firms in annual reports. To 
achieve this goal, two research questions have been identified: 
 To what extent do the UK firms introduce discretionary information related to 
their R&D activities in annual reports? This question is answered by using the 
same technique that has been used to answer the first question of the current 
study. 
 How do R&D disclosure practices in the annual reports of the UK firms 
change over time? To provide an answer to this question, the R&D voluntary 
disclosure score has been tracked over the three-year period of the study, and 
a statistical test has been applied to investigate whether there is a significant 
change in the extent of R&D disclosure practices over this time.  
The third objective of the current study is to examine the impact of corporate 
governance on the level of R&D voluntary disclosure in the UK firms’ annual 
reports. This objective is achieved by answering the fourth research question of the 
current study which is, does corporate governance have any influence on the 
managers’ incentives to disclose information regarding  R&D activities in the annual 
reports of the UK firms?  
To find the answer of this question, the study reviews the relevant theoretical 
foundations that have been used to explain managers’ incentives to introduce 
voluntary disclosure regarding R&D activities. It also reviews the prior studies that 
investigate the R&D disclosure in annual reports. Therefore, the study formulates 
seven hypotheses in order to examine the impact of seven corporate governance 
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variables on the R&D disclosure. To examine the research hypotheses, the seven 
proposed explanatory variables are grouped into three sets: board characteristics, 
ownership structure, and audit committee quality controlling for six firm 
characteristics. Finally, the hypotheses have been tested using OLS regression and 
Tobit regression.  
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Figure 1.1 
The Relationship between Research Objectives, Research Questions, Research Techniques and Research Hypotheses 
H1:There is a positive relationship 
between the board size and the 
level of R&D voluntary disclosure 
in annual reports. 
H2:There is a negative relationship 
between the role duality and the 
level of R&D voluntary disclosure 
in annual reports.  
H3:There is a positive relationship 
between the board independence 
and the level of R&D voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports. 
H4:There is a positive relationship 
between the number of board 
meetings and the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. 
H5:There is a negative relationship 
between the level of management 
ownership and the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. 
H6:There is a negative relationship 
between the level of ownership 
concentration and the level of 
R&D voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports. 
H7:There is a positive relationship 
between the audit committee 
quality and the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. 
 
Research Hypotheses 
 
 
Research Objectives 
 
Research Questions 
What type of R&D information 
do the UK firms disclose in their 
annual reports? 
 
 
Does corporate governance have 
any influence on managers’ 
incentives to disclose information 
regarding R&D activities in the 
annual reports of the UK firms? 
 
 
To what extent do the UK firms 
introduce discretionary 
information related to their R&D 
activities in their annual reports? 
 
How do R&D disclosure 
practices in the annual reports 
of the UK non-financial listed 
firms change over time? 
Do corporate governance 
mechanisms have any 
influence on the man g rs’ 
incentives to disclose 
information regarding R&D 
activities in the annual reports 
of the UK non-financial listed 
firms? 
 
 
 
How do R&D disclosure 
practices in the annual reports of 
the UK firms change over time? 
 
Do corporate governance 
mechanisms have any
fluenc  on the managers’
centives to disclose
information regarding R&D
activities in the annual reports
of the UK non-financial listed 
firms? 
 
 
 
Research Techniques 
 
Applying a descriptive analysis 
of the total R&D disclosure; its 
categories, its types and of each 
item presented in annual reports 
and including in the disclosure 
index. 
 
Applying a statistical test to 
investigate whether there is a 
significant change in the extent of 
R&D disclosure practices over 
the period of the study.  
 
 
 
Formulating the hypotheses and 
testing them using OLS 
regression and Tobit regression. 
 
1. Exploring the R&D 
voluntary disclosure 
practices in the UK firms’ 
annual reports.  
 
 
 
2. Assessing the extend and 
trend of the R&D 
voluntary disclosure in the 
UK firms’ annual reports. 
3. Examining the impact of 
corporate governance on 
R&D voluntary disclosure 
in the UK firms’ annual 
reports. 
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1.7. THE RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS  
The present study contributes to the prior literature in several ways:  
First, the current study belongs to the stream of research on R&D activities, which 
investigates the R&D activities’ economic, financial and accounting implications.    
A considerable amount of literature has addressed R&D expenditures, focused on 
their limited disclosure regulation, and evaluating their performance and productivity 
(e.g. Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Aboody and Lev, 1998; Zhao, 
2002; Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas, 2011). The findings from these studies emphasize 
the significant impact of R&D investments on a firm’s productivity and growth. 
Another group of studies examines R&D voluntary disclosure outside the formal 
firms’ annual reports (e.g. Chan et al., 1990; Woolridge & Snow, 1990; Hirshey et 
al., 2001; Dedman et al., 2008). This group of studies highlight the importance of 
R&D voluntary disclosure introduced by the firms outside the formal annual reports.  
Although the previous literature points out that the R&D context is a rich research 
area, too little attention has been paid to the R&D narrative disclosure in annual 
reports. However, recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in the R&D 
narrative disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadie and 
Elshandidy, 2013; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
The current study is one of a few studies, which sheds light on the importance of this 
area of research. It seeks to improve the understanding of R&D-related information 
introduced discretionarily into annual reports as an important tool to provide more 
information about R&D activities beyond the financial statement. 
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Second, the previous studies that addressed the R&D narrative disclosure in annual 
reports has been conducted in many countries other than the UK such as Canada (e.g. 
Entwistle, 1999; Zeghal et al., 2007), US (e.g. Jones, 2007; Merkley, 2014), 
Malaysia (e.g. Nor et al., 2010), France (e.g. Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 
2015).  Moreover, it is argued that the environmental factors could be the reason for 
the international differences in accounting and corporate disclosure from one country 
to other (e.g. Cooke and Wallace, 1999; Von Alberti-Alhtaybat et al., 2012). In 
addition, empirically, Ding et al., (2004) hypothesize and find significant differences 
in R&D voluntary disclosure practices between Canadian and French firms. 
Therefore, the results of the few previous studies that conducted in some countries 
cannot be generalised to other countries. Consequently, further work is required to 
introduce evidence on the UK regarding the R&D disclosure practices in the firms’ 
annual reports.  
To the best of my knowledge, the only study into the UK context that investigates the 
R&D disclosure in annual reports is a working paper conducted by Abdelbadie and 
Elshandidy (2013). They employ computerised content analysis to investigate the 
overall R&D disclosure and examine its determinants. They use the total number of 
the R&D-related sentences in annual report to measure the level of R&D disclosure. 
One of the limitations, which is mentioned in their study, is considering the level of 
overall R&D disclosure without incorporating the R&D-related topics such as R&D 
competition, strategies, patents, and findings.  
However, the current study employs the manual content analysis, and uses a self 
constructed disclosure index to measure the R&D disclosure in annual reports of the 
UK firms. Furthermore, the current study identifies and analyses the types of R&D-
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related information that is introduced discretionarily by the UK firms in annual 
reports. Finally, the current study examines the impact of corporate governance on 
R&D disclosure, and considers some other variables that have not been addressed by 
Abdelbadie and Elshandidy (2013), such as the effectiveness of the audit committee 
and the number of board meetings. 
Third, the current study makes a contribution to the literature on corporate 
governance studies by exploring whether corporate governance attributes influence 
the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports. Many researchers consider the 
association between corporate governance and corporate disclosure (e.g. Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Lim et al., 2007). Moreover, a large and 
growing body of literature investigated the impact of corporate governance on a 
number of specific types of information that have been introduced in firms’ annual 
reports, including, environmental disclosure (e.g. Salama et al., 2012), intellectual 
capital disclosure (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Hidalgo et al., 
2011; Li et al., 2012), forward looking information (e.g. Hussainey et al., 2003; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013) and risk disclosure (e.g. Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
However, less attention has been devoted to the relationship between corporate 
governance and R&D disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Zeghal et al., 2007; Nor et 
al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 
2015). 
Although, some studies introduce helpful insights into the determinants of R&D 
disclosure, they only consider incomplete proxies for corporate governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, the systematic analysis of the corporate governance 
 -16- 
attributes that might affect the managers’ decisions to introduce more R&D-related 
information in the firm’s annual reports is limited. In other words, the few studies 
that addressed the impact of corporate governance on R&D disclosure have focused 
on examining the characteristics of the board of directors and the firm’s ownership 
structure without considering the role of the audit committee in influencing R&D 
disclosure. 
The current study examines the influence of a comprehensive set of corporate 
governance variables, which are expected to affect R&D voluntary disclosure 
according to the theoretical foundation and prior empirical studies. To the best of my 
knowledge, the current study is the only study that addresses the impact of audit 
committee characteristics on R&D disclosure decisions, except Nekhili et al., (2015). 
They consider only the impact of audit committee independence on R&D disclosure 
in annual reports of French companies. Moreover, the current study considers the 
interaction effect between audit committee characteristics by employing the 
composite measure used by Zaman et al., (2011). 
Fourth, notwithstanding the significant contributions of the previous studies that 
investigated the R&D narrative disclosure in annual reports, the findings must be 
interpreted within the context of the number of limitations.  Some studies cover only 
one year (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007) which may help in exploring R&D 
disclosure in annual reports, but does not help in assessing the trend of disclosure 
across time. Moreover, the majority of these studies are limited to small samples (e.g. 
Entwistle, 1999; Ding et al., 2004; Zeghal et al., 2007; Jones, 2007; Nor et al., 2010) 
which may affect the potential for generalising  the findings. Furthermore, some of 
the prior studies emphasise R&D intensive industries (e.g. Jones, 2007; La Rosa and 
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Liberator, 2014), hence, the sample cannot claim to represent R&D disclosure 
practices of all firms from different industries. 
The current study considers the limitations of the previous studies. It contributes to 
the disclosure literature and the R&D setting through exploring R&D voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports of a large sample of the UK firms (505 firm year 
observations), from different industries (nine industry sectors) and covering three 
years (2007-2009) to assess the extent and trend of R&D disclosure in annual 
reports.  
Fifth, the current study uses a self constructed disclosure index to measure the level 
of R&D disclosure in annual reports. This index is primarily based upon the 
classification of R&D-related information that introduced by the pioneer study of 
Entwistle (1999), and reviews 100 annual reports of the UK firms to identify the 
R&D information that fit the UK context. To the best of my knowledge, there are 
very few studies that use a self constructed disclosure index to measure the level of 
R&D disclosure in annual reports (Jones, 2007; Nekhili et al., 2012; La Rosa and 
Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2015). Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, there 
is no previous index established in the UK context. 
Sixth, the current study examines the impact of corporate governance on the overall 
R&D disclosure. Moreover, it investigates the association between corporate 
governance and each of R&D financial disclosure and R&D non-financial disclosure. 
To the best of my knowledge, Nor et al., (2010) is the only study that considers the 
disaggregation of R&D disclosure in annual reports into forward looking disclosure, 
quantitative disclosure, and financial disclosure in examining the association 
between R&D disclosure and corporate governance. They use the number of text 
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units to measure the level of R&D disclosure for 187 annual reports of firms listed in 
the Malaysian market. 
Although, Nor et al., (2010) introduce a useful analysis of three types of R&D 
disclosure, which are forward looking, quantitative, and financial information, their 
study is limited by the small sample size. Another limitation, mentioned in their 
study, is the unique environment of Malaysia, so the findings cannot be generalized 
to other capital markets.  
The current study contributes to this research area by using a self-constructed 
disclosure index to measure R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports for a large 
sample size (505 firm year observations) of the UK firms. Furthermore, it examines 
the impact of corporate governance separately on financial and non-financial R&D 
disclosure. 
Finally, drawing on a specific theory or a particular concept, the previous studies 
that investigated the R&D disclosure practices in annual reports have developed their 
hypotheses and have explained their findings. For example, some researchers have 
built their argument drawing on agency theory (e.g. Nor et al., 2010; Abdelbadie and 
Elshandidy, 2013), and other studies have employed both agency and signalling 
theories (e.g.  Zegal et al., 2007; Nekhili et al., 2015). Moreover, some studies have 
used a theoretical foundation drawing on a number of concepts to formulate their 
hypotheses and interpret their results. These include, the cost-benefit analysis 
(Entwistle, 1999), proprietary costs and information asymmetry (Jones, 2007; 
Nekhili et al., 2012; Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 
2015). The current study employs an integrated theoretical framework based on 
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agency and signalling theories. It also considers cost-benefit analysis and more 
importantly proprietary costs and information asymmetry. 
1.8. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
This section presents the structure of the current study and provides an overview of 
its contents. The thesis is organised into seven chapters as follows:  
Chapter two discusses the main concepts related to the current study, identifying the 
nature and importance of R&D activities. Moreover, it highlights the growing trend 
toward enhancing a firm’s narrative disclosure. It also discusses R&D disclosure in 
the UK, followed by a summary of the research framework of the narrative 
disclosure in annual reports. Finally, the chapter identifies the main aspects of 
corporate governance that include corporate governance definition and its impact on 
the disclosure policy. 
Chapter three introduces a discussion of the integrated theoretical framework 
employed in the current study. The chapter starts with a summary of the potential 
costs and benefits of R&D disclosure, which may affect the managers’ incentives to 
introduce R&D information. This is followed by a discussion of agency and 
signalling theories and how they can be employed to explain the R&D disclosure in 
annual reports. Finally, the theoretical framework of the current study is identified 
based on agency and signalling theories, with a consideration of the main aspects of 
costs and benefits analysis. 
Chapter four reviews the main studies concerning the influence of corporate 
governance on corporate disclosure in annual reports, especially on the disclosure of 
intellectual capital. Furthermore, it introduces a brief discussion of the studies that 
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are concerned with R&D activities in general. Moreover, the chapter reviews in 
details, the studies that have investigated R&D voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports, which is the core of the current study. Therefore, the chapter identifies the 
gap in the literature and explains how the current study will contribute to the 
knowledge. Moreover, this chapter presents the different approaches employed in 
literature to analyse the narrative disclosure in annual reports. Finally, the hypotheses 
are formulated based on the theoretical framework presented in chapter three, and the 
literature review introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter five outlines the methodology employed in the current study to answer the 
research questions and to examine the research hypotheses. It clarifies the research 
method and research design which includes choosing a UK context, the R&D 
disclosure in annual reports, the time horizon, the study population, the sample 
selection, the characteristics of the disclosure index, the construction of the 
disclosure index and the assessment of  its reliability and validity. This is followed 
by the definition and measurement of the variables and the shaping of the model 
specification.  Finally, the chapter summarizes the analytical procedures. 
Chapter six introduces the analysis of data and presents its results. It starts with a 
descriptive analysis of the extent and trend of R&D disclosure. Four levels of 
analysis are presented: overall R&D disclosure, its categories, its types and  R&D 
disclosure items. This is followed by the descriptive analysis of the dependent and 
independent variables. The regression diagnostics are summarised, and the results of 
OLS regression and Tobit regression are presented for each of overall R&D 
disclosure, financial R&D disclosure, and non-financial R&D disclosure. The 
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chapter ends with the sensitivity analysis for the full model and for both dependent 
and independent variables. 
Finally, chapter seven presents a summary of the research objectives, research 
questions and methodology.  It also introduces a brief report of the research findings. 
This is followed by the theoretical and  practical implications of the current study. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the limitations of the study and suggests some ideas for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been growing concern that the traditional financial report cannot cope with 
the information needs of the new economy (AICPA, 1994). Consequently, to bridge 
the gap between information introduced in financial statements and the information 
needs of the users of financial statements, many commentators argue that more 
disclosure of non-financial, forward looking, and intangible assets information is 
needed (FASB, 2001, a). Therefore, improving the quality of corporate disclosure 
and enhancing firms’ transparency is one of the most rich and attractive research 
areas.  
In general, narrative disclosure in corporate annual reports is well documented in a 
considerable body of literature (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; 
Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Mak, 1991; Gray et al., 2001; Watson et al., 2002; Eng and 
Mak 2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-
Ballesta, 2010). However, few studies have addressed the narrative disclosure of 
R&D activities in annual reports (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007; Nekhili et al., 
2012; Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
The current study contributes to the corporate disclosure literature by introducing 
new evidence of the R&D narrative disclosure practices in annual reports. The 
previous chapter presents the main focus of this study, which is R&D voluntary 
disclosure practices in the UK firms. The current chapter aims to identify the main 
concepts and aspects related to the present study. 
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Section (2) starts with the definition of R&D activities, followed by highlighting its 
importance and finally, an explanation of the unique nature of R&D investments. 
Section (3) discusses issues related to R&D disclosure. These include: the definition 
of accounting disclosure in general, the importance of narrative disclosure, R&D 
disclosure and specifically, R&D disclosure in the UK. Section (4) reviews the 
framework for research on accounting narratives. Section (5) starts with the 
definition of corporate governance and followed by the role that has been played by 
corporate governance to enhance the firm’s transparency. Finally, section (6) 
summarises the main issues discussed in the current chapter. 
2.2. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 
This section introduces the definition of R&D activities that is used in the current 
study and stated by the International Accounting Standards (IAS). It also emphasizes 
the importance of R&D activities for firms and for the general economy. Finally, the 
distinctive nature of R&D investments is highlighted.    
2.2.1. Definition of Research and Development Activities 
IAS 38 (Para: 8) defines the research activity as “original and planned investigation 
undertaken with the prospect of gaining new scientific or technical knowledge and 
understanding”, while the development activity is defined as “the application of 
research findings or other knowledge to a plan or design for the production of new 
or substantially improved materials, devices, products, processes, systems, or 
services before the start of the commercial production or use” (IAS 38 Para. 8). 
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2.2.2. The Importance of Research and Development Activities  
R&D activities play an important role in economic growth and a nation’s welfare; 
they are a major contributor to technological change that leads to enhanced 
productivity and growth (Lev, 1999). 
The literature has provided evidence on the importance of R&D investments. 
Sougiannis (1994) investigates the productivity of R&D investments and proves that 
investors place a high value on R&D investments, and the market value reflects this 
assessment in the future. He finds that approximately every one-dollar increase in 
R&D spending creates a five-dollar increase in the market value. In addition, Lev 
(1999) surveys a large group of empirical research and concluded that, most results 
clearly demonstrate that R&D activities significantly contribute to productivity and 
firm value as reflected in stock prices.  
Moreover, an exploratory international study conducted by Ding et al., (2007) 
introduced further evidence on the positive contribution of R&D activities for the 
future performance of a firm, and points out that this contribution varies from one 
country to another.  
2.2.3. The Nature of  Research and Development Activities  
R&D activities have a unique nature. The distinctive features of R&D activities have 
been identified by many researchers. Munari et al., (2010) indicate that R&D 
activities are a long-term investment which characterized by the high level of 
uncertainty. Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) show that R&D expenditure is considered 
as a type of intangible asset investment with expected positive influence on future 
cash flow. They argue that any information regarding R&D spending can help 
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investors to form their expectations about the amount and variability of future cash 
flow. 
The main differences between R&D activities and other types of investments are 
summarized by Aboody and Lev (2000) as follows: 
 Most R&D activities are unique to each developing firm, while most capital 
investments have similar features across firms within a certain industry. For 
this reason, it will be not appropriate to compare the R&D performance 
among firms. 
 While most physical and financial assets can be assessed in the organised 
markets, the R&D activities do not have such an organised market where the 
asset’s price can convey its value. 
 R&D activities are traded differently from other types of investments, 
according to accounting reporting rules. While the fair value of most financial 
investments and the recognition of value impairment of physical assets are 
mandated by accounting rules, immediately expensed of R&D expenditure is 
the basic rule.  The only exception is R&D expenditures capitalisation when 
the firm can meet specific conditions. Consequently, there is no reported 
value of R&D investments to communicate the productivity of R&D activities 
to investors. 
2.3.  RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DISCLOSURE  
This section briefly discusses the definition of accounting disclosure in general. 
Then, it highlights the increasing importance of the narrative disclosure as a result of 
the fundamental changes in a business environment that notably affect information 
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needs and a firm’s transparency. Next is a more detailed discussion of R&D 
disclosure, and in particular, the R&D disclosure in the UK context. 
2.3.1. Accounting Disclosure 
Corporate disclosure can be defined as “the communication of information by people 
inside the public firms towards people outside” (Farvaque et al., 2011: 8). 
The company can communicate its performance to all stakeholders by using different 
means. Firstly, through financial statements which are prepared according to the 
accounting standards and must follow specific rules and format. The second formal 
way to introduce more information to stakeholders is through the annual report 
which contains information about the firm’s operations, performance and activities. 
Besides financial reporting as a main formal tool of corporate disclosure, there are 
many other channels available for firms to communicate with stakeholders, including  
conferences, press releases, websites and announcements.  
Consequently, financial disclosures are simply defined by (Gibbins et al., 1990: 122) 
as:“any deliberate release of financial information, whether numerical or 
qualitative, required or voluntary, or via formal or informal channels.”. For a more 
particular definition, Meek et al., (1995: 555) define voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports as “disclosure in excess of requirements-present free choices on the part of 
company management to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant 
to the decision needs of users of their annual reports.”.  
2.3.2. The Importance of Narrative Disclosures 
Beattie et al., (2004) argue that the fundamental changes in the business 
environment, which has become gradually more involved in the value creation 
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process that depends on intangible assets not recognized in the financial statements, 
raise the call for enhancing the reporting model and meeting the information needs of 
the market by introducing the fundamental information required for firm 
transparency.  
It can be noticed that, there is a growing trend towards enhancing corporate 
disclosure. Many academic researchers and accounting entities draw attention to the 
importance of narrative disclosure and emphasise the need to improve corporate 
reporting to bridge the gap between traditional financial reporting, and the 
information needs of the new economy. (e.g. Lev and Zarowin, 1999; AICPA, 1994; 
FASB, 2001, b; ASB, 2006; FRC, 2014). 
The next paragraphs outline some of the important reports produced by significant 
accounting entities that emphasise the importance of narrative disclosures. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) formed the Jenkins 
Committee. The committee issues its report in 1994: “Improving Business Reporting. 
A Customer Focus; Meeting the Information Needs of Investors and Creditors.”.  
The committee conducted a comprehensive study to illustrate the information needs 
of professional investors, creditors and their advisors to identify the most useful 
types of information in evaluating firms and assessing their future prospects. It 
develops some recommendations to improve business reporting. Providing more 
forward-looking information and non-financial data is among these 
recommendations.  In addition, the committee identifies some areas for further 
research that would provide helpful information to standard setters, regulators, and 
other parties interested in improving business reporting.  
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The current study belongs to one of these suggested areas; which is investigating the 
types of information that introduced discretionarily by firms.  
The steering committee of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued 
its report in 2001 entitled “Improving Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing 
Voluntary Disclosure.”. This report aims to help firms to improve their business 
reporting by providing them with examples of extensive voluntary disclosure 
introduced by leading firms. These examples illustrate how companies can 
communicate effectively with investors. The report introduces the findings of a set of 
working groups that investigated voluntary disclosure practices in eight industries. 
The working groups consider firms’ annual and quarterly reports, SEC reports, press 
releases, web sites and conference calls. 
The steering committee’s recommendations highlight the expected increasing 
importance of voluntary disclosures in the future as a result of the significant changes 
in the business environment. In addition, the committee encourages firms to 
introduce additional information about unrecognized intangible assets. It also 
indicates that this kind of information would be beneficial due to the importance of 
intangible assets to a firm’s value.  Moreover, the committee believes that forward-
looking information would be helpful to current and potential investors. However, 
the adverse influence of this disclosure on the firm’s competitive position should be 
considered. 
The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issued its report (2006) entitled “Reporting 
Statement: Operating and Financial Review” to identify the best practices in the 
preparation of the Operating and Financial Review (OFR). The report introduces a 
set of recommendations and implementation guidance. It specifies the key elements 
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of the disclosure framework that should be addressed in an OFR such as, information 
with forward-looking orientation that helps others in the assessment of the current 
and future performance of the firm. The report also recommends introducing 
financial and non-financial information to complement the financial statements. 
Indeed, the key performance indicators (KPIs) and the principal risks facing the firm 
are considered as a necessary kind of information to evaluate the objectives and 
strategies of the firm. 
The reporting statement has been replaced by the report published by The Financial  
Reporting Council (FRC), (2014) entitled “Guidance on the Strategic Report”.  It is 
non-mandatory guidance supporting the mandatory requirements of the strategic 
report that apply for periods ending on or after 30 September 2013. The guidance 
helps firms to tell their businesses’ stories with a focus on the shareholders’ needs 
and with achieving the best use of the regulatory framework that is  drawn up in  the 
companies Act 2006. 
The importance of investigating R&D disclosure arises from the increasing focus on 
improving narrative disclosure in general and especially on intangibles and forward 
looking information. 
2.3.3. The Importance of Research and Development Disclosure 
Recently, intangible assets have received great attention. This study concentrates on 
R&D activities as an important part of intangible assets, which play an important role 
in the future of companies and in the world economy.  
IAS 38 states that any spending on research activity must be recognized as an 
expense immediately, (IAS 38, Para. 54). An asset arising from development activity 
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shall be recognised if the firm can demonstrate the recognition criteria. Considering 
these criteria, the company should capitalise development expenditures when it 
intends to complete the asset and can demonstrate the technical feasibility of 
completing it and also its ability to either use it or sell it. In addition, the company 
should be able to show how the asset will generate future economic benefits, and 
illustrate the availability of resources to complete and use, or sell the asset. Finally, 
the company must demonstrate its ability to measure reliably the development 
expenditures (IAS 38, Para. 57). According to the requirements of IAS 38, most 
R&D expenditures will be expensed in financial statements. 
Several studies have documented a decrease in the usefulness of the financial 
statements of firms. They argue that, the reason behind this decline could be the 
inadequate value of intangible assets introduced by firms in their financial statements 
(e.g. Amir and Lev, 1996; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Canibano et al., 2000). 
Amir and Lev (1996) examine the value relevance of financial and non-financial 
information in the wireless telecommunication industry. They find that non-financial 
information has value relevance, while financial information (earnings, book value, 
and cash flow) is not significantly associated with stock price. They argue that 
because of the insufficiency of accounting information, firms provide non-financial 
information to enhance their disclosure.  
Lev and Zarowin (1999) document a systematic decrease in the association between 
market values and accounting information. They also find that the rise in R&D 
intensity is associated with a decrease in the value relevance of earnings. The authors 
conclude that the investment in R&D activities is a significant factor in the decline of 
the usefulness of financial reports. Moreover, this noticeable decline is due to the 
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non-reporting of intangible assets in the balance sheet. Given the drawbacks of the 
informative of accounting information, financial statements are becoming less 
revealing of the current financial position and future forecasts because they 
concentrate on the reliable estimates of the firm value but not necessarily the relevant 
ones (Canibano et al., 2000). 
The limited systematic investigation of information relating to intangible assets, 
including R&D activities has raised the call for further  research into R&D voluntary 
disclosure. Gelb (2002) empirically investigated the intangible assets and firm 
disclosure.  He finds that firms with significant levels of R&D expenditure are more 
likely to enhance their voluntary disclosure above mandated accounting requirements 
as the primary tool to present their financial performance. He suggests that standard 
setters may wish to consider additional disclosures about intangible assets within the 
requirements of generally accepted accounting principles.  
Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, (2006) examine the association between stock prices and 
R&D reporting and suggest future research to study the voluntary disclosure of R&D 
activities as an alternative source of information other than R&D reporting.  
The importance of R&D information is widely considered in an emerging body of 
research. Many researchers document a significant influence of R&D expenditures 
on the market value of firms (e.g. Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Sougiannis, 1994, 
Lev and Sougiannis, 1996), and confirm a value relevance of non-financial patent 
information as a long-term benefit derived from R&D activities (e.g. Hirschey et al., 
2001). Accordingly, R&D information would be helpful to investors in their ongoing 
valuation of firms. 
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This study contributes to the debate on disclosure of R&D activities by exploring 
R&D disclosure in annual reports. Moreover, it investigates the determinants of 
R&D voluntary disclosure, especially the role of corporate governance as a potential 
driver of disclosure in annual reports, using a sample of the largest corporate 
spenders on R&D in the UK. 
2.3.4. Research and Development Disclosure in the UK 
Narrative disclosure in annual reports is considered as the key element in achieving 
the required enhancement of corporate reporting, and regulators are focusing their 
efforts on management discussion, operations and financial matters by issuing, 
extending and revising their guidelines for the narrative report (Beattie et al., 2004).  
In the UK, the ASB issued “Reporting Statement: Operating and Financial Review” 
in 1993 to set out guidance for a narrative report on the OFR which was revised in 
2006 (Deloitte, 2009). More recently, new enhancement of business review 
requirements has come into force for UK listed companies under the companies ACT 
2006 (FRC, 2009). 
The companies Act 2006 (Part 15, chap. 5, Section 417) requires listed companies to 
introduce a business review in their director’s report. This should include a fair 
review of the company’s business, a description of the principal risks, information 
about some issues: environmental matters, the company’s employees, social and 
community issues and an analysis using KPIs. 
However, a survey conducted by Deloitte (2009) to set out the common 
implementation problems for mandatory requirements, and the recommended content 
of the OFR reveal that there is a difficulty in interpreting some requirements, whilst 
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others are too generic. The results of the survey suggested that the ASB needs to 
issue another document and provide companies with a clear, comprehensive and 
logically ordered guide to narrative disclosures. 
Moreover, The Companies Act 2006 (Part 15, chapter 5, Section 417:10) declares 
that “Nothing in this section requires the disclosure of information about impending 
developments or matters in the course of negotiation if the disclosure would, in the 
opinion of the directors, are seriously prejudicial to the interests of the company.”. 
This statement provides a level of protection for firms against certain negative effects 
of introducing this highly confidential information. It was pointed out in section two 
of this chapter, the R&D activities are long-term investments with a high level of 
uncertainty and distinctive features (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Aboody and Lev, 
2000; Munari et al., 2010).  Accordingly, the managers have the right to withhold the 
R&D-related information when they believe that specific disclosures would be 
harmful to the company. 
In addition, The Companies Act 2006 does not assure any particular disclosures 
related to specific issues. Therefore, the selection of issues to be discussed and KPIs 
to be introduced in the business review are at the discretion of the directors (Li et al., 
2012). Consequently, current narrative disclosure practices of R&D activities are 
essentially voluntary.  
2.4. NARRATIVE  DISCLOSURE STUDIES:THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
The importance of narrative disclosure and the growing trend toward enhancing the 
firm’s transparency have attracted many researchers to explore corporate disclosure 
and explain the existing practices. Moreover, they have tried to investigate the 
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consequences of information introduced by firms and draw some helpful 
recommendations in order to improve corporate reporting. 
Beattie, (2014) introduces a framework for the observed research questions regarding 
accounting narratives. Her framework includes five questions as follows: 
 What is reported? 
 What explains the observed practice? 
 How does the author explain observed practice? 
 What are the consequences of observed practice? 
 What should be reported? 1 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1   
Research into Accounting Narratives 
Source: adopted from Beattie, 2014. 
 
                                                          
1
  The interpretive narrative research, the consequences of narrative practice and normative statements 
are beyond the Current study. 
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Given the lack of studies that address R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports, 
especially in the UK context, the present study investigates the first and second 
questions from the previous framework outlined by Beattie, (2014). The description 
of the actual R&D disclosure practice in annual reports and examining its 
determinants could be a logical starting point to introduce useful insights into the 
R&D disclosure process in annual reports.  
Therefore, the current study seeks to explore R&D narrative disclosure practices 
introduced by the UK firms in their annual reports. Furthermore, the current study 
tries to explain the observed R&D disclosure practices by investigating the impact of 
a set of corporate governance variables on the level of R&D disclosure.  At the same 
time, it considers some firm characteristics that could explain the R&D disclosure 
practices based on the theoretical foundation and prior empirical studies. 
However, further research in this field is needed to complement the current study. 
Considering the consequences of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports could 
be an important research area. These would include the influence of R&D disclosure 
on market value and on information asymmetry. In addition, the management’s 
explanations of the existence disclosures and the researcher’s recommendations for 
the best practices of the R&D disclosure in annual reports are important issues for 
future research. 
2.5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: OVERVIEW 
This section starts with identifying the narrower and broader definitions of corporate 
governance, followed by a brief discussion of the association between corporate 
governance and disclosure policy. Finally, the development of corporate governance 
code in the UK is discussed. 
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2.5.1. Definition of Corporate Governance 
The Cadbury Committee (Cadbury Report, 1992, Para. 2.5) defines corporate 
governance in one statement as“the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. In the simple corporate governance structure, the demand for corporate 
governance mechanisms is created by the separation between the capital managers 
and the capital providers (Gillan, 2006). 
However, the firm is more than managers and capital suppliers. Accordingly, a more 
comprehensive corporate governance structure is considered by Gillan and Starks 
(1998: 4) who define corporate governance as “the system of laws, rules and factors 
that control operations at a company” and by Donnelly and Mulcahly (2008: 416) 
who defines corporate governance as “a set of control mechanisms that is specially 
designed to monitor and ratify managerial decisions, and to ensure the efficient 
operation of a corporation on behalf of its stakeholders.”. 
Consequently, the stakeholders of a firm such as shareholders, creditors, suppliers, 
consumers, employees, and the government can protect their interests in a firm by the 
existence of the effective corporate governance mechanisms. (John and  Senbet, 
1998:374) State that “Corporate governance is a means by which various 
stakeholders exert control over a corporation by exercising certain rights as 
established in the existing legal and regulatory frameworks as well as corporate 
bylaws.”. 
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Figure 2.2  
Corporate Governance beyond the Balance Sheet Model  
Source: Gillan, 2006, 383. 
2.5.2. Corporate Governance and Disclosure Policy 
Effective corporate governance is supposed to improve monitoring quality by 
reducing the possibility that managers will increase their interest through 
withholding information; therefore, both voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance are considered mechanisms of accountability (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 
2007; Hidalgo et al., 2011). 
In addition, Hidalgo et al., (2011) indicate that the design of efficient corporate 
governance mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry and enhance firm’s 
transparency is one of the most broadly discussed issues in both academic and 
business press settings. Therefore, a positive association between the quality of 
corporate governance structure and firm disclosure decisions is expected, given the 
monitoring role of corporate governance. (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005, Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007; Brown et al., 2011).   
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Empirically, previous literature demonstrates the association between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007; Lim et al., 2007; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010). However, there 
are a few studies address the influence of corporate governance on intellectual capital 
disclosures (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Hidalgo et al., 2011; 
Li et al., 2012).  
Although the influence of corporate governance on R&D voluntary disclosure can be 
theoretically justified, the systematic analysis of this effect is limited and 
inconclusive. To date, the literature introduces very little evidence regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance and R&D disclosure in annual reports 
(Nor et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et 
al., 2015). 
2.5.3. Corporate Governance in the UK 
The growing attention to corporate governance in the UK started in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, as a result of the concerns about the corporate financial systems 
following a series of corporate collapses and scandals (FRC, 2010). This led to the 
setting up of the corporate Governance Committee in 1991. The committee was 
chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, and in 1992 issued its report “The Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance”, now known as the Cadbury report. 
The Cadbury committee’s objective was to review those aspects of corporate 
governance relating to financial reporting and accountability. The committee’s report 
was mainly concerned three issues: the structure and responsibilities of boards of 
directors, the role of auditors and the rights and responsibilities of shareholders. The 
main achievement of the committee was the code of best practices, which draws the 
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outlines for high standards of corporate governance. Although, the corporate 
governance code was not mandatory, all listed companies in the UK had to state 
whether they are complying with the code or if not, identify the reasons for non-
compliance; this requirement is known as “comply or explain” (Cadbury, 1992). 
Cadbury has been followed by further moves to improve the corporate governance in 
the UK
2
.  
The Greenbury report (1995) specified the recommendations of director’s 
remuneration. The Hampel committee (1998) reviewed the Cadbury and Greenbury 
reports and introduced its report that led to the publication of the combined code of 
corporate governance in 1998. In 2003, the UK government decided that the FRC 
should take the responsibility for maintaining and publishing the corporate 
governance code. The UK corporate governance code sets out the principles of good 
practice in relation to issues such as board leadership and effectiveness, 
remuneration, accountability and the relations with shareholders. The FRC has 
revised and updated the code regularly in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 and most 
recently in September 2014. 
Throughout all of these improvements, over two decades of dynamic developments 
of corporate governance code’s principals and provisions, the “comply or explain” 
approach, which was first set out in the Cadbury report has been retained as a 
trademark of corporate governance in the UK and a foundation of its flexibility 
(FRC, 2014). 
                                                          
2
  The Greenbury Report, 1995;The Hampel Report, 1998;The combined Code, 1998; The Turnbull 
Report,1999; Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulation, 2002; The Higgs Report, 2003; The 
Smith Report, 2003;The combined code, 2003; The combined code, 2006;The combined code, 
2008; The  UK corporate governance code, 2010; The UK corporate governance code, 2012; The 
UK corporate governance code, 2014.  For more details, Coyle, B. (2009). 
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2.6.  SUMMARY 
The business environment has changed fundamentally. The increasing of 
competition, the rapid advance of technology, innovations and a value creation 
process that mainly relies on intellectual capital has led to significant changes in 
information needs. In response to these new information requirements that go behind 
the traditional financial statements, firms try to differentiate themselves by adapting 
effective corporate governance mechanisms. This leads to reduce agency costs and to 
introduce more voluntary disclosure in order to enhance the firm’s transparency. 
R&D activities have a considerable influence on the future of firms and of the whole 
economy. They are also characterised by unique features and limited mandated 
accounting disclosure. Hence, R&D investment is one of the most confidential 
activities that create information asymmetry. 
Enhancing voluntary disclosure of business information has been recommended by 
many researchers and professional accounting entities with an emphasis on those 
concerning intangible assets and forward-looking information. Consequently, it can 
be argued that, effective voluntary disclosure about intangible assets generally and 
particularly R&D activities, can provide more transparency and better understanding 
of the firm’s activity. 
The current chapter discusses the main concepts related to the present study. It 
mainly identifies the R&D activities, the accounting disclosure and the corporate 
governance. The chapter starts with the definition of R&D activities, followed by 
highlighting the importance of the R&D activities and explaining the unique nature 
of the R&D investments. Next, the importance of narrative disclosure and 
particularly, the importance of R&D disclosure are discussed. 
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This chapter, also presents briefly, the framework of narrative disclosure studies. The 
literature on accounting narratives considers many research interests; the present 
study addresses two related research issues. These are, firstly, the exploring of R&D 
disclosure practices in corporate annual reports and secondly, the determinants of the 
observed practices. After that, the chapter identifies the definition of corporate 
governance and its potential influence on disclosure policy. Finally, it summarises 
the development of corporate governance regulations in the UK.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION  
In the context of accounting disclosure, many theories have been employed to 
explain disclosure practices. These theories include, agency theory, signalling theory, 
stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, political cost theory, capital need theory and 
cost-benefits analysis 
3
. 
However, surveying R&D disclosure literature indicates that agency and signalling 
theories are the central theories that are employed to clarify the managers’ incentives 
to disclose or not disclose R&D information (e.g. Zeghal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 
2010, Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). Moreover, the costs 
and benefits of introducing voluntary R&D-related information in annual reports is 
considered in addressing R&D disclosure decisions (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 
2007; Nekhili et al., 2012; Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et 
al., 2015). 
The theoretical framework employed in the current study is built on the combination 
of the theories and concepts that have been considered in prior studies to explain 
R&D voluntary disclosure practices in firms’ annual reports. This framework 
includes agency theory, signalling theory and the benefits and costs of R&D 
disclosure. 
Based on agency theory and signalling theory, the argument of the current study can 
be put forward as follows: R&D activities have been comprehensively described by 
                                                          
3  Details on disclosure theories are given in Von Alberti-Alhtaybat et al., 2012; Omran and El-Galfy, 
2014. 
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Aboody and Lev (2000) as risky, long-term investments with limited mandated 
disclosure and much confidential related information. These characteristics create an 
information asymmetry problem (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Merkley, 2014). 
In addition, the separation between managers and capital suppliers leads to the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consequently, it can be argued that, 
firms with an effective corporate governance may have the incentive to enhance their 
R&D disclosure. Hence, they can reduce information asymmetry and agency costs by 
signalling their ability in managing R&D activities and their firm’s transparency. 
However, this notion cannot be accepted without considering the disclosure-related 
costs, which may be a significant obstacle to any comprehensive R&D disclosure. 
The proprietary cost is an essential difficulty for discretionary R&D disclosure 
decisions (Jones, 2007; Merkly, 2014) 
The current chapter aims to provide a discussion of the integrated theoretical 
framework adopted by the current study. Section (2) focuses on the cost-benefit 
analysis of the R&D voluntary disclosure. Section (3) summarises the main aspects 
of agency theory and how it can be employed to explain the R&D voluntary 
disclosure. Section (4) summarises the main aspects of signalling theory and how it 
can be employed to explain the R&D voluntary disclosure. Section (5) introduces the 
integrated theoretical framework that has been employed in the current study. 
Section (6) summaries the main issues discussed in the current chapter.  
3.2. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COSTS AND BENEFITS OF R&D DISCLOSURE 
Within the disclosure literature, many researchers address a number of disclosure’s 
benefits. The main possible disclosure advantages, according to theoretical 
foundation and empirical evidence is: (1) reducing information asymmetry (e.g. 
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Verrecchia, 2001; Jones, 2007; Beyer et al., 2010 Farvaque et al. 2011; Von Alberti-
Alhtaybat, 2012; Merkley, 2014), (2) enhancing the firm’s value (e.g. Chan et al., 
1990; Woolridge and Snow, 1990; Hirshey et al., 2001; Dedman et al., 2008; Li et 
al., 2008), (3) reducing the cost of capital (e.g. Botosan 1997; Sengupta, 1998), (4) 
increasing the firm’s liquidity (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healy et al., 
1999), and (5) reducing the agency costs (e.g. Huang and Zhang, 2012; Beattie and 
Smith, 2012). 
Although there are considerable benefits to increasing transparency through more 
informative disclosure, firms do not reveal all their private information because the 
disclosure is not without cost. The disclosure costs may be weighed in the managers’ 
decisions regarding introducing voluntary information. Entwistle (1999) concluded 
from his field study that managers consider many benefits gained from introducing 
appropriately information about their R&D activities, such as enhancing the firm’s 
credibility and ensuring realistic expectations. He also points out that managers tend 
to employ cost/benefit analysis before deciding to introduce R&D-related 
information discretionarily.  
Accordingly, disclosure is considered as a rational trade-off between costs and 
benefits. Hence, managers need to make difficult decisions to determine the amount 
and the type of voluntary disclosure that maximise the disclosure benefits combined 
with affordable costs (Entwistle, 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Prencipe, 2004; 
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010). 
However, it is impractical to measure with accuracy many of the costs and benefits 
of enhancing disclosure; these would include the cost of disclosing harmful 
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competitive information, or the benefit of introducing a specific useful piece of 
information (AICPA, 1994).  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the trade-off between the benefits and costs of disclosure. It 
shows three main types of benefits that could promote managers to introduce 
voluntary R&D disclosure. These benefits are information asymmetry reduction, 
agency costs reduction, and balancing the limited mandated R&D disclosure 
requirements.  
The figure also demonstrates three main types of disclosure costs that could be 
obstacles to introduce more R&D disclosure. These costs are the cost of collecting 
information, litigation costs, and proprietary costs. To make a decision regarding the 
R&D disclosure that introduced discretionarily by firms, the managers need to 
evaluate both costs and benefits of the R&D disclosure, and decide the level and the 
kind of information that will be appropriate. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  
The Trade-off between Benefits and Costs of R&D Disclosure 
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The following paragraphs summarise the main potential benefits and costs of R&D 
disclosure, which may affect positively or negatively the management’s incentives to 
introduce discretionary information about their R&D activities. 
3.2.1. Disclosure Benefits 
The main objective of traditional financial reporting is to introduce sufficient 
information to meet accounting standards. However, many firms exceed the 
mandatory disclosure requirements and provide more information within their 
corporate annual reports. The reason for such behaviour is the expected benefits that 
may be achieved by firms from voluntary disclosure (Dedman et al., 2008). The main 
benefits of disclosing R&D-related information can be classified into three groups: 
(1) information asymmetry reduction, which may enhance the firm value, reduces 
cost of capital, and improves liquidity, (2) agency cost reduction, and (3) balancing 
the limited mandated R&D disclosure requirements. 
3.2.1.1.  Information Asymmetry Reduction  
The information asymmetry existence explained by Stiglitz (2002: 469) as “different 
people know different things.”. Connelly et al., (2011) believes that not all information 
is freely available and there is confidential information that is only accessible to a 
subset of the public: therefore, information asymmetry arises between people who hold 
this information and others who could improve their decisions if they hold it too.  
Verrecchia, (2001) emphasises the importance of information asymmetry reduction 
and argues that it could be a potential foundation upon which to build a 
comprehensive disclosure theory. Verrecchia (2001:97) states, “I recommended 
information asymmetry reduction as a vehicle to integrate the efficiency of the 
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disclosure choice, the incentives to disclose and the endogeneity of the capital 
market process as it involves the interactions among individual and diverse 
investors.”. Farvaque et al., (2011:11) support this point of view and state:  
“Enhancing the information received by investors in the financial market allows 
them to improve the quality of their expectations. The more transparent a firm is, 
the more actors in the market get information that is specific to the share. 
Variations of the price of the share, thus depend less on the general market trend, 
and more on reasons related to the firms. Thus, the systematic risk decreases, and 
the cost of capital is lower.”. 
The information asymmetry between the firm and the capital market and between 
informed and uninformed investors can be reduced by increasing voluntary 
disclosure and firm’s transparency (Beyer et al., 2010; Von Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2012). 
For that reason, managers could use voluntary disclosure as a mechanism to reduce 
the information asymmetries between themselves and outsiders (Verrecchia, 1990, 
Jones, 2007). Consistent with this argument, Merkley, (2014) confirms a negative 
relationship between R&D narrative disclosure and information asymmetry, 
suggesting that R&D disclosure can be used as an effective tool to decrease 
information asymmetry. 
To sum up, it seems that the effective disclosure could reduce information 
asymmetry. Hence, this reduction could have positive effects on firm value and share 
liquidity. Moreover, it may decrease the cost of capital. 
The following paragraphs discuss the interaction between information asymmetry 
reduction and each of: firm value, cost of capital, and liquidity, in addition to their 
association with R&D voluntary disclosure.  
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3.2.1.1.1. Value Creation   
It is argued that, managers have the incentives to introduce information concerning 
intellectual capital in order to enhance the firm’s value: this is achieved by helping 
investors to build a better assessment of the firm’s financial position, when they 
make their decisions (Li et al., 2008). In a survey conducted by Petty et al., (2008) 
and directed to a group of financial professionals in Hong Kong, most respondents 
would like firms to introduce more information on their intellectual capital activities. 
They believe that more transparency would be rewarded with an increase in the 
firm’s stock price. This conclusion has been supported by the empirical researches 
that address the influence of R&D voluntary disclosure on the market value (e.g. 
Chan et al., 1990; Woolridge & Snow, 1990; Dedman et al., 2008; Hirshey et al., 
2001). Regarding R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports, the findings of the 
empirical research are mixed. While Nekhili et al., (2012) find a positive association 
between firm value and R&D disclosure, the result of Nekhili et al., (2015) does not 
support this relationship. 
This indicates that disclosing more information concerning R&D activities may have 
value-relevance for investors. Therefore, managers may have incentives to be more 
transparent and introduce such private information about R&D activities to reduce 
information asymmetry and gain market rewards for better disclosure. 
3.2.1.1.2. Cost of Capital 
Verrecchia, (2001) explains the relation between information asymmetry and the cost 
of capital, and argues that information asymmetry represents a component of the cost 
of capital. This comes out because the varying degrees of information among 
investors make firm equity more costly as a result of the problem of adverse 
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selection. Hence the firms introduce a discount as a tool to moderate this problem. A 
similar argument is made by Healy and Palepu, (2001) who suggests that the 
information asymmetry problem in capital markets increases the cost of capital and 
provides managers with motivation to reduce it by increasing voluntary disclosure.  
Literature provides some evidence consistent with this argument. Botosan (1997) 
examines the relationship between voluntary disclosures in annual reports and the 
firm’s cost of equity capital, and finds a negative association between disclosure 
level and cost of equity capital for firms with a low analyst following. 
Sengupta (1998) extended the examination of the consequences of voluntary 
disclosure by investigating the association between disclosure quality and the cost of 
debt capital. She finds that firms with a higher disclosure score enjoy a lower interest 
cost. Recently, Mangena et al., (2014) have confirmed the negative association 
between the cost of equity capital and the level of intellectual capital disclosure. 
These findings provide evidence of the importance of corporate disclosure as an 
effective tool used by managers to reduce the cost of capital.  
In the R&D context, although La Rose and Liberator (2014) hypothesised that firms 
with higher levels of R&D disclosure can benefit from a lower cost of equity; their 
empirical evidence does not support their hypothesis. The nature of R&D 
information that raises the fear of investors and makes them ask for higher rates of 
return is considered by the researchers as a potential explanation of the unexpected 
positive relationship between the R&D disclosure and the cost of equity. 
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3.2.1.1.3. Liquidity  
Many researchers highlighted the influence of voluntary disclosure on capital market 
liquidity and on the liquidity of the firm’s securities. Elliot & Jacobson (1994) argue 
that disclosure enhances the liquidity of the capital market by reducing information 
asymmetry and uncertainty between buyers and sellers. It is also suggested that, 
reducing information asymmetry through greater disclosure will enhance the 
liquidity of the firm’s securities and attract more investment (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). 
Empirically, Healy et al., (1999) find that firms with increased improvements in 
disclosure quality are accompanied by an increase in liquidity of the firms’ stock. 
Regarding R&D disclosure, Boone and Raman (2001) find  that R&D-intensive 
firms have less market liquidity. Consequently, they argue that, the reason behind 
this result may be the limited mandated information about R&D activities, and 
suggest introducing more R&D disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and 
enhance market liquidity.  
3.2.1.2. Agency Costs Reduction  
The agency problem occurs because the development and enforcement of the 
contract between the principals and agent are not without cost (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). The agency costs are defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as the sum of : 
(1) monitoring costs, incurred by principals to limit the unfavourable activities of the 
agent; (2) bonding costs, incurred by the agent to guarantee that  the agent does not 
act in ways that go against the interests of principals; (3) residual loss (with the 
optimal monitoring activities by the principals  and the optimal bonding activities by 
the agent) is any reduction in the principals’ welfare resulting from the difference 
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between the actual agent’s choices, and those decisions which would  maximize the 
principals’ welfare.  
The control role of disclosure policy is highlighted by many researchers. For 
example, Huang and Zhang (2012) argue that higher disclosure levels increase the 
external monitoring function and enhance the discipline forced by the market; this in 
turn limits the managers’ ability to achieve private benefits against the interest of 
outside shareholders. Consequently, the shareholders’ monitoring can be facilitated 
by voluntary disclosure; this leads to the subsequent reduction of agency costs 
(Beattie and Smith, 2012).  
3.2.1.3. Balancing the Limited Mandated R&D Disclosure Requirements  
It is argued that, firms with relatively fewer informative mandated disclosure 
requirements have stronger incentives to introduce more discretionary information 
(Tasker, 1998; Dedman et al., 2008). Moreover, a survey conducted by Graham et 
al., (2005) to explore the economic implications of corporate reporting, finds that 
nearly three-quarters of the interviewed CFOs think that voluntary disclosure is an 
important tool to fill the gaps in the effectiveness of mandatory reporting. 
The valuation of R&D investments under the current accounting standards, and the 
limited mandated disclosure regarding R&D activities is unable to introduce 
sufficient information for effective assessment of the consequences of R&D 
investments (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Lev, 1999). In the line with this argument, 
Merkley, (2014) argues that the unique characteristics of R&D activities, and the 
limited R&D disclosure mandated by accounting standards give rise to information 
problem. Therefore, he concluded that managers may have an incentive to introduce 
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more R&D disclosure to help investors in evaluating the firm’s R&D investments, 
which improve the firm’s transparency. 
Many empirical studies support this point of view. Gelb (2002) finds that firms with 
higher levels of R&D expenditure are more likely to enhance their voluntary 
disclosure as a tool to demonstrate their financial performance. Jones (2007) also 
finds that managers disclose substantial information voluntarily about their R&D 
activities in annual reports and conference calls. Moreover, she proves that firms 
with a lower book-to-market value ratio disclose more R&D-related information, 
suggesting that firms with fewer informative financial statements tend to disclose 
more information about their R&D activities.  
Consequently, it can be concluded that managers may consider the voluntary 
disclosure of R&D activities as a way to balance the poor mandated requirements. 
3.2.2. Disclosure Costs  
Managers do not select the full disclosure option because there are costs involved in 
this choice, which may work as forces against it. The costs of R&D disclosure can be 
mainly classified into three types: first, the cost of collecting information, second: the 
litigation costs, and third the cost of losing the competitive position if competitors 
can benefit from proprietary information. 
3.2.2.1 The Cost of Collecting and Presenting Information 
As stated by Elliott and Jacobson (1994: 83) “disclosure costs include the cost of 
gathering, processing, auditing (if the information is audited) and disseminating the 
information.”. The costs of preparing the R&D information may have a significant 
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impact on the amount and kind of R&D disclosure, since producing this information 
needs scientific expertise in addition to financial knowledge. 
3.2.2.2  Litigation Costs  
Firms may face litigation claims when they introduce insufficient, or misleading 
disclosures (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). Accordingly, it can be argued that the 
litigation costs may be one of the reasons for withholding information by managers. 
On the other hand, Skinner, (1994) argues that managers may disclose voluntary 
information, especially bad news such as negative earnings to avoid legal action from 
stockholders. A survey conducted by Graham et al., 2005 provides moderately 
supportive result regarding the negative effect of litigation on the managers’ 
incentive to introduce forward looking information.  
3.2.2.3 Proprietary Costs   
The proprietary costs are considered as one of the most important obstacles to the 
introduction of full disclosure by managers. These costs are derived from introducing 
private information, which may be used by competitors in a way that affect the firm 
negatively (Prencipe, 2004). 
The proprietary cost as an important consideration on discretionary disclosure 
decisions was modelled by Verrecchia (1983) who provides evidence that when the 
proprietary costs exist, and information is not provided to the market; the traders 
cannot make sure whether the managers retained this information because it signals 
bad news, or because it was just not good enough to warrant the related proprietary 
costs. He finds that the reaction of the market of retaining greater proprietary costs of 
information is less negative than when the proprietary costs are limited.  
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Elliott and Jacobson, (1994) argue that the level of competitive disadvantage from 
informative disclosure can be determined by considering four factors: the timing of 
disclosure, the type of information, the level of details and the disclosure’s audience. 
Actually, it is difficult to be certain about the effect of disclosing particular 
confidential information on competitiveness (FASB, 2001, b). For example, 
disclosing information about new and planned products could guide competitors to 
develop the same product or to improve an existing one to win the race to the market 
(Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). On the other hand, disclosing product development 
plans may give the product a head start and reveal the firm’s progress to outsiders 
(FASB, 2001, b). However, when stealing a firm’s ideas by competitors is relatively 
difficult, the expected harm of disclosing private information will be low (Jones, 
2007). 
Therefore, the managers must evaluate the potential disadvantage from the use of 
confidential information to decide which specific disclosure would be unsafe to 
reveal to competitors and, which would not (FASB, 2001, b). 
Consequently, the level of disclosure and the kind of information introduced by the 
firm discretionarily depends on the trade-off between the negative effect of revealing 
proprietary information, and the disclosure benefits achieved from introducing such 
private information.  
Some empirical evidence on the impact of the proprietary costs on the level of 
disclosure is documented. Depoers (2000) documents that firms with low proprietary 
costs (measured by gross fixed assets on gross total assets) disclose significantly 
more information than firms with fewer fixed assets. Moreover, Prencipe (2004) 
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confirms that proprietary costs tend to limit the management’s incentive to introduce 
voluntary segment information. The major challenge in understanding the influence 
of proprietary costs on the disclosure decision is the measuring and quantifying of it 
(Beyer et al., 2010). 
In the R&D context, the assessment of proprietary costs is likely to be more sensitive 
because of the highly confidential nature of R&D activities (Zhao, 2002). Jones 
(2007) confirms a negative relationship between abnormal stock returns in the 
previous year and the level of R&D disclosure, suggesting that managers may prefer 
not to introduce detailed information about firm’s R&D activities when the 
proprietary costs of this information are high. 
3.3.  AGENCY THEORY  
This section discusses the main concepts of the agency theory and the rationale 
behind using it to explain managers’ incentives to disclose R&D information 
discretionarily.  
3. 3.1. Background to Agency Theory Development  
Agency theory is considered a broadened of the risk sharing problem that occurs 
when collaborating parties do not have the same attitude toward risk; the theory was 
developed in literature during the 1960s and early 1970s, by including the agency 
problem that arises when cooperating parties have been conflicting goals and 
interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The conflict of interests between cooperating parties are well documented in 
literature. For example, the relationship between ownership and control of a firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), between bondholders and stockholders (Smith and 
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Warner, 1979), and the separation of decision management, residual risk bearing and 
decision control (Fama and Jenesn, 1983). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976:5) define the agency relationship as “a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principle(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent.”. 
On other words, agency theory is concerned with the agency relationship in which 
one party (the principal) delegates some duties to the other party (the agent). The 
separation between the principal and the agent could create a conflict between their 
interests. This conflict creates agency costs that managers have an incentive to 
reduce. 
Agency theory is commonly employed in accounting research to explain the 
managers’ incentives for voluntary disclosure (e.g. Lim et al., 2007; Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 208; Von Alberti-Alhtaybat et al., 2012).  
According to agency theory, the ownership of a firm (principals) delegates the task 
of managing the firm to the agent (managers). The agency relationship that results 
from the separation between the stockholders, and management may create some 
kind of interest conflict between the agent and the principals. This conflict leads to 
the agency problem when managers tend to make decisions that achieve their 
interests, although these decisions could be harmful to the interests of principals. 
Consequently, principals will need to monitor whether their agent performs 
according to the contractual agreements, and to control its behaviour by bridging the 
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information asymmetry. Therefore, the performance of managers will be tracked and 
evaluated
4
. 
Disclosure can be considered as one of the common devices to alleviate agency 
problems (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Furthermore, it is used by management to enhance 
the firm’s transparency and reduce the agency costs (Morris, 1987; Von Alberti-
Alhtaybat et al., 2012).  Figure 3.2 illustrates the main idea of the agency theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2   
Agency Theory (Principal-Agent Relationship) 
 
3. 3.2. Agency Theory and R&D Disclosure  
Munari et al., (2010) argue that the management decisions of R&D investments are 
mainly indicative of the disagreement between principals’ and agents’ interests; this 
happens because R&D investments have unique characteristics as a type of long-term 
investments with a high level of uncertainty. 
Moreover, it is argued that for firms engaged in risky innovation, the monitoring by 
principals will be more difficult because there is a lack of informative signals about 
the performance of the agent until the outcome of innovation is noticed as financial 
data (Holthausen, et al., 1995). 
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   Agency theory see, Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Shapiro, 
2005; Cotter et al., 2011 ; Omran and El-Galfy, 2014. 
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From the previous discussion, it can be concluded that, managers may have 
incentives to introduce more information concerning the R&D activities to reduce the 
agency problems. 
3.4.  SIGNALLING THEORY 
This section discusses the main concepts and relations that underpin signalling theory 
and the rationale behind using it to explain managers’ incentives to disclose R&D 
information discretionary. 
3.4.1. Background to  Signalling Theory Development 
Signalling theory was developed in the labour market by Spence (1973) who used 
education as a signal of the workers’ skills, and suggested that the potential 
employers do not have enough information about the workers, so, the workers try to 
signal their ability by gaining education (Verrecchia, 1983; Connelly et al., 2011).  
Although the signalling theory was developed to explain the information asymmetry 
in the labour market, it has been applied to explain the information being introduced 
voluntarily by managers (e.g. Singh and Mitchell Van der Zahn, 2008; Elshandidy et 
al., 2013). In the case of applying signalling theory to explain corporate reporting, 
Campbell et al., (2001) points out that the existence of information asymmetry 
problem will motivate the firms to signal their quality to the market when they 
believe that they are better than other firms. Therefore, they can attract investment 
and enhance the firm’s reputation. 
Although firms with good news have been understandable motivations to signal their 
quality to others, firms with bad news also have incentives to reveal this news.  
Managers choose to disclose bad news to avoid the reputational costs that may be 
 -61- 
incurred if they do not expose these bad news in a timely manner (Skinner, 1994). 
Figure 3.3 illustrate the main idea of the signalling theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 
  Signalling Theory   
According to signalling theory, the senders are insiders (managers) who hold private 
information about the company, and the receivers are outsiders (stakeholders) who 
already have some information about the company, but would like to have this 
confidential information. They think that this information may help them to make 
better decisions.  Hence, information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders 
arises and this problem may have a negative influence on the firm’s transparency.  
Consequently, managers would have incentives to enhance transparency and prove 
their ability in managing the different activities of the firm. Voluntary disclosure is 
one of the most common means used by managers to signal the quality of the firm 
and its management. Stakeholders who receive these signals and interpret them as 
expected by managers may reward the managers with favourable consequences, such 
as an increase in the firm’s market value or a reduction in the cost of capital5. 
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3.4.2. Signalling Theory and R&D Voluntary Disclosure 
As stated by Omran & El-galfy (2014:261)“Signalling theory is useful for describing 
behaviour when two parties (individuals or organizations) have access to different 
information.”. 
Therefore, signalling theory is useful for explaining the management attitude when 
the insiders’ information about the firm is superior to the outsiders; this information 
gap between managers and stakeholders creates the information asymmetry problem 
which is a crucial condition of signalling theory (Omran and El-galfy, 2014). 
Aboody and Lev (2000) suggest  that all kinds of firm’s investments are associated 
with information asymmetries. This is because the managers can track the value of 
each investment and its productivity continually, while outsiders can only have highly 
aggregated information at specific points of time. On the other hand, they argue that 
the information asymmetry created by R&D activities is larger than that created by any 
other types of tangible and financial investments as a result of the unique features of 
R&D investments that make it difficult for outsiders to assess its value and 
productivity.  Consequently, Aboody and Lev (2000) conclude that R&D activities can 
be identified as a major contributor to information asymmetry. 
Empirically, many researchers introduce evidence consistent with the existence of 
considerable information asymmetry associated with R&D investments. For 
example, Tasker (1998) reports that R&D-intensive firms carry out more conference 
calls than firms with low R&D activities. In addition, Barth et al., (2001) find that the 
number of analysts following a firm as a proxy of analyst coverage is significantly 
greater for firms with larger R&D spending. These finding reflect the relatively 
importance of R&D activities related information and the significant demand for 
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such information. Moreover, Aboody and Lev (2000) provide evidence that the 
insider gains in R&D-intensive firms are significantly larger than insider gains in 
firms with no R&D activities. This suggests that R&D activities are associated with a 
significant level of information asymmetry.  
Trueman (1986) argues that managers use the voluntary disclosure of earning’s 
forecasts to signal their ability to predict the future. A survey conducted by  Graham 
et al., (2005) to explore the executives’ attitude toward the drivers of voluntary 
disclosure concluded that, the management talent signalling is a statistically 
significant motivation for voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, CFOs use voluntary 
disclosure as a tool to enhance a reputation for transparent reporting. 
The previous discussion emphasizes that managers of the firms with a high level of  
R&D activities may have an incentive to signal the positive prospects to the market, 
by using voluntary disclosure as a device to reduce information asymmetry 
concerning the performance of R&D projects (Zeghal et al., 2007). 
In the line with the previous argument, Jones (2007) points out that managers of 
firms with promising R&D projects may tend to provide more detailed information 
about their R&D activities to differentiate themselves from firms with fewer 
expectation’s success from their R&D projects. Percy (2000) confirms that the R&D 
intensity, as a proxy of information asymmetry, has a considerable influence on 
R&D voluntary disclosure by introducing evidence that high research-intensive firms 
introduce more voluntary disclosure about their R&D activities than low research-
intensive firms. 
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Consequently, managers who know more than others about their abilities, experience 
and sincerity, could signal their quality and capability in managing the firm’s R&D 
investments and also their credibility through voluntary disclosure. Therefore, they 
distinguish themselves from other managers whose performance may be considered less 
effective. 
3.5. THE INTEGRATED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Morris, (1987) demonstrates that agency and signalling theories are not equivalent 
because they do not share the same necessary conditions. He argues that they are 
actually consistent theories and proved his argument by comparing the essential 
conditions of the two theories. He concludes that there is a considerable overlap 
between agency and signalling theories such as the relational behaviour of all market 
participants. Moreover, the monitoring costs, and the separation of capital suppliers 
and managerial control as necessary conditions of agency theory imply information 
asymmetry (the necessary condition of the signalling theory). In addition, agency 
theory does not identify the concept of “quality”, but its meaning can be applied in 
the market context and may be defined in terms of variables such as the expected 
firm’s value and its risk. This is because the signal is a general phenomenon and can 
be valid in any market with information asymmetry. 
Finally (Morris, 1987: 52) states “Given the consistency of signalling and agency 
theories, it is conceivably possible to combine them to yield predictions about 
accounting choices not obtainable from either theory along.”. 
Morris, (1987) argues that, given the consistency of the agency and signalling 
theories, the predictions of accounting choices can be improved by combining the 
predictions from each theory. Furthermore, this combination of the two theories 
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could also contain new concepts not included in either agency or signalling theories. 
Empirically, many researchers employed agency theory and signalling theory 
together to explain voluntary disclosure practices (e.g. Elzahar and Hussainy, 2012; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013). 
In terms of R&D context, reviewing the literature regarding R&D voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports indicates that, some researchers have formulated their 
hypotheses and explaining their findings drawing on agency theory (e.g. Nor et al., 
2010; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013), and other studies have employed both 
agency and signalling theories (e.g. Zeghal et al., 2007; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
Alternatively, some studies have used a theoretical foundation drawing on cost-
benefit analysis (e.g. Entwistle, 1999), or concentrating on proprietary costs and 
information asymmetry (e.g. Jones, 2007; Nekhili et al., 2012; Merkley, 2014; La 
Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2015).  
The theoretical framework employed in the current study incorporates the main 
theories and concepts used in prior studies to explain the R&D voluntary disclosure 
practices in annual reports. It is also used to consider the factors which may influence 
the management decision to introduce discretionary information regarding the firm’s 
R&D activities. Therefore, the current study employs an integrated theoretical 
framework based on agency and signalling theories, considering the cost-benefit 
analysis, and placing further attention on proprietary costs and information 
asymmetry.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the integrated theoretical framework employed in the current 
study. The figure shows that, the agency relationship between managers and 
stockholders (the core of the agency theory) creates agency costs. In addition, the 
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information gap between managers and stockholders (the core of the signalling 
theory) produces information asymmetry problems. Mitigating the agency costs and 
reducing the information asymmetry could encourage managers to introduce more 
R&D voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, the negative effect of revealing 
proprietary information could be a significant obstacle to any comprehensive R&D 
disclosure. Consequently, the managers need to make a rational disclosure decision 
based on the expected effects of the previous factors. 
The corporate governance as a control tool to monitor the managerial decisions, and the 
firm characteristics as important determinants of disclosure, that well documented in 
literature, could also have a significant influence on the level of R&D disclosure. 
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3.6. SUMMARY 
Managers could be willing to introduce more voluntary disclosure about their R&D 
activities to gain some expected benefits such as reducing information asymmetry 
and decreasing the agency costs. However, they need to consider whether disclosures 
about their private R&D information would cause competitive disadvantage. 
Given the significant needs to monitor risky, confidential and unrecognised R&D 
activities, the agency costs and information asymmetry may be considered as 
important issues in studying R&D voluntary disclosure. Consequently, the managers’ 
incentives to disclose or not disclose information about R&D activities can be 
realized by employing agency and signalling theories and by considering the cost-
benefit analysis of the disclosure decision.  
The current chapter discusses the main potential disclosure benefits that are expected to 
increase the managers’ incentives to introduce more information about their R&D 
activities. These benefits are: (1) reducing information asymmetry, (2) reducing agency 
costs, and (3) balancing the limited mandated disclosure requirements. The chapter also 
discusses the main possible disclosure costs that may reduce the managers’ incentives to 
disclose voluntary R&D information. These costs are: (1) collecting and processing 
information costs, (2) litigation costs, and (3) proprietary costs. 
Next, the key concepts and relations of both agency and signalling theories were 
identified to highlight the consistency between them. This is followed by a 
justification of using the agency and signalling theories as a theoretical base to 
explain the R&D voluntary disclosure.  Finally, the integrated theoretical framework 
is drawn based on the combination between agency and signalling theories, and with 
consideration of the costs and benefits of R&D disclosure.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
  
4.1. INTRODUCTION    
Corporate disclosure is considered an important research area that has attracted many 
researchers in accounting since 1970s (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). A considerable 
amount of literature has been primary concerned with the impact of certain corporate 
characteristics on corporate disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Mak, 1991; Gray et al., 2001; 
Khlif and Souissi, 2010). More recent a large and growing body of literature has 
investigated the association between corporate governance and corporate disclosure 
in annual reports (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Lim et al., 
2007; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; Samaha et al., 2015).  
However, little attention has been paid to R&D narrative disclosure in annual reports. 
Recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in this area of research (e.g. 
Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; 
Nekhili et al., 2015). The current study is one of a few studies that seeks to improve 
the understanding of R&D disclosure introduced discretionarily  in firms’ annual 
reports. 
The main objective of the current study is to explore R&D voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports, and to investigate the influence of corporate governance on R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the UK firms.  
With a very limited number of studies investigating R&D voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports, the aim of this chapter is to review some existing studies that 
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addressed the impact of corporate governance on disclosure as a whole, and 
specifically on intellectual capital disclosure. This is because R&D activities are a 
specific component of intellectual capital. Therefore, this review can help in 
identifying  the determinants which may explain the variations in R&D voluntary 
disclosure among firms. Moreover, the chapter briefly highlights the main studies 
that addressed the R&D activities in general. It also reviews in detail the studies that 
investigated R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports, which is the core of the 
current study. Consequently,  the gap  in the literature can be identified, and the role 
of  the current study to fill this gap can be determined. Figure 4.1 shows the structure 
of  corporate disclosure in annual reports and R&D context studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1  
The Structure of Corporate Disclosure in Annual Reports and R&D Context Studies 
The following three streams of studies are relevant to the current study:  
 Prior studies examining the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate disclosure.   
 Prior studies examining the relationship between corporate governance and 
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The structure of the present chapter is as follows. Section (2) reviews the literature 
regarding corporate disclosure in annual reports; this includes two main research 
issues: the association between corporate governance and overall corporate 
disclosure, and the association between corporate governance and intellectual capital 
disclosure. Section (3) surveys briefly the researchers’ efforts in many aspects related 
to R&D activities. This is followed by a review of the few studies investigating R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Section (4) highlights the gaps in the existing 
literature, and explains how the present study will fill this gap, and section (5) 
reviews the main approaches used to measure the disclosure in annual reports. 
Section (6) explains hypotheses development, finally, section (7) presents a summary 
of the main issues discussed in this chapter. 
4.2. LITERATURE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STUDIES  
Corporate disclosure in annual reports has been examined in a large number of prior 
studies over the years. Most earlier studies mainly investigated the extent of 
disclosure and the influence of some firm characteristics on the observed disclosure 
practices, which may explain the variations in the level of disclosure (e.g. Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Mak, 1991; Gray et al., 
2001; Watson et al., 2002). 
More recently, an increasing number of empirical studies have examined the 
association between corporate disclosure in annual reports and corporate governance 
(e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Garcia-Meca 
and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; Samaha et al., 2015). For the purpose of the current 
study, prior studies examining the corporate disclosure can be classified into two 
groups.  First, the studies assessing the impact of corporate governance on the overall 
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corporate disclosure. Second, the studies assessing the impact of corporate 
governance on intellectual capital disclosure, since R&D activities are one of the 
main components of intellectual capital. The following paragraphs introduce some of 
the important studies that examined the association between corporate governance 
and firstly, corporate disclosure and secondly, intellectual capital disclosure.  
4.2.1. Prior Studies Assessing the Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure 
and Corporate Governance 
The next paragraphs present some of the important studies that assess the 
relationship between corporate disclosure in annual reports and corporate 
governance. 
Eng and Mak (2003) investigate the association between corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure for a sample of 158 firms listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES) at the end of 1995. They examine the influence of ownership 
structure and board composition on a firm’s disclosure policy.  Ownership structure 
is measured by managerial ownership, blockholder ownership and government 
ownership. Board composition is measured by the proportion of outside directors. 
The study uses the agency theory to formulate its hypotheses. It uses a disclosure 
index to measure the voluntary disclosure of strategic, non-financial and financial 
information. 
The effect of some firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure is considered. These 
characteristics included firm size, debt, growth opportunities, profitability, audit firm 
size, number of analysts following the firm, stock price performance and industry 
type. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to examine the research 
hypotheses. 
 -73- 
The results indicate that lower managerial ownership and higher government 
ownership are associated positively with voluntary disclosure. However, there is no 
association between blockholder ownership and disclosure. Regarding the board 
composition, the findings reveal that an increase of independent directors reduces 
voluntary disclosure.  Finally, firm size and lower debt are positively associated with 
disclosing more information. 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007), investigate the effect of ownership structure and board 
composition on voluntary disclosure practices of listed companies in China. Five 
types of ownership structure are examined: blockholder ownership, managerial 
ownership, state ownership, legal person ownership and foreign shares ownership. In 
addition, the study considers two variables related to board composition, which are 
independent directors and CEO duality. The study assumed the expected 
relationships between voluntary disclosure and explanatory variables based on 
agency theory. The control variables are firm size, leverage, intangible assets ratio 
and auditor reputation. 
The sample, of 559 firm observations, come from financial and non-financial 
companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2002. The unweighted 
disclosure index is developed based primarily on Botosan (1997) and modified to 
adapt with the disclosure environment in China.  
The linear multiple regression analysis is employed to test the research hypotheses. 
The findings indicate that both blockholder ownership and foreign ownership have a 
positive impact on voluntary disclosure. The other three types of ownership structure 
have no influence on voluntary disclosure. In terms of board composition, there is a 
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positive association between voluntary disclosure and the proportion of independent 
directors, conversely, disclosure is negatively associated with CEO duality. 
Based on agency theory, Lim et al., (2007) address the impact of board composition 
on voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Using a sample of 181 Australian listed 
companies in 2001, a two-stage least square regression (2SLS) model is employed to 
examine the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure. A self 
constructed disclosure index based on the index used by Meek et al., (1995) and 
modified for the Australian disclosure environment is used to measure the total 
disclosure in annual reports and its subsets. The developed index contains 67 items to 
consider the total voluntary disclosure in annual reports and its different types such 
as forward looking, strategic, historical, financial and non-financial information. 
The study controls for the voluntary disclosure determinants which have been 
documented in the previous studies, including firm size, leverage, return on assets, 
type of auditing, industry and market to book value ratio. The findings provide 
empirical evidence of the positive relationship between board composition and total 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Moreover, the results indicate that 
independent board introduces more strategic and forward looking information. 
However, the board composition has no impact on financial and non-financial 
voluntary disclosure.  
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010) conducted a meta-analysis to explore the 
influence of board independence and ownership concentration on voluntary disclosure. 
Using a sample of  27 empirical studies from all over the world, they aim to achieve a 
quantitative generalization for the different results obtained in this research field.  
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The results reveal that there is a positive association between the board independence 
and voluntary disclosure, and this positive relationship occurs in those countries that 
protect investor rights. Thus, the reason behind the mixed results in different 
countries, when applying the similar measures for corporate governance variables, 
may be the differences between the legal and institutional environments of countries. 
The findings also document a negative association between ownership concentration 
and voluntary disclosure. 
A recent meta-analysis conducted by Samaha et al., (2015) complements the study of 
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010).  It investigates the influence of board and 
Audit committee characteristics on voluntary disclosure. Using 64 empirical studies 
between 1997 and 2013 that examine the total disclosure score, intellectual capital 
disclosure, and social and environmental disclosure. 
The results show that there is a positive association between voluntary disclosure and 
board size, board composition, and audit committee. However, the results indicate 
that role duality has a negative impact on voluntary disclosure. Moreover, the 
findings reveal that the country location moderates the association between voluntary 
disclosure and each of board size, board composition, and role duality.  Additionally, 
investor protection, the type of disclosure and the measure of disclosure affect the 
association between role duality and voluntary disclosure. 
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Table 4.1   
Empirical Studies on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Corporate Disclosure  
Author 
date & 
Country 
Research 
Issue 
Sample size 
and Time of 
Observation, 
Variables 
Findings 
Dependent Independent Control 
Eng and 
Mak 
(2003) 
Singapore 
Corporate 
governance 
& voluntary 
disclosure. 
158 
 
1995 
Disclosure 
score. 
Managerial ownership; 
blockholder ownership; 
government ownership; 
proportion of outside 
directors. 
Firm size; debt; growth 
opportunities; 
profitability; audit firm 
size; number of analysts 
following the firm; stock 
price performance and 
industry type. 
The results reveal that the 
lower managerial ownership 
and significant government 
ownership are associated 
positively with voluntary 
disclosure. The increase of 
independent directors 
reduces voluntary disclosure. 
Huafang 
and 
Jianguo 
(2007) 
China 
The effect of 
ownership 
structure & 
board 
composition 
on voluntary 
disclosure 
practice. 
559 
 
2002 
Disclosure 
score. 
Blockholder 
ownership; 
managerial ownership; 
state ownership; 
legal person ownership; 
foreign shares; 
ownership; independent 
directors; and CEO 
duality. 
Firm size; leverage; 
intangible assets ratio; 
and auditor reputation. 
The findings reveal that both 
blockholder ownership and 
foreign ownership have a 
positive impact on voluntary 
disclosure. There is a positive 
association between voluntary 
disclosure and the proportion 
of independent directors, 
conversely, the disclosure 
negatively associated with 
CEO duality. 
Lim et 
al., 
(2007) 
Australia 
 
The 
association 
between 
board 
composition 
and 
voluntary 
disclosure. 
181 
 
2001 
Disclosure 
score. 
Board composition. Firm size; leverage;  
return on assets; type of 
auditor; industry and 
market to book value 
ratio. 
The findings provide an 
empirical evidence of the 
positive relation between 
board composition and total 
voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. Moreover, the results 
indicated that the independent 
board introduces more 
strategic and forward looking 
information. 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Author 
date  & 
Country 
Research  
Issue 
Sample size 
 and time of  
observation, 
Variables 
Findings Dependent Independent Control 
Garcia-
Meca and 
Sanchez- 
Ballesta  
(2010) 
Meta 
Analysis 
The influence  
of  board 
independence 
and ownership 
concentration on 
voluntary 
disclosure. 
27 empirical  
studies. 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Board 
independence; 
ownership 
concentration. 
 The results reveal that there is a 
positive association between the board 
independence and voluntary 
disclosure. 
The findings also document a negative 
association between ownership 
concentration and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Samaha et 
al., 2015 
Meta 
Analysis 
 
 
The influence of 
board and Audit 
committee 
characteristics 
on voluntary 
disclosure. 
64  empirical 
 studies 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
board and audit 
committee 
characteristics. 
 The results reveal that there is a 
positive association between voluntary 
disclosure and each of board size, 
board composition, and audit 
committee.  However, the results 
indicate that the role duality has a 
negative impact on voluntary 
disclosure. 
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Based on the above review of studies investigating corporate disclosure in annual 
reports, it can be concluded that generally, corporate governance has an influence on 
corporate disclosure in annual reports. However, the results are mixed and there is no 
agreement regarding the nature and significance of this influence for each corporate 
governance mechanism.  
Although the findings of these studies do not necessarily extend to R&D disclosure 
practices, they are still a useful guide for the hypotheses development and also when 
considering the suitable research methods.  
4.2.2. Prior Studies Assessing the Relationship Between Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure and Corporate Governance 
The aim of the current study is to identify the impact of the corporate governance on 
R&D voluntary disclosure. R&D activity is a specific component of intellectual 
capital. Consequently, the studies that investigated the disclosure of intellectual 
capital can provide a helpful indicator for the elements which may affect R&D 
voluntary disclosure. Accordingly, the next paragraphs present some of the important 
studies that assess the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure in annual 
reports and corporate governance. 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), explore the impact of corporate governance on 
intellectual capital disclosure and base their argument on agency theory. The study 
covers four characteristics of the board of directors: board size, CEO duality, board 
composition and board structure. It controls for firm size, leverage, profitability, 
ownership structure, growth opportunities, listing status and legal enforcement. The 
study uses a sample of listed European biotechnology companies for the years 2002, 
2003 and 2004. The sample includes 54 companies belong to ten different countries. 
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Using the content analysis of 145 annual reports, eight different scores of intellectual 
capital disclosure are calculated. The first one includes the total amount of 
information disclosed. Three disclosure scores are calculated for the content of 
information disclosed, which are: internal, external and human capital information. 
Two scores are calculated for the orientation outlook which are forward-looking and 
historical information. Two scores are calculated for the economic sign which are : 
positive and negative information. The findings reveal that board size, board 
structure and CEO duality have a negative effect on the extent of disclosure. 
However, there is a positive association between the proportion of independent 
directors and disclosure of intellectual capital information. 
Li et al., (2008), investigate the association between intellectual capital disclosure 
and corporate governance structure in the UK firms, controlling for company age, 
profitability and firm size. The researchers justify the expected relationships between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables using agency theory. 
The study examines five corporate governance variables, which are board 
composition,  role duality, share concentration, audit committee size and frequency 
of audit committee meetings. Content analysis is carried out for 100 UK firms’annual 
reports from high intellectual capital sectors, listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) for the financial year-ends between March 2004 and February 2005. Three 
different metrics are used to measure the dependent variable. These metrics  are 
disclosure index, word count and word count as a percentage of total word count of 
the annual reports. Based on multiple regression models, the empirical results 
indicate that all variables together are associated with intellectual capital disclosure 
with the exception of role duality. While board composition, audit committee size 
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and frequency of audit committee meetings have a positive impact on intellectual 
capital disclosure, share concentration was found to be negatively associated with 
intellectual capital disclosure.  
Hidalgo et al., (2011) examine the influence of corporate governance on intellectual 
capital disclosure. They cover eight corporate governance characteristics, which 
include board size, board independence, audit committee independence, the role 
duality, insider ownership, family ownership, ownership concentration, institutional 
shareholding. The study controls for firm size, leverage, profitability and industry 
type. Agency theory is used to establish the proposed influence of corporate 
governance on intellectual capital disclosure.  
 The dependent variable is measured by a self-constructed disclosure index, 
including 58 items classified into three groups: structural capital, human capital and 
relational capital. The sample consists of 300 annual reports of 100 companies listed 
on the Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE) over a three-year period 2005-2007.  
Linear regression analysis is employed to test the expected relationships. The results 
show that board size has a positive and significant effect on intellectual capital 
disclosure. However, institutional ownership structure has a negative influence on 
intellectual capital information introduced by listed Mexican companies. The study 
could not find any significant association between the other corporate governance 
variables and intellectual capital disclosure. Regarding control variables, the results 
indicate that larger firms introduce more intellectual capital information in their 
annual reports.  However, profitability and leverage have no significant influence on 
intellectual capital disclosure. 
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Li et al., (2012), examine  the association between audit committee characteristics and 
intellectual capital disclosure based on agency theory. The audit committee 
characteristics, which have been examined, are audit committee size, frequency of audit 
committee meetings, audit committee independence, audit committee directors' 
shareholding and audit committee financial expertise. The study controls for a number of 
other variables, two control variables related to corporate governance: board 
independence, ownership concentration, and three control variables related to corporate 
characteristics: listing age, profitability and firm size.  A sample of 100 companies is 
selected from intellectual capital intensive sectors in the UK. The selected companies 
were listed on (LSE) on 30 December 2005. 
The study applies the disclosure index developed by Li et al., (2008) which included 
61 items. Based on multiple regression analysis, the results show that audit 
committee size and frequency of audit committee meetings have a positive effect on 
intellectual capital disclosure. However, there is a negative association between 
intellectual capital disclosure and audit committee directors’ shareholding. Audit 
committee independence and audit committee financial expertise do not have any 
significant influence on intellectual capital disclosure.  
With respect to control variables, the study reveals that there is a positive association 
between intellectual capital disclosure and each of board independence firm size and 
profitability. In contrast, there is a negative association between intellectual capital 
disclosure and both ownership concentration and listing status. An interesting 
observation is that the association between explanatory variables and intellectual 
capital disclosure varies with the three components of it (structural capital, relational 
capital and human capital), concluding that the determinants of different components 
of intellectual capital disclosure are different. 
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Table 4.2  
Empirical Studies on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
Author 
date & 
Country 
Research  
Issue 
Sample size 
& time of 
observations 
Variables 
Findings 
Dependent Independent Control 
Cerbioni 
and 
Parbonetti  
( 2007) 
European 
The impact of 
corporate 
governance on 
intellectual 
capital 
disclosure. 
145 
 
2002-2004 
Disclosure score. Board size; CEO duality; board 
composition; board structure. 
Firm size; 
leverage; 
profitability; 
ownership 
structure; growth 
opportunities; 
listing status and 
legal enforcement. 
The findings show that board size, 
board structure and CEO duality have a 
negative effect on the extent of 
disclosure. However, there is a positive 
association between the proportion of 
independent directors and disclosure of 
intellectual capital information. 
Li et al.,  
(2008) 
 
UK 
The influence of 
corporate 
governance on 
intellectual 
capital 
disclosure in 
annual reports. 
100 
 
2004 
Disclosure index, 
word count and 
word count as a 
percentage of total 
word count of the 
annual reports 
Board composition; role duality; 
share concentration; audit 
committee size and frequency 
of audit committee  meeting. 
Company age; 
profitability and 
firm size. 
The empirical results reveal that all 
variables together are associated with 
intellectual capital disclosure except of 
role duality.  
 
Hidalgo et 
al., (2011) 
 
Mexican 
The impact of 
corporate 
governance on 
intellectual 
capital 
disclosure. 
300 
 
2005-2007 
Disclosure score. Board size; boardindependence; 
audit committee independence; 
the role duality; insider; 
ownership; Family ownership ; 
ownership concentration and 
institutional shareholding. 
Firm size; 
leverage; 
profitability and 
industry type. 
The results reveal that the board size has 
a positive and significant effect on the 
intellectual capital disclosure. However, 
institutional ownership structure has a 
negative influence on the intellectual 
capital information introduced by listing 
Mexican companies. 
Li et al., 
 (2012) 
 
UK 
The effect of 
audit committee 
characteristics 
on intellectual 
capital 
disclosure. 
100 
 
2005 
Disclosure score. Audit committee size; 
frequency of audit committee 
meetings; audit committee 
independence; audit committee 
directors’ shareholding and 
audit committee financial 
expertise. 
Board 
independence; 
ownership 
concentration; 
listing age; 
profitability and 
firm size. 
The results reveal that the audit 
committee size and frequency of 
meetings have a positive effect on 
intellectual capital disclosure. However, 
there was a negative association 
between intellectual capital disclosure 
and audit committee directors’ 
shareholding. 
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The previous review of the voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital studies shows 
that generally, firms introduce discretionary information in their annual reports 
regarding intellectual capital, and the variation in the amount of this information 
could be related to some corporate governance mechanisms. 
La Rosa and Liberatore (2014) argue that the desegregation of intellectual capital 
reporting into distinct categories of information such as R&D activities may 
introduce valuable supplementary insights into the disclosure practices of  
intellectual capital as a whole. This point of view is supported by the findings of  Li 
et al., (2012) who find that the determinants of different components of intellectual 
capital disclosure are different. 
Consequently, the aim of this study is to examine, in the UK context, the impact of 
corporate governance on R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports, as a distinct 
type of intellectual capital information. 
4.3. LITERATURES ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DISCLOSURE 
STUDIES 
There are many channels firms may use to introduce information about their R&D 
activities. These channels can be classified into three types: R&D information in 
mandatory financial reporting, R&D Voluntary disclosure outside of the firms’ 
formal annual reports and R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Figure 4.2 
illustrates the channels that may be used by firms to provide information regarding 
their R&D activities. 
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Figure 4.2  
The Structure of the Studies in R&D Context 
 
In the context of R&D activities, a large body of literature examined R&D 
expenditures concentrating on its performance, valuation and limited disclosure 
regulations. (e.g. Sougiannis, 1994; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Aboody and Lev, 
1998; Zhao, 2002; Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas, 2011). Another group of studies 
examine R&D voluntary disclosure outside the formal firms’ annual reports (e.g. 
Chan et al., 1990; Woolridge & Snow, 1990; Hirshey et al., 2001; Dedman et al., 
2008). 
Recently, a growing number of studies have started to consider the importance of 
R&D narrative disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013; 
Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2015). Although, these 
studies introduce a helpful understanding of the R&D disclosure environment, the 
findings of these studies  are generally limited to small samples, selected industries, 
short time period or overlook many variables, which may affect R&D disclosure 
practices. 
R&D Information 
Financial Statement 
(e.g. Sougiannis, 1994; 
Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; 
Aboody and Lev, 1998; 
Zhao, 2002; Tsoligkas and  
Tsaliavoutas, 2011) 
Annual Reports 
(e.g. Jones, 2007; 
 Merkley, 2014; La Rosa 
and Liberator, 2014;  
Nekhili et al., 2015). 
 
 
Others Channels 
(e.g. Chan et al., 1990; 
Woolridge and Snow, 
1990; Hirshey et al., 
2001; Dedman et al., 
2008). 
 
Stakeholders 
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The literature related to R&D activities can be categorised into three groups of 
studies: (1) R&D expenditures: reporting, productivity and valuation, (2) R&D 
voluntary disclosure outside of the firms’ formal annual reports, and (3) R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
The following parts of this chapter introduce a brief discussion of the first and 
second categories. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the third category, 
because the focus of the present study is R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
4.3.1. R&D Expenditures: Reporting, Productivity and Valuation 
In recent years, innovations and value creation processes in a highly competitive 
environment rely on intangible assets not reflected in financial statements (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Beattie, 2004). Innovations are the reward of R&D activities, so 
information required to communicate R&D efforts and to effectively assess 
innovations has been considered by many studies. There was a great debate regarding 
R&D reporting as a traditional tool to provide the essential information about firm’s 
activities.  
Many researchers have attempted to employ the incremental association studies to 
examine the value relevance of R&D expenditures (e.g. Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; 
Aboody and Lev, 1998; Zhao 2002; Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas 2011). This approach 
tests whether a specific financial component or disclosure is helpful in explaining the 
market value
6
. The main assumption of the incremental value relevance studies is 
that the accounting number has value relevance if its estimated regression coefficient 
is significantly different from zero (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). The main 
challenge of conducting the incremental association studies of R&D activities is the 
                                                          
6
   For more details: Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Barth, et al., 2001. 
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lack of data. This problem is due to the accounting treatment which charges R&D 
expenditures to the income statement and permits capitalisation when the company 
succeeds in meeting some criteria. 
To deal with this difficulty, some researchers estimated the amounts of capitalised 
R&D, including  Lev and Sougiannis (1996) who used the relation between the value 
of tangible and intangible assets and earnings to estimate the R&D capital, and 
adjusted the reported earnings and book values of the sample for capitalised R&D. 
The results indicate that R&D capitalization has a positive relation with stock return 
and market value. 
Other researchers used the real data; for instance, Aboody and Lev (1998) investigate 
the value relevance of capitalisation of software development costs, which is the only 
exception in the US to the expensing rule of all R&D costs. Using data from 163 
software companies during 1987-1995, they find a significant association between 
the annual capitalised development costs and stock returns. They also find that the 
software asset reported on the balance sheet is associated with stock prices. 
Along with the US studies, some empirical evidence from other countries is 
documented. An international comparison conducted by Zhao (2002) examines the 
value relevance of R&D reporting in France, Germany, the UK and the US under 
different R&D accounting standards for a ten-year period from 1990 to 1999. The 
study concludes that the allocation between capitalisation and expense increases the 
value relevance of R&D reporting.  
The previous studies may be criticised because they depend on adjusted data or a 
small sample. Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas (2011) uses data from 2005 to 2007 to 
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investigate the value relevance of R&D expenditures after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in 2005 in the UK. The study concluded that the capitalised portion has value 
relevant, while the expenses are negatively associated with the market value. 
Oswald (2008) argues that managers desire the accounting method for R&D 
expenditure, which provides the best communication of their private information 
regarding R&D expenditures.  
From the previous brief discussion, it can be concluded that generally, R&D 
expenditures have a substantial impact on share prices and market value. 
Consequently, investors consider the investment in R&D activities and find that the 
amount of R&D expenditures, and the accounting treatment of these expenditures 
have an impact on share valuation.  
Another group of studies investigate the consequences of R&D investment and 
consider the impact of R&D expenditure on firm’s productivity and growth (e.g. 
Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Sougiannis, 1994; Lev, 1999; Ding et al., 2007). 
Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) find a significant positive influence of advertising and 
R&D expenditures on a firm’s market value and conclude that the spending on 
advertising and R&D activities is a kind of investment in intangible assets, which can 
be expected to affect positively future cash flow. Sougiannis (1994) examines the 
long-run effect of R&D investment and documented the substantial contribution of 
R&D investment to earnings, suggesting that the capital market rewards the 
companies for this investment with an increase in market value. 
After conducting a survey of the major empirical findings regarding productivity of 
R&D investment, Lev (1999) concluded that R&D investments contribute 
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significantly to the productivity, and stock prices reflect this contribution. Ding et al., 
(2007) conducted an international study to compare the rate of return on R&D 
investment for six developed countries. The study presents additional evidence on 
the positive contribution of R&D investment to the future performance of companies. 
This contribution differs from one country to another with the rates of return varying 
from 17.6  percent based on a Swiss sample to 35.6 percent for the Japanese sample. 
4.3.2. R&D Voluntary Disclosure Outside of the Firms’Formal Annual Reports  
The accounting mandated information about R&D activities is inadequate to evaluate 
R&D efforts and their consequences (Lev, 1999; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014). To 
meet the information needs of all parties interested in corporate transparency, the 
managers may discretionarily introduce information about their R&D activities. 
A large stream of literature examines whether the firms with significant R&D 
activities choose to supplement the financial statement with more flexible voluntary 
R&D information through different devices, including announcements, press 
releases, conference calls, and websites.  
Some of these studies employ the information content approach which uses event 
studies to examine the impact of R&D information on firm value (e.g. Chan et al., 
1990; Woolridge and Snow, 1990; Dedman et al., 2008). 
Chan et al., (1990) examine the response of share prices to 95 announcements of 
increases in spending on R&D. They find a significant positive response for a two-
day announcement period, and concluded that investors in the US equity market 
value strategic investments and look beyond short-term earnings. Woolridge and 
Snow (1990) investigate the US market response to four strategic investment 
 -89- 
decisions, including R&D projects. They use 52 announcements of new R&D 
projects. The findings indicate a strong relationship between the announcements of 
strategic investment decisions and market value.  
Similar studies conducted in the US, for instance, those of Kelm et al., (1995) and 
Sundaram et al., (1996) find new evidence for a market valuation of R&D 
information. However, there is little empirical evidence other than from the US 
market.  
Using a sample of 22 firms from UK biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, 
Dedman et al., (2008) examine the impact of voluntary disclosure on share prices. 
They examine the abnormal share price returns around 151 drug development 
announcements. The findings support the importance of non-financial voluntary 
disclosure for the market valuation of high R&D firms in biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical sectors.  
Concerning the role of non-financial information in improving the understanding of 
firm’s performance and valuation, Hirshey et al., (2001) find that the patent 
information adds to the value relevance of R&D expenditure information. They 
suggest that the corresponding relation between financial information and non-
financial information regarding R&D activities may help investors to assess the value 
created by firm’s R&D efforts in the high-tech sector. 
The previous studies highlight the importance of R&D voluntary disclosure 
introduced by firms outside the formal annual reports. Moreover, the findings of 
these studies suggest that R&D voluntary disclosure can supplement traditional 
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financial reporting to help investors assess R&D activities by improving their 
understanding of essential issues related to these activities. 
4.3.3. R&D Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports 
Although a considerable number of studies provided insights into R&D information 
introduced in financial statements or voluntarily disclosed via many sources other 
than annual reports,  our understanding of the narrative disclosure of R&D activities 
in annual reports is still limited and based on the findings of a few studies. The 
reason for this limited empirical evidence may be the difficulty of capturing R&D 
narrative information in annual reports and the unavailability of this type of 
information in large commercial databases (Merkly, 2014). 
Although, there are many other communication channels such as press releases and 
corporate websites, the disclosure in corporate annual reports is widely investigated 
in prior research. The importance of annual reports as a formal communication 
channel is well justified in literature (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997; 
Guthrie, 2004). Campbell and Abdul Rahman (2010:57) states“As a document 
produced regularly, editorially controlled by the company and intended for a 
shareholder leadership, the annual report has a crucial role in the conveyance of 
material information to a range of stakeholders including shareholders.”.  
The main focus of the present study is investigating R&D-related information 
introduced voluntarily by firms in their annual reports. Hence, the next paragraphs 
present a detailed discussion of the studies that addressed R&D voluntary disclosure 
in firms’annual reports. These studies can be classified into two groups. The first 
group includes the prior studies assessing the association between the R&D 
voluntary disclosure in firms’annual reports and firm characteristics. The second 
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group includes the prior studies assessing the association between the R&D 
voluntary disclosure in firms’annual reports and corporate governance. 
4.3.3.1. Prior Studies Assessing the Relationship between Research and  
Development Disclosure and Firm Characteristics 
Entwistle (1999) conducted a pioneering study into the research and development 
disclosure environment in Canada. He performs a series of interviews with 15 
analysts and 21 executives from intensive technology firms, and he carries out 
content analysis for firm’s annual reports.  
His field interviews illustrate six main groups of information, which are disclosed by 
firms and used by analysts: inputs, outputs, future expenditures, financing, 
accounting and strategy information. The responses of interviewers also reveal that 
the decision to introduce R&D-related information is dependent on cost/benefit 
analysis.  In addition, the content analysis of the annual reports of 113 Toronto Stock 
Exchange-listed firms provides a description of the extent of R&D disclosure. It also 
identifies the most common types of R&D information and their location in annual 
reports. 
The sample consists of four industry groups: hardware, software, biotech and 
traditional. The traditional group includes less technologically intensive firms such as 
household goods and electrical products.  The findings of content analysis reveal that 
the greatest amount of R&D disclosure is provided by biotech firms, followed by 
software and hardware while the traditional sector introduces the smallest number of 
sentences related to R&D activities. In addition, the majority of information 
describes the actual and potential outputs from R&D activities.  
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Finally, the study examines the association between R&D disclosure, measured by 
the number of sentences of R&D-related information in annual report, and six 
explanatory variables: R&D spending, accounting policy, listing status, industry 
type, capital structure and firm size. The results of the multiple regression analysis 
reveal that R&D expenditures and listing status explain the disclosure of R&D 
information, while industry type provides a partial explanation of it. The regression 
result of the whole sample, including traditional firms indicated a significant 
influence on the industry type on R&D disclosure. However, after excluding the 36 
traditional firms, the results provide no evidence of the industry effect. The author 
argues that the traditional firms (not technology-intensive) introduce far less R&D 
information than any of the other groups (technology-intensive). 
However, firm size, capital structure and firm’s accounting policy did not have any 
significant association with the level of R&D disclosure. 
Notwithstanding the importance of Entwistle (1999) as a pioneering explanatory 
study that highlights R&D disclosure practices in annual reports and examines their 
determinants, the findings are subject to at least two limitations. First, the study 
depends on a small sample (113 observations). Second, the study examines the 
impact of firm characteristics on R&D disclosure and ignores the role of corporate 
governance as a potential driver of the observed R&D disclosure practices. 
Following Entwistle (1999), some subsequent papers investigate issues related to 
R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Based on the environmental 
determinism theory, a comparison study conducted by Ding et al., (2004) explored 
the differences between R&D disclosure practices in France and Canada. The annual 
reports of a sample of 186 high-tech firms are analysed. The sample consists of 76 
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French companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange and 110 Canadian companies 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The study found that Canadian firms 
introduce significantly more R&D disclosure than French companies. Moreover, the 
findings reveal a positive correlation between R&D intensity and R&D disclosure 
among Canadian firms. 
These findings suggest that Canadian firms in high-tech segments with intensive 
R&D activities intend to introduce more information regarding R&D activities 
beyond the traditional financial reporting. In contrast, the French firms desire 
confidentiality more than introducing information about their R&D activities. 
Finally, according to the findings, while French firms provide more traditional 
financial information, Canadian firms use more non financial information to 
communicate their R&D efforts. 
Although, the study emphasizes the impact of differences in the environment on 
R&D disclosure practices by comparing the R&D information provided 
discretionarily by firms in France and Canada, it does not introduce any empirical 
evidence on the determinants of R&D voluntary disclosure. 
A very similar study to Entwistel (1999) performed in Canada as well, was 
conducted by Zeghal et al., (2007) to improve understanding of R&D disclosure 
practices. Both agency and signalling theories were used to justify R&D voluntary 
disclosure. The researchers investigate the relationship between the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure and three groups of variables that were expected to affect R&D 
voluntary disclosure. First, firm characteristics (firm size, leverage, and listing 
status). Second, R&D-related variables (R&D intensity, R&D accounting policy, 
R&D partnership agreement). Third, governance-related variables (board 
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independence,  and the separation of the CEO and board chair roles). Industry type is 
included as a control variable. They use a sample of annual reports of 150 Canadian 
companies, which are composed of all listed firms on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) in February 2005 that reported R&D information in their annual reports. The 
final sample included 82 firms in 2004 and 68 firms in 2003. 
Using content analysis, the extent of R&D voluntary disclosure is measured by the 
number of sentences that include R&D-related information in the annual report. The 
study finds that firm size, R&D intensity and R&D partnership agreement have a 
significant positive impact on R&D disclosure. However, the results reveal that 
leverage, listing status and R&D accounting policy have no significant impact on the 
level of R&D disclosure. With regard to corporate governance-related variables, the 
findings indicate that the separation of the CEO and board chair function positively 
impacts on information disclosed on R&D activities. Conversely, the board 
independence has no significant effect in explaining R&D disclosure. Moreover, 
firms in the biotechnological sector provide more information on their R&D 
activities relative to the other sectors.  
Although Zeghal et al., (2007) extend Entwistle (1999) with a little bearing of 
corporate governance mechanisms, they only consider the board independence and 
the separation of the board chair and the CEO function and overlooked other 
corporate governance mechanisms such as board size, and audit committee 
characteristics. In addition, the findings are limited by the small sample and by 
covering only one year. 
Jones (2007) investigates three related research areas. First, she explores R&D 
related voluntary disclosure for a sample of 119 US firms over a one-year time 
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period. The study aims to examine whether managers of R&D-intensive firms 
introduce some information about their R&D activities and if so, what kind of 
information does they introduce.  Second, she examines three main drivers, which 
are expected to influence R&D-related disclosures: information asymmetry, 
proprietary costs and firm characteristics (firm size, R&D intensity, financial 
statement informativeness, the need of external financing, and analysts following). 
Finally, the study investigates the association between R&D-related information and 
analysts’ forecasts.  
The study depends on hand collecting data on R&D-related information in four R&D 
intensive industries: chemicals & pharmaceuticals, machinery & computer hardware, 
electronics and scientific instruments. It examines voluntary disclosure from the 
annual reports, as well as from sources other than annual reports, including 
disclosure introduced directly to financial analysts in the form of conference calls or 
other presentations made by a firm’s management.  
Jones (2007) relies primarily on Entwistle, (1999) to construct the R&D disclosure 
index which comprises all information related to R&D activities and includes three 
types of information that capture the different stages of R&D activities: R&D 
spending, R&D projects in progress and in the development stage. 
She assigns a disclosure score to each firm in the sample and gives the descriptive 
information one point and numerical information two points. The findings reveal that 
companies disclose substantial information about the three stages of R&D activities, 
although R&D-related disclosures are potentially costly to make. As general, the 
majority of companies disclose descriptive information only. However, managers 
provide numerical and descriptive information about the developmental stage. 
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In addition, the study finds a negative association between the level of R&D 
disclosure and abnormal returns, suggesting that the proprietary costs influence 
negatively on R&D disclosure provided by the firms. Moreover, firms with a lower 
book-to-market value ratio disclose more R&D-related information, suggesting that 
firms with less informative financial statements tend to disclose more information 
about their R&D activities. In contrast, there is a positive, but not significant 
relationship between R&D intensity and R&D-related information. 
The  study could not find a relationship between information asymmetry measured 
by the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted stock returns in the previous year 
and the level of R&D disclosure. Finally, the study reveals that the disclosure about 
both R&D projects in progress, and R&D development stage are negatively 
associated with earnings forecast error, while a higher level of disclosure about 
development stage is associated with less error in sales forecasts. 
Although Jones (2007) investigates many important issues related to R&D 
disclosure, the study has a number of limitations. Firstly, it uses a small sample (119 
observations). Secondly, it covers a single point of time (only one year) which does 
not help in assessing the trend of R&D disclosure. Thirdly, the study has a bias 
towards R&D intensive industries. Finally, it ignores the role of corporate 
governance. 
A recent study conducted by Merkly (2014) examined whether managers adjust 
R&D narrative information according to changes in earnings performance. To 
address the influence of earnings performance on R&D narrative disclosure provided 
by firms in annual reports, Merkly (2014) considered three related research areas. 
First, examining the relationship between R&D disclosure and earnings performance 
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and considering the role of information demand and proprietary costs on this 
relationship. Second, investigating the impact of R&D narrative disclosure on analyst 
forecasts and information asymmetry. Finally, measuring R&D disclosure detail, 
tone and readability. 
The final sample includes 22445 firm-year observations for fiscal years from 1996 to 
2007 with R&D investment and financial data available on the compustat 
fundamental annual table and pricing data from the Centre for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). Using computerized content analysis, narrative R&D disclosure is 
measured as the total number of R&D-related sentences.  
Regarding the relationship between earnings performance and R&D narrative 
disclosure, multivariate regression is employed controlling for many disclosure 
determinants examined in prior studies. The results show that current earnings 
performance is negatively associated with R&D narrative disclosure, and this 
relationship is stronger for firms that invest more resources in their R&D activities. 
Moreover, the study finds that firms with higher leverage and positive net stock 
issuance introduce more R&D disclosure. 
Moreover, the study investigates the influence of information demand and 
proprietary cost aspects of the estimated negative relationship between earning 
performance and R&D narrative disclosure. Some empirical proxies for information 
demand, including the number of analysts, institutional ownership and number of 
earnings forecasts are used. Other proxies for proprietary costs, including book to 
market value, ease to entry by competitors and industry competition are employed. 
The results in general support the role of information demand and proprietary costs 
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in the negative relationship between R&D narrative disclosure and earnings 
performance. 
In general, the results are consistent with economic theories that suggest that 
disclosure can be used as an effective tool to decrease information asymmetry. The 
findings confirm a negative relationship between R&D narrative disclosure and 
information asymmetry.  Moreover, the study provides evidence that R&D narrative 
disclosure is positively related to earnings forecast accuracy, suggesting that R&D 
disclosure improves the information required for corporate transparency. 
Three main characteristics of R&D narrative disclosure are examined: disclosure 
detail, tone, and readability. The study uses the forward-looking statements, the 
amount of numerical content and repetition to measure the detail of R&D disclosure. 
It finds that the increase of forward-looking statements and repetition is related to the 
decline in earnings performance. However, the amount of numerical content does not 
have any significant impact on earnings. Regarding R&D disclosure tone and 
readability, the findings reveal that the tone relates positively to earnings 
performance. In contrast, there is no evidence that readability of R&D disclosure 
affect earnings performance. 
Merkly (2014) extends the prior literature in R&D disclosure in annual reports. He 
considers some limitations in the previous studies by examining a larger sample 
(22445 observations), for a long time period (from 1996 to 2007) from different 
industries. He also contributes to prior literature by considering the characteristics of 
narrative R&D disclosure such as tone and readability. However, Merkly (2014) does 
not consider the impact of corporate governance on R&D voluntary disclosure. 
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Another recent study conducted by La Rosa and Liberator (2014) explores whether 
the regulatory regime of R&D narrative disclosure affects the cost of equity capital. 
To measure the extent of firm’s R&D narrative disclosure, the study uses the 
construction of a disclosure index obtained from the content analysis of 77 
biopharmaceutical and chemical listed companies’ management reports from eight 
Western European Countries across the period 2005-2009. 
The rationale behind choosing eight Western European countries is to consider the 
effect of the different regulatory regimes of R&D narrative disclosure. Hence, some 
countries have a mandatory regulation of R&D activities such as Germany and 
Denmark, and others have voluntary recommendations such as France and UK. The 
2005-2009 period is selected after the mandatory implementation of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), so the European listed companies employ the 
same accounting treatment of R&D expenditures.  
The final disclosure index composed of 58 items across nine subcategories and 
employed in 309 annual reports. To consider the differences between countries 
across years; the study uses LSDV regression (Least Squares with Dummy 
Variables).  
The first main model examines the influence of the regulatory regime on the quantity 
of total disclosure of R&D activity introduced by the firm. It controls for some 
variables, including firm size, R&D expenses, leverage, return on equity, market to 
book value ratio, industry and effective legal insinuation. The impact of the 
regulatory regime on the disclosure level of each of the ninth sub-categories of the 
index is also examined.   
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The findings of the first model show a significant influence of the regulatory regime 
on the level of R&D disclosure with the exception of the strategic aspects of R&D, 
which is not related to the level of regulation.  Moreover, the results reveal a positive 
influence of the firm size and the effective legal insinuation on the total amount of 
R&D disclosure for the main model and also for some others models of sub-
categories. However, market to book value ratio is inversely related to R&D 
information provided by the sample.  
The second main model examines the influence of the level of R&D disclosure as a 
consequence of the regulatory regime on the cost of equity capital. The findings are 
contrary to the study’s hypothesis and could not confirm a significant relationship 
between the amount of R&D disclosure and the cost of capital. Generally, La Rosa 
and Liberator (2014) provide a further evidence regarding the impact of the 
regulatory regime on R&D disclosure in a number of Western European countries. 
However, regarding the understanding of R&D disclosure trends, the study cannot 
claim to represent R&D disclosure practices of all firms from different countries due 
to the small number of observations for each country (e.g. 49 observations for UK 
firms). In addition, the results are limited to specific industry sectors 
(biopharmaceutical and chemical firms) and overlook the role of corporate 
governance. 
4.3.3.2. Prior Studies Assessing the Relationship between Research and 
Development Disclosure and Corporate Governance 
Nor et al., (2010) examine the association between R&D voluntary disclosure and 
corporate governance. The study investigates 187 annual reports for a sample of 
listed companies on the Malaysian market (MESDAQ) in the years 2005 and 2006. 
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Three groups of corporate governance variables were examined: ownership structure, 
board structure, and audit firm size. The study controls for leverage, profitability, 
firm size, current ratio and the proportion of R&D capitalized to total assets. The 
hypotheses of the study are formulated drawing on agency theory. 
The dependent variable is measured as the number of text unit of R&D information 
introduced in the annual report. The study uses Tobit regression to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and each of total R&D disclosure, R&D 
forward looking information, R&D quantitative information and R&D financial 
information.  
The results show a positive association between government ownership and R&D 
disclosure. However, the other four types of ownership structure: family, foreign, 
management and institutional ownership, do not affect R&D reporting. 
Nor et al., (2010) perform a more detailed study and address three dimensions of 
R&D disclosure: historical and forward looking, financial and non-financial, 
quantitative and non-quantitative. They also consider the effect of ownership 
structure and board composition on R&D voluntary disclosure. However, they 
overlook the other corporate governance mechanisms such as audit committee 
characteristics. In addition, the small sample is a limitation for this study. 
Nekhili et al., (2012) examine the influence of ownership structure on R&D 
disclosure. They investigate five variables related to ownership structure: ownership 
concentration, institutional ownership, family ownership, managerial ownership, and 
director’s ownership. They control for R&D intensity, R&D capitalization, firm 
performance, sales growth, leverage and firm size. The study uses a sample of 84 
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French listed companies in the SBF 250 index over the 2000-2004 periods: a total of 
420 firm-year observations are examined. 
An unweighted R&D disclosure index composed of 32 items is constructed. The 
study uses content analysis to measure the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
The R&D disclosure score is calculated by dividing the total score for each company 
over the potential maximum score. The results show that, family and French  
institutional ownerships negatively influence R&D disclosure. On the other hand, 
foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with R&D information. 
However, the study could not find any relationship between management or 
director’s ownership and the level of R&D disclosure.  
Regarding the control variables, the results reveal that both R&D intensity and firm 
size have a positive effect on R&D disclosure. However, firm performance and sales 
growth affect R&D disclosure negatively. 
While Nekhili et al., (2012) consider the effect of ownership structure on R&D 
voluntary disclosure, they overlook the other corporate governance mechanisms such 
as board and audit committee characteristics. 
A recent working paper introduced by Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, (2013) 
investigates the determinants of voluntary disclosure of R&D activities in the UK 
context using a computerised content analysis. It examines the impact of firm 
characteristics, board features, and ownership structure on R&D voluntary disclosure 
of 95 non-financial firms in the FTSE 350 index. Considering the mandatory 
adoption of the IFRS in EU countries, the study covers the period from 2005 to 2009. 
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It uses the total number of R&D-related sentences in annual report to measure the 
level of R&D disclosure. 
The regression results show that R&D voluntary disclosure is positively associated 
with poor earnings performance and large board size. Moreover, firms with more 
R&D activities and more volatile earnings introduce more information related to 
their R&D activities. However, the results did not confirm a significant influence of 
the board composition, the ownership structure, and the dividend policy on the 
managerial incentives to introduce voluntary disclosure about their R&D activities. 
 Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, (2013) introduce the first evidence regarding R&D 
disclosure in annual reports in the UK context. The study has several limitations. One 
of the limitations, which is mentioned in the study, is investigating the level of 
overall R&D disclosure without incorporating the R&D-related topics such as R&D 
competition, strategies, patents, and findings. The study overlooks the effectiveness 
of the audit committee as a potential driver of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
A more recent study conducted by Nekhili et al., (2015) to complement Nekhili et 
al., (2012) investigates the impact of R&D narrative disclosure on the market value 
of equity and considers several corporate governance mechanisms. The study 
depends on agency and signalling theories and cost-benefit analysis to justify the 
expected relationships between variables. 
Using Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimation, the study examines the 
association between R&D narrative disclosure and the market value of equity. A 
simultaneous equation model is built to consider the direct effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm market value and their indirect effect through their 
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influence on R&D narrative disclosure. The sample comprised 98 French listed firms 
over the period 2000-2004. Therefore, a total of 490 observations are examined. The 
R&D disclosure index that constructed by Nekhili et al., (2012) is adopted to 
calculate the R&D voluntary disclosure score. 
The results indicate that, the audit committee independence and the equity-based 
compensation are the most important corporate governance mechanisms that 
positively affect R&D voluntary disclosure. Moreover, both R&D intensity and R&D 
capitalization have a positive influence on it.  
Unexpectedly, the results did not reveal any significant impact of R&D voluntary 
disclosure on firm’s value. Furthermore, the association between R&D voluntary 
disclosure and each of board size, board independence, and role duality is 
insignificant. However, the family ownership has a negative impact, while the 
institutional ownership has a positive impact on R&D voluntary disclosure. 
Surprisingly, the results reveal a negative relationship between R&D voluntary 
disclosure and firm size. 
Nekhili et al., (2015) contribute to R&D literature by investigating the influence of a 
set of corporate governance variables on the level of R&D disclosure in annual 
reports. The study only considers the independence of the audit committee and 
overlooks the other audit committee characteristics recommended by the FRC, 
(2012). These are audit committee size, frequency of audit committee meetings and 
the existence of audit committee financial expertise. Moreover, the study examines 
the overall R&D disclosure without employing a detailed analysis on the type of 
R&D information introduced discretionarily by firms in annual reports.  
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Table 4.3  
Empirical Studies on the Impact of Firm Characteristics and Corporate Governance on Research and Development Disclosure  
Author 
date & 
country 
Research Issue 
Theoretical 
Base 
Sample size, 
Time of 
observation 
Variables 
Findings 
Dependent Independent Control 
Entwistle  
(1999) 
 
Canada 
Exploring the 
R&D disclosure 
environment. 
Cost-benefit 
analyses 
113  
1994 
 
Number of 
sentences. 
R&D spending; 
accounting policy; 
listing status;industry 
type; Capital structure 
and firm size. 
 The results reveal that the 
R&D expenditures and 
listing status explain the 
disclosure of R&D 
information, while industry 
type provides a partial 
explanation of it. 
Ding et 
al., (2004) 
 
Canada -
France 
The differences in 
research and 
development 
reporting practices 
between France 
and Canada. 
Environmental 
determinism 
76 French 
listed 
companies 
110 Canadian 
listed 
companies. 
Number of 
sentences.  
R&D intensity 
 
 The study finds that 
Canadian firms introduce 
significantly R&D voluntary 
disclosure more than French 
companies. 
Zeghal et 
al., (2007) 
 
Canada 
The determinants 
of research and 
development 
voluntary 
disclosure. 
Agency theory 
and signalling 
theories. 
150 
2003-2004 
Number of 
sentences. 
Firm size; leverage; 
listing status; R&D 
intensity; R&D 
accounting policy; 
R&D partnership 
agreement; board 
independence; CEO 
and board chair roles. 
Industry 
 
 
 
  
 
The study shows that firm 
size, R&D intensity and 
R&D partnership agreement 
have a significant positive 
impact on R&D disclosure, 
and the separation of the 
CEO and board chair 
function positively impacts 
the information disclosed on 
R&D activities. 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
Author 
date & 
country 
Research 
Issue 
Theoretical 
Base 
Sample 
size,Time of 
observation 
Variables 
Findings 
Dependent Independent Control 
Jones 
(2007) 
 
US 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
disclosure in 
R&D, 
Intensive 
industries. 
Proprietary 
costs. 
Information 
asymmetry. 
119 firms 
  
1997 
R&D 
disclosure 
score. 
Information 
asymmetry; 
proprietary costs; 
firm size; R&D 
intensity; financial 
statement 
informativeness; 
 the need of 
external financing; 
and analysts 
following. 
 The R&D disclosure score is 
negatively associated with 
proprietary costs and the 
informative of the financial 
statements. 
Merkley 
(2014) 
 
US 
R&D narrative 
disclosure and 
earnings 
performance. 
Information 
asymmetry, 
Proprietary 
costs 
22445  
Observations 
 
1996-2007 
Number of 
sentences  
Earnings 
performance 
Firm size; firm age; 
number of analysts 
following the firm; 
Institutional ownership, 
number of management 
forecasts issued during the 
year; book to market value; 
R&D intensity, book to 
market value; capital 
intensity; information 
uncertainly; leverage and  
stock return performance. 
The results show that current 
earnings performance is 
negatively associated with 
the quantity of narrative 
R&D disclosure, and this 
relationship is stronger for 
firms that invest more 
resources in its R&D 
activities and facing a higher 
degree of competition. 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
Author 
date & 
country 
Research 
Issue 
Theoretical 
Base 
Sample size, 
Time of 
observation 
Variables 
Findings 
Dependent Independent Control 
La Rosa 
and 
Liberator 
(2014) 
eight 
Western 
European 
Countries 
The impact of 
regulatory 
regime on R&D 
disclosure & 
cost of capital. 
Proprietary 
costs. 
77 firms 
2005-2009 
 
(309 
observations) 
R&D 
disclosure 
score. 
Regulatory regime. Firm size; R&D 
expenses;  
leverage; 
 return on equity; 
 market to book  
value ratio;  
industry; effective 
legal insinuation. 
The findings show a 
significant influence of the 
regulatory regime on the 
level of R&D disclosure.  
Nor et al.,  
(2010) 
 
Malaysia 
 
The association 
between 
corporate 
governance & 
R&D reporting. 
Agency 
theory. 
187 firm year 
observation 
 
2005-2006 
The number 
of text unit. 
Family government; 
foreign 
management and 
institutional; 
ownership; 
independent 
directors; audit firm 
size. 
Leverage; 
profitability; firm 
size; current ratio 
and the proportion 
of R&D capitalized 
to  
total assets. 
The results reveal a positive 
association between 
government ownership & 
quantitative R&D 
disclosure. In addition, 
independent directors and 
big audit firm influence 
R&D voluntary disclosure. 
Nekhili et 
al., (2012) 
 
France  
The influence 
of ownership 
structure on 
R&D 
disclosure. 
Proprietary 
cost. 
Information 
asymmetry. 
84 firms 
2000-2004 
 
420 firm year 
observations. 
R&D 
disclosure 
score. 
Ownership 
concentration; 
institutional 
ownership; 
family ownership; 
managerial 
ownership; & 
director’s 
ownership 
R&D intensity; 
R&D 
capitalization; firm 
performance; sales 
growth; leverage &  
firm size. 
The results show that, 
family & French 
institutional investor’s 
ownership is negatively 
influencing the R&D 
disclosure. While, foreign 
institutional investor’s 
ownership is positively 
associated with R&D 
information. 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
Author 
date & 
country 
Research 
Issue 
Theoretical 
Base 
Sample size, 
Time of 
observation 
Variables 
Findings 
Dependent Independent Control 
Abdelbadie 
and 
Elshandidy 
(2013) 
UK 
The 
determinants 
of voluntary 
disclosures on 
R&D 
expenditures. 
Agency 
theory. 
Cost and 
benefits 
analysis. 
95 firms  
2005-2009 
Number of 
R&D-
related 
sentences 
in annual 
reports 
Profitability; board 
characteristics, 
ownership 
structure; firm size; 
investment mix, 
Financing mix; 
volatility of the 
market return 
(standard 
deviation); 
dividend policy. 
 The results show that R&D 
voluntary disclosure is 
positively associated with 
poor earnings performance & 
large board size. Indeed, 
firms with more R&D 
activities and more volatile 
earnings introduce more 
information related to their 
R&D activities. 
Nekhili et 
al., (2015) 
 
France
  
The impact of 
narrative 
R&D 
disclosure 
and corporate 
governance 
on the market 
value. 
Agency and 
signaling 
theories. 
Cost and 
benefits 
analysis. 
98 companies 
 2000-2004 
490 firm year 
observations 
R&D 
disclosure 
score. 
Board size; board 
independence; 
CEO duality; 
equity based 
management 
compensation; 
audit committee 
independence. 
R&D intensity; 
R&D 
accounting; 
ownership 
structure, audit 
quality; 
leverage; return 
on assets, firm 
size; industry. 
The audit committee 
independence and the equity, 
based compensation are the 
most important corporate 
governance mechanisms that 
positively affect the R&D 
voluntary disclosure. 
Both R&D intensity and 
R&D capitalization have a 
positive influence on R&D 
voluntary disclosure. The 
association between R&D 
voluntary disclosure and each 
of board size, board 
independence, and role 
duality is insignificant. 
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4.4.  LITERATURE GAP AND THE CURRENT STUDY 
While corporate disclosure in annual reports has been examined in a large number of 
prior studies, and the importance of R&D information is well documented in the 
literature, very few studies have been concerned with the voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports with respect to R&D activities.  
These pioneer studies, that investigated R&D disclosure in annual reports, highlight 
the importance of R&D narrative disclosure, and introduce insights into the type and 
extent of R&D information in annual reports. Consequently, the understanding of the 
R&D disclosure environment has been improved. Moreover, some of these studies 
examine the determinants of R&D information introduced discretionarily in annual 
reports.  
Notwithstanding the helpful contributions of these studies, the findings must be 
interpreted in the context of a number of limitations. First, some studies cover only 
one year (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007) which may help in exploring R&D 
disclosure in annual reports, but does not help in assessing the trend of disclosure 
across time. Other studies investigate observations from two years without assessing 
the trend (e.g. Zeghal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 2010).  However, a longitudinal study 
that can track the R&D disclosure practices over the years may be helpful in 
improving the understanding of extent and trend of R&D disclosure practices. 
Consequently, the current study extends the prior work  by employing the analysis of 
a longitudinal basis for three years, aiming to monitor the changes in R&D disclosure 
practices. 
Second, the majority of studies that examine R&D voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports are limited to small samples (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Ding et al., 2004; Zeghal 
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et al., 2007; Jones, 2007; Nor et al., 2010) which may affect the generalising of their 
findings. The current study considers this limitation by examining a large sample 
which consists of (505) observations. 
Third, some studies have a bias towards R&D intensive industries (e.g. Jones, 2007; 
La Rosa and Liberator, 2014). Consequently, the sample cannot claim to represent 
R&D disclosure practices of all firms from different industries. The current study 
considers this limitation by examining a sample from nine industries. The industry 
sectors investigated in the current study are: utilities, basic materials, consumer 
goods, consumer services, healthcare, industrials, oil & gas, technology and 
telecommunications.  
Fourth, the previous studies that specifically examine R&D voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports are employed in different countries (Canada, France, US, eight 
Western European Countries, Malaysia). Regarding the UK setting, to the best of my 
knowledge, there is no evidence on the extent, trend and determinants of R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports except a working paper conducted by 
Abdelbadie and Elshandidy (2013). This employs computerised content analysis to 
investigate only the overall voluntary disclosure of R&D expenditures without 
analysis of any R&D-related topics such as competition, funding or patents. 
The current study considers this limitation by examining the R&D disclosure 
practices in the UK context using manual content analysis, and exploring the total 
R&D voluntary disclosure: its categories (general, input, output, and financial 
information), its types (financial and non-financial information) and each item of 
R&D information presented in the annual reports. 
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Finally, Although, some studies introduce helpful insights into the determinants of 
R&D disclosure, they only consider incomplete proxies for corporate governance 
attributes. (e.g. Zeghal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadie 
and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
The expectation that corporate governance could affect R&D disclosure derives from 
the monitoring role of corporate governance, which could suggest a positive relation 
between the quality of corporate governance and firm’s transparency (Brown et al., 
2011). 
The few studies that addressed the impact of corporate governance on R&D 
disclosure in annual reports focused on examining the characteristics of the board of 
directors and ownership structure without considering the role of the audit 
committee. To the best of my knowledge, the only study that addresses the impact of 
audit committee characteristics on R&D disclosure decision, is Nekhili et al., (2015). 
This considers only the impact of audit committee independence on R&D disclosure 
in the annual reports of French companies. 
The current study considers this limitation by examining the influence of a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance variables, which are expected to affect 
R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports according to the study’s theoretical 
foundation and prior empirical studies. 
Based on the above discussion, the current study contributes to disclosure literature 
and R&D setting through exploring R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports of 
UK non-financial listed firms. To bridge the gap in the literature, the current study 
will extend the previous studies by introducing a number of contributions:   
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Firstly, the present study is the first to undertake a disclosure study of R&D activities 
in annual reports of UK firms using a self-constructed disclosure index. Moreover, it 
considers the total R&D voluntary disclosure, its categories (general, input, output, 
and financial information), its types (financial and non-financial information) and 
each item of R&D information presented in the annual reports. 
Secondly, the present study uses a large sample (505 observations) from different 
industries (nine industry sectors) and covers three years (2007-2009) to assess the 
extent and trend of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
Finally, the study investigates the determinants of R&D disclosure in annual reports 
by examining the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. 
It also considers a group of firm characteristics that could affect the R&D disclosure 
practices.  
4.5. THE MEASUREMENT OF DISCLOSURE  
The main objective of the current study is to explore and analyse R&D narrative 
disclosure introduced discretionarily by UK firms in their annual reports and to 
examine its determinants. 
To achieve this goal, the different existing approaches employed in the literature to 
analyse narrative disclosure in annual reports should be considered. Hence every 
approach should be evaluated to choose the appropriate method which achieves the 
aim of the current study. 
Beattie et al., (2004) documented five approaches to analyse the narratives in annual 
reports that can be classified into three groups: (1) subjective analyst rankings, (2) 
the two principal ways to measure the disclosure which have been employed by 
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accounting researchers for a long time: Self-Constructed Disclosure Indices and 
Thematic content analysis, and (3) the renewed trend that includes readability studies 
and Linguistic analysis. Although, the main objective of the first and second groups 
is to measure narrative disclosure, the third group pays more attention to its 
characteristics.  Figure 4.3 summarises the main  approaches that have been used by 
researchers to analyse the narratives in annual reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3   
Approaches used to Analyse the Narratives in Annual Reports.  
Source: adapted Beattie et al., 2004. 
The next paragraphs presents a brief discussion of the approaches used to analyse 
narrative disclosure. 
 Subjective Rankings 
Subjective rankings provide an overall score of corporate disclosure quality. In the 
US, the Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR), formerly the 
Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) introduced a composite measure of the 
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disclosure quality dependent on the analysts’ evaluation of three sources of 
information: annual published information, other published information such as press 
releases and quarterly reports, and investor relations. These measures are prepared by 
a specific analysts subcommittee for each industry. Each group of analysts prepares a 
list for each industry containing the most important information requirements and 
allocates a score for each company
7
. Many studies employed AIMR ranking (e.g.  
Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy et al., 1999; Gelb and Zarowin, 2002). The UK 
does not have a similar ranking. 
 Self-Constructed Disclosure Indices 
Healy and Palepu (2001:2) argue that“One of the limitations of the studies on 
voluntary disclosure is the difficulty in measuring the extent of voluntary 
disclosure.”. Considering the difficulty of assessing disclosure quality, disclosure 
index studies assume that the amount of disclosure on certain topics is considered a 
proxy for the quality of disclosure (Beattie et al., 2004). The disclosure index has 
been widely used to analyse the narrative disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Botosan, 
1997; Meek et al., 1995; and Hossain et al., 1995; Nekhili et al., 2015).  
Core (2001) argues that the disclosure rating introduced by Botosan (1997), Lang 
and Lundholm (2001), may involve some small problems of judgment error. 
However, the actual problem with this method is that it is so labour-intensive, hence; 
it is appropriate only for small samples. 
 Thematic Content Analysis  
A key assumption underlying content analysis is that volume equates with the 
importance of the information being disclosed (Unerman, 2000). Hence, the choice 
                                                          
7
   For more details: Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy and palepu, 2001; Beattie et al., 2004. 
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of the unit of measurement is a critical decision in any content analysis study. 
Generally, in thematic content analysis studies, the researchers measure the quantity 
of information at the level of word, sentence, paragraph, page and text. Each unit of 
measurement has its own advantages and disadvantages.  
Regarding the level of the word, Campbell et al., (2010) argue that the word will be 
appropriate as a unit of analysis when the meaning is conveyed at that level and 
where the writer weighted every word for meaning before using, as it would be in a 
legal document. However, the coding of individual words without a sentence for 
context is clearly meaningless (Milne and Adler, 1999). Moreover; the same word 
may be a part of a more distinct kind of disclosure. For example: the word 
“development” could be related to R&D activities “research and development 
expenditures”, and could be related to any other type of information: “market 
development, leadership development, development of strategy”. 
Milne and Adler (1999) believe that the sentence is more reliable than any other unit 
of analysis to provide the foundation for both coding and measuring disclosure. On 
the other hand, using sentence count may have some implementation problems when 
one sentence conveys two types of information. For example “around 12,000 people 
in our R&D organisation and 17 principal R&D centres in eight countries” (Astra 
Zeneca annual report, 2008, p.8). This sentence holds two types of information : 
“Around 12,000 people in our R&D organization” reporting information about 
Management and People and“17 principal R&D centres in eight countries”  
reporting information about the infrastructure of R&D activities. 
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In addition, the counting of words, sentences, or paragraphs will only capture 
narrative disclosure, and are not able to effectively reveal non narrative forms of 
disclosure (McMurtrie, 2005). 
Beattie and Thomson (2007) suggest  the text unit as an alternative unit of analysis and 
measurement and to relax the concerns of using the sentence. They recommend  splitting 
sentences into single pieces of information. They declare  that this coding measure is not 
claimed to be the best and do not introduce a solution to all the issues involved. The 
main problem of the text unit according to Beattie and Thomson (2007) is the 
complexity of using it compared to the use of sentences; this complexity may decrease 
reliability. 
 Readability and Linguistic studies 8. 
Loughran and McDonald (2014:1649) define readability as “the ability of individual 
investors and analysis to assimilate valuation-relevant information from a financial 
disclosure”. Beattie, (2014:116) states that “Linguistic sentiment analysis generally 
involves the creation of wordlists to capture positive and negative opinions. The tone 
is measured as the ratio of positive to negative words.”. Beattie et al., (2014) argue 
that this trend is encouraged by the increasing availability of digital texts and 
advanced computerised software. 
To sum up, in the absence of a subjective disclosure rating in the UK, there are two 
alternative approaches to investigate R&D narrative disclosure in annual reports 
using  manual content analysis: 
                                                          
8
   The review of the readability studies and linguistic analysis is beyond the scope of this study. For 
more details: Dreyer, 1984; Stevens et al., 1992; Sydserff and Weetman, 1998; and Beattie et al., 
2004. 
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The first approach quantifies the extent of disclosure by the frequency of a specific 
unit such as words, sentences, text, or page proportion. Although this approach is 
commonly used in previous studies that have investigated R&D disclosure in annual 
reports (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Zeghal et al., 2007; Merkley, 2014), some concerns can 
be identified. Firstly, the higher frequency of specific information does not 
necessarily reveal the importance of it. Secondly, the counting of words, sentences, 
or texts does not help in capturing other non-narrative disclosures such as tables and 
graphs.  
The second approach is the use of disclosure index, which has been employed in 
many studies that concerned R&D disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Jones, 2007; La 
Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2015). Although 
Marston and Shrives (1991) acknowledge that the construction of a disclosure index 
involves subjective judgment, they conclude that the value of the results depending 
on the disclosure score cannot be considered uncritically and the aim of researchers 
should be to minimise the subjectivity of the disclosure index. Therefore, the current 
study employs a self-constructed disclosure index.  
4.6.  DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
Reviewing the disclosure literature and prior research on the R&D context reveals 
that, R&D investments are important activities that affect significantly the 
productivity, performance and market value of firms. Moreover, R&D-related 
information has value relevance. Hence, R&D disclosure is necessary for 
communicating the management’s efforts.  
R&D voluntary disclosure may be driven by many factors. In addition to the firm 
characteristics that have been examined extensively in the disclosure literature; the 
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current study examines a set of corporate governance variables that could influence 
the level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
4.6.1. Corporate Governance Variables  
Brown et al., (2011) argue that the positive influence of corporate governance quality 
on disclosure is expected according to the regulators’ presumption. They also point 
out that the empirical evidence provides mixed results, suggesting rich research 
opportunities to investigate the impact of corporate governance on corporate 
disclosure on a cross country basis.  
The current study contributes to the limited existing literature regarding R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. It investigates the influence of three groups of 
corporate governance variables on the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports for 
a sample of the UK firms. These groups are: the board characteristics, Ownership 
Structure, and Audit Committee characteristics. 
4.6.1.1. The Board Characteristics  
Conheady et al., (2014:13) state “an effective board of directors is central to agency 
theory’s prescription to protecting owners’ interests, the minimization of agency 
costs and ensuring that principal-agent interests are aligned.”. Hence, the board of 
directors is considered a main tool to exercise control on top management by 
shareholders (John and Senbet, 1998).  Moreover, the main responsibility of the 
board of directors, as identified by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), is to 
present a fair, balanced and understandable evaluation of the company’s position and 
prospects. Accordingly, board effectiveness is a key element in mitigating the agency 
costs, and enhancing the firm’s transparency. Consequently, board characteristics 
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could influence the R&D disclosure decisions. The current study examines four 
board characteristics these are: board size, role duality, board independence and 
frequency of board meetings. 
 Board Size 
The size of the board represents the total number of directors on the board. The 
influence of board size on the board effectiveness has been a subject to debate. 
Hidalgo et al., (2011) summarize this debate by concluding  that, the large number of 
members on the board increase the range of expertise and the board’s monitoring 
capacity. However, this benefit may be compensated by the incremental costs of 
decision making time that are associated with large groups.  
According to agency theory, the board effectiveness in implementing its monitoring 
role is determined by its size, independence, and composition (John and Senbet, 
1998). 
As recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), having sufficient 
diversity on the board is very important to achieve an effective engagement with key 
stakeholders and to fulfil the firm’s strategy. Moreover, the guidance of board 
effectiveness issued by (FRC, 2011: 2) states that “Diversity in board composition is 
an important driver of a board’s  effectiveness, creating a breadth of perspective 
among, and breaking down a tendency towards ‘group think’.”. 
Empirically, the evidence is mixed. While, the positive influence of large board size 
on intellectual capital disclosure is supported by the findings of Hidalgo et al., 
(2011), Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) find a negative relationship between board 
size and intellectual capital disclosure. 
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Regarding R&D disclosure, the empirical evidence on the relationship between board 
size and R&D disclosure is very limited. Although, Nekhili et al., (2015) were unable 
to confirm a significant impact of board size on R&D narrative disclosure, the 
existence of a significant and positive association between board size and R&D 
disclosure in annual reports is documented by Abdelbadi and Elshandidy (2013).  
The positive association between R&D disclosure and board size is expected because  
R&D activities have a distinctive nature. Hence they may  need the judgement of a 
director with a scientific background to provide a clear understanding of some R&D- 
related information. This kind of skill is more likely to be available in large boards 
that have a greater diversity of expertise. This leads to the first hypothesis in the 
current study. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the board size and the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
 Role Duality  
Role duality exists when the (CEO) is also the chairman of the board. According to 
agency theory, the separation of decision management and decision control functions 
will reduce the agency costs and improve firm’s performance (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). This separation will be effective when the chairman of the board does not 
hold the CEO position (Brown et al., 2011).  
Consequently, separating the roles of chairman of the board and CEO helps the board 
to improve its performance and implement its control function more effectively 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Conheady et al., 2014). Moreover, the UK Corporate 
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Governance Code 2014 recommends that, the roles of the chairman of the board and 
(CEO) should not be performed by the same person. 
Although the majority of studies that address the association between role duality 
and R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports were not able to confirm a 
significant association between the two variables (Nor et al., 2010; Abdelbadi& 
Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015), Zeghal et al., (2007) find a negative 
association between role duality and R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports in 
the Canada context.  
Based on the above discussion, separating the roles of chairman of the board and 
CEO makes the board of directors more likely to carry out its control function more 
effectively, and ensure the firm’s transparency. Consequently, role duality is 
expected to be associated negatively with the level of R&D disclosure in annual 
reports. This leads to the second hypothesis in the current study: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the role duality and the level of 
R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
 Board Independence 
Board independence is measured as the percentage of the number of independent 
non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board. 
According to agency theory, Lim et al., (2007) argue that the employment of 
independent non-executive directors works as a mechanism to monitor management's 
performance and decrease information asymmetry between managers and owners. In 
addition, the outside directors have an incentive to perform as decision experts to 
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develop their reputation and increase their own value in the human capital market 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
R&D activities are a specific type of investment, which differs from most of the 
company’s other activities. They are long-term investments characterised by 
uncertainly and long run return (Munari et al., 2010). Therefore, R&D activities can 
be identified as a major contributor of information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000) 
Consequently, drawing on agency theory, the independent directors may increase the 
R&D voluntary disclosure by monitoring the management’s performance and 
encouraging managers to introduce more R&D-related information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry. Moreover,  they have a motivation to perform as experts in 
order to enhance their reputation in the human capital market. 
The existing literature provides empirical evidence supporting the role of 
independent directors in introducing more voluntary disclosure in general (Lim et al., 
2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008 Gisbert and Navallas, 2013), and intellectual 
capital disclosure, in particular (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007) 
In terms of the R&D context, the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
board independence and R&D disclosure is limited. In addition, the few studies, that 
have addressed this relationship, could not find a significant association between 
board independence and R&D disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Zegal et al., 2007; 
Abdelbadi and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). Although, these few studies 
were unable to introduce evidence on this relationship, a positive influence of board 
independence on the level of R&D disclosure is expected. This proposed relationship 
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follows the argument that support  the effective monitoring role of the independent 
non executive directors. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the board independence and the 
level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
 Frequency  of Board Meetings  
According to agency theory, the board of directors has the power to monitor the 
decisions which are made by top level management, and this role exercised by the 
board of directors is one of the main bases of the decision control system of firms 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The number of board meetings held during the year could be an indicator of the 
board effectiveness in implementing this monitoring role. As stated by Zaman et al., 
(2011:173)“the number of board meetings can indicate the level of diligence 
exercised by the board of directors.”. This view is supported by The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014:7)“The board of directors should meet sufficiently regularly 
to discharge its duties effectively.”. 
Consequently, the frequency of board meetings is more likely to increase the board 
effectiveness, and improve its monitoring role, in turn, enhancing the firm’s 
transparency. Based on this argument, boards that meet more frequency are more 
likely to introduce more R&D voluntary disclosure. 
There is a very limited investigation of the association between frequency of board 
meetings and the level of disclosure. Kent and Stewart, (2008) find a positive 
relationship between the quantity of disclosure and the frequency of board meetings. 
Empirically, to the best of my knowledge, the relationship between the number of 
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board meetings and R&D disclosure in annual reports has not been examined. From 
the previous discussion, it could be argued that, boards that held more meetings are 
more likely to be more effective and provide enhanced R&D disclosure. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the number of board meetings and 
the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
4.6.1.2. Ownership Structure 
Eng and Mak, (2003:326 ) states that“The structure of ownership determines the 
level of monitoring and thereby the level of disclosure.”. 
Following (Eng and Mak, 2003) the ownership structure can be assessed by the 
percentage of ordinary shares held by managers and by blockholders. Therefore, 
ownership structure examined in the present study includes managerial ownership 
and ownership concentration. 
 Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership is measured as a percentage of shares held by management. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the increase of managerial ownership will 
decrease the need for monitoring and controlling the behaviour of an agent by the 
principal. Consequently, according to agency theory, firms with higher management 
ownership may have less incentive to introduce more disclosure (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Rouf and Alharun, 2011). Management ownership supports the interests of the 
agent and shareholders, thus reducing the need for monitoring by shareholders and 
thereby the need for more disclosure (Samaha et al., 2012). 
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Empirical evidence in Eng and Mak (2003) show that firms are less likely to provide 
voluntary disclosure when managerial ownership increases. However, regarding 
R&D disclosure in annual reports, most studies could not detect any significant 
association between managerial ownership and R&D disclosure (e.g. Nor et al., 
2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al, 2015).  
Based on agency theory the negative association between managerial ownership and 
the level of R&D disclosure is expected. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is formulated 
as follows: 
H5: There is a negative relationship between the level of management ownership 
and the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
 Ownership Concentration (Blockholder Ownership) 
Blockholder ownership is the percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial 
shareholders. This percentage identified as 5% or more  (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Huafang & Jianguo, 2007), or as 3% or more of the firm's share capital (e.g. Li et al., 
2012).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) theorized that diffusion in ownership raises the agency 
problems. Hence, it is expected that managers will disclose more information to 
mitigate the agency costs resulting from the ownership dispersion. (Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007; Garcia-Meca and Ballesta, 2010). Moreover, the diffusion in 
ownership will increase the monitoring by outside shareholders and thereby the level 
of disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Li et al., (2012) suggest that enhanced intellectual capital disclosure is less likely in 
firms with higher levels of blockholder ownership. They indicate that the availability 
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of the information in the private meetings that are attended by substantial 
shareholders may decrease their motivation to prompt firms to enhance public 
disclosure of this information.   
The evidence from empirical studies reveals a significant negative association 
between ownership concentration and corporate disclosure (e.g. Garcia-Meca and 
Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010). However, other empirical results indicate a positive 
relationship between corporate disclosure and ownership concentration (e.g. Huafang 
and Jianguo, 2007). To the best of my knowledge, no empirical evidence of the 
relationship between ownership concentration and R&D disclosure in annual reports 
has been confirmed (e.g. Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadi and Elshandidy, 2013; 
Nekhili et al., 2015) 
Based on the above discussion, ownership concentration is associated with less 
agency conflicts, so the managers may have less incentive to introduce more 
voluntary disclosure. Consequently, the ownership concentration is expected to 
decrease the probability of introducing more R&D voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H6: There is a negative relationship between the level of ownership concentration 
and the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
4.6.1.3. Audit Committee Characteristics 
The guidance on audit committees issued by FRC in September (2012) identifies the 
role of the audit committee regarding narrative reporting as: 
“Where requested by the board, the audit committee should review the content 
of the annual report and accounts and advise the board on whether, taken as a 
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whole, it is fair, balanced and understandable and provides the information 
necessary for shareholders to assess the company’s performance, business 
model and strategy.”. (FRC, 2012: 7) 
Li et al., (2012) argue that the audit committee would affect the intellectual capital 
disclosure by reducing the information asymmetry. This is because the main 
responsibility of the audit committee as a sub-committee of the board of directors is 
monitoring the reporting processes of financial and non financial information 
including intellectual capital information. 
From the agency theory perspective, this monitoring role of the audit committee can 
be considered as a tool to mitigate the agency costs (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
Consequently, the effectiveness of the audit committee may have a positive influence 
on R&D disclosure decisions. Following Zaman et al., (2011), the audit committee 
effectiveness can be assessed by four dimensions that are audit committee size, audit 
committee independence, frequency of audit committee meetings and the existence 
of an audit committee financial expertise.  
 Audit Committee Size  
The size of an audit committee is the total number of audit committee members. The 
audit committee size will vary according to the need and culture of the company, 
hence; the cornerstone of the committee’s efficiency is meeting the board’s 
expectations and carrying out its delegated responsibilities (KPMG, 2009). Bedard et 
al., (2004) argue that the key element is to establish a committee large enough to 
achieve effective monitoring, but not so large to negatively affect the decision-
making process. FRC recommended a minimum audit committee membership of 
three, or two in the case of smaller companies (FRC, 2009). 
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 Audit Committee Independence 
The audit committee should be independent of the firm's management in order to 
undertake its duties (Bedard et al., 2004). Audit committee independence is 
measured as the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the audit 
committee. 
FRC recommends that the audit committee should be established with at least three 
(or two in the case of smaller companies) members, who are independent non-
executive directors (FRC, 2009).  
Consequently, the composition of the audit committee, which included a majority of 
independent directors, can improve the quality of financial disclosure to ensure the 
accurate evaluation of management performance (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). 
 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
Frequency of audit committee meetings is measured by the number of audit 
committee meetings held during the year. The frequency of audit committee 
meetings and their duration should vary depending on the range and complexity of 
the committee’s responsibilities, and it is recommended that the audit committee may 
need to meet at least eight times a year to conduct its activities effectively (KPMG, 
2009). According to the guidance on the audit committee published by FRC, there 
should be at least three meetings of audit committee during the year; however, most 
audit committee chairmen will wish to call more frequent meetings (FRC, 2009).  
Raghunandan and Rama (2007) argue that the frequency of audit committee 
meetings is considered the only publicly available quantitative indicator about the 
diligence of audit committees.  
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 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
In order to carry out their tasks and achieve an effective reviewing of both financial 
and narrative reporting and also an efficient monitoring of internal controls and risk 
management systems, the members of the audit committee should have relevant 
financial experience. Best practice required that at least one member of the audit 
committee should have recent and relevant financial experience (FRC, 2009). On the 
other hand, Li et al., (2012) do not empirically support the association between 
intellectual capital disclosure and existence of financial expertise on the audit 
committee. They argue that the rationale behind this result may be that the financial 
experience is more related to financial issues than to intellectual capital information. 
This is because understanding some intellectual capital information such as research 
and development activities may require another knowledge. 
 Audit Committee Quality 
According to the guidance of audit committees published by the FRC (Guidance on 
Audit Committees) in September 2012 to revise the Smith Report (2003), the audit 
committee should be established with at least three independent non-executive 
directors; one of them at least should have recent and relevant financial experience. It 
is recommended by the FRC that there should be no fewer than three meetings 
during the year. Zaman et al., (2011) suggest that the audit committee effectiveness 
can be measured according to the composite measure of four dimensions: audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, 
frequency of audit committee meetings. Following Zaman et al., (2011) audit 
committee effectiveness is a dichotomous variable equal to (1) when an audit 
committee is comprised of at least three members, all of them independent non-
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executive directors, at least one member of the audit committee has financial 
expertise, and audit committee members meet at least three times a year, and equal to 
(0) if otherwise.   
Given the role of the audit committee in monitoring the reporting processes of 
financial and non financial information the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 H7: There is a positive relationship between the audit committee quality and the 
level of R&D disclosure in annual reports. 
4.6.2. Control Variables  
The control variables of the current study are the corporate characteristics that have 
been examined by a large number of studies and considered to be important 
determinants of corporate disclosure. These are: firm size, R&D investments, 
liquidity, leverage, profitability and growth rate. 
 Firm Size  
Firm size has been used in literature as an important control variable on studying the 
association between corporate disclosure and corporate governance. According to 
signaling theory, large companies are more likely to catch the attention of financial 
analysts to gain the information needed in making rational advices (Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar, 2011). So, signaling theory would suggest a positive association between 
corporate disclosure and firm size. 
One explanation of the association between firm size and disclosure is the  decrease 
of the fixed cost component of disclosure for large companies (Lang and Lundholm 
1993). Large companies have a more developed internal reporting system; hence, the 
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disclosure costs are smaller for large companies (Chavent et al., 2006). Another 
possible explanation could be that small firms may be unwilling to introduce more 
information because this disclosure might put them at a competitive disadvantage 
(Cooke, 1989). Furthermore, Raffournier (1995) suggests that larger companies will 
disclose more to reduce political costs. 
 The influence of firm size on disclosure has been examined in most prior studies, 
which investigated the determinants of voluntary disclosure. Results have often 
provided evidence that firm size is positively associated with disclosure levels (e.g. 
McNally et al., 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1989, Hossain et al., 
1995; Raffournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Watson et al., 2002). However, other 
studies find an insignificant relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm size 
(e.g. Mak, 1991; Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007). Moreover, Nor et al., (2010) and 
Nekhili et al., (2015) document a negative association between firm size and R&D 
voluntary disclosure. According to the previous discussion and the results of the 
majority of prior studies, a positive relationship between firm size and R&D 
disclosure in annual reports is expected. 
 R&D Investment 
Many researchers argue that R&D activities are associated with the existence of 
considerable information asymmetry (Tasker, 1998; Aboody and Lev, 2000; Barth et 
al., 2001). Therefore, some researchers use R&D intensity as a proxy for information 
asymmetry (e.g. Aboody and Lev, 2000; Percy, 2000). Hence, the information 
asymmetry hypothesis will expect a positive association between R&D investments 
and the level of disclosure (Gu and Li, 2003). 
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Moreover, Munari et al., (2010) indicate that the management decisions of R&D 
investments are mainly indicative of the disagreement between principals’ and 
agents’ interests. In addition, providing more information regarding R&D activities 
has value-relevance influencing the firm’s market value (Chan et al., 1990; 
Woolridge and Snow, 1990; Dedman et al., 2008; Hirshey et al., 2001). Therefore, 
signalling and agency theories would suggest that, the managers of the firms with 
high level of R&D investments may have a stronger  incentive to signal their 
transparency, reduce the information asymmetry, moderate the conflict between 
principals’ and agents’ interests and finally, gain the market rewards for better 
disclosure. This can be achieved by introducing more information about their R&D 
activities. Accordingly, signalling and agency theories would predict a positive 
relationship between the disclosure and R&D investments. 
Empirically most studies that address R&D disclosure document a significant 
positive relationship between R&D disclosure and each of, R&D expenditures to 
total sales (Zeghal et al., 2007; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2015), and R&D 
expenses as a percentage of total current operating expenses (Entwistle, 1999; 
Abdelbadi and Elshandidy, 2013; Merkley, 2014). However, other studies could not 
find a significant association between R&D disclosure, and each of R&D capitalised 
over the total assets (Nor et al., 2010), amount of R&D expenses (La Rosa and 
Liberatore, 2014), R&D expenditures to total sales (Jones, 2007). 
 Leverage 
Leverage describes the financial structure of the firm, and measures its financial risk. 
Drawing on agency theory two different arguments have been used to explain the 
expected relationship between leverage and the level of disclosure.  
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The first point of view suggests that a positive relationship is expected between 
voluntary disclosure and leverage because firms with high leverage are more likely 
to incur higher monitoring cost (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Therefore, managers 
would use the disclosure as a tool to reduce the monitoring costs for creditors 
(Raffournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Chavent et al., 2006). On the contrary, the other 
point of view argues that increasing leverage is more likely to reduce equity agency 
costs by involving more debt financing, thus, reducing total equity financing 
(Crutchley and Hansen, 1989). Jensen, (1986) argued that debt creation can be an 
effective substitute for dividend in reducing the agency costs of  the firms with free 
cash flow, that is available for spending at the discretion of managers, and pointed 
out the importance of considering the debt agency costs.  
Although leverage is widely examined in prior disclosure studies, conflicting results 
have been reported regarding the influence of leverage on corporate disclosure. 
Many studies have confirmed a significant positive relationship between disclosure 
level and leverage (e.g. Hossain et al., 1995; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Merkley, 
2014). On the contrary, Eng and Mak (2003) found a negative relationship between 
debt and disclosure. However, other studies found no significant effect due to 
leverage on disclosure (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Entwistle, 1999; Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Depoers, 2000; Nekhili, 2012).  
 Profitability 
Many theories have been employed to explain the effect of a firm’s performance on 
its disclosure decisions. Signalling theory would suggest that the firm would provide 
information about its high profitability to investors (Watson et al., 2002). Moreover, 
Li et al., (2008) suggest that profitability may be considered as the gain from 
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continuous investments in intellectual capital, so managers may introduce more 
information to signal the significance of their investment decisions. 
Agency theory can also be used to support this relationship, Singhvi et al., (1971) 
argue that managers tend to disclose more information when they achieve a high rate 
of return in order to support their position.  
Empirically, there have been conflicting results in prior literature relating to the 
impact of profitability on disclosure. While Ahmed and Courtis (1999) find no 
significant association between corporate profitability and disclosure level, 
Raffournier (1995) and Watson et al., (2002) find a positive association between 
voluntary disclosure and profitability. Recently, Merkley (2014) has reported a 
negative relationship between earnings performance and narrative R&D disclosure. 
 Liquidity  
liquidity is an indicator of the firm’s ability to cover its current obligations. Wallace 
and Naser (1995) suggest that firms with a high liquidity ratio are more likely to 
introduce more disclosure to demonstrate their ability to meet their short term 
obligations. From signalling theory perspective, managers of highly-liquid firms will 
introduce more disclosure to signal their ability in managing liquidity compared to 
other managers in companies with low liquidity ratios (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). 
Regarding the R&D context, managers may have the incentive to disclose more 
information about R&D activities in highly-liquid firms to signal their strong 
position and their ability to face their current obligations.  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate disclosure and liquidity is 
quite limited.  While Elshandidy et al., (2013) confirm a positive association between 
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the liquidity and voluntary risk disclosure, Mangena and Pike (2005) are unable to 
confirm any significant relationship between liquidity and the level of disclosure in 
interim reports; Elzahar and Hussainey, (2012) also find an insignificant association 
between liquidity and corporate risk disclosure in the UK interim reports. However, 
Wallace et al., (1994) provide evidence that firms with lower liquidity ratios 
provided more disclosure in their annual reports. Regarding R&D disclosure, Nor et 
al., (2010) are not able to confirm any significant influence of liquidity on the level 
of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
 Firm’s Growth Rate 
Firms with a higher growth rate may have higher information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders, so they would have more incentives to disclose 
voluntary information in order to reduce this information gap (Gul and Leung, 2004).  
However, the growth rate is used by Prencip (2004) as a proxy for proprietary costs. 
Prencip (2004) argues that the competitive costs of introducing voluntary segment 
information could be higher for growing companies, so, the negative association 
between a firm’s growth rate and voluntary disclosure is expected. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate disclosure and growth rate 
is also inconclusive. La Rosa and Liberattore (2014) confirm a negative association 
between the firm’s growth, measured by market to book ratio, and the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure. While, Eng and Mak (2003) find no significant association 
between the growth opportunities and voluntary disclosure; McNally et al., (1982) as 
well, are not able to confirm any significant association between corporate voluntary 
disclosure and firm’s growth measured by growth in total assets.  
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4.7.  SUMMARY  
This chapter reviews some of the important studies that examined the association 
between corporate governance and each of corporate disclosure and intellectual 
capital disclosure. In general,  the findings indicate that corporate governance has an 
influence on corporate disclosure and on intellectual capital disclosure in annual 
reports. However, the results are mixed and there is no agreement regarding the 
nature and significance of this influence for each corporate governance attribute. 
More specifically, the chapter reviews the studies, which have investigated R&D 
activities. Generally, the findings reveal that R&D investments are important 
activities that affect significantly the productivity, performance and market value of 
the firms, and highlight the importance of R&D voluntary disclosure introduced by 
firms outside the formal annual reports.  
Although, there are many studies which investigate voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports, few specifically examine the R&D disclosure in annual reports. The findings 
of the few studies concerning R&D disclosure in annual reports are limited to a short 
time period, small samples, specific industries. They also overlook the role of some 
corporate governance attributes as a possible explanation of variations in the level of 
R&D disclosure among firms. Consequently, the current study contributes to 
literature by considering these limitations. It examines the influence of a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance on R&D voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports, for a large sample of the UK firms, from different industries, and over a 
three-year period. It uses a self-constructed disclosure index that considers the total 
R&D voluntary disclosure, its categories (general, input, output, and financial 
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information), its types (financial and non-financial information) and each item of 
R&D information presented in the annual reports. 
The second part of this chapter summarises and evaluates the main  approaches that 
have been used by researchers to analyse the narratives in annual reports. Finally, the 
research hypotheses are formulated based on the integrated theoretical framework 
presented in chapter three, and the literature review presented in the first part of the 
current chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Methodology 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
The current study investigates R&D voluntary disclosure practices in annual reports 
of the UK firms. The theoretical discussion in chapter three outlines the proposed 
theoretical framework for the current study. In addition, the review of prior literature 
in chapter four highlights the lack of studies that have investigated R&D voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports, especially, the influence of corporate governance 
attributes on R&D-related information introduced discretionarily by firms. 
Based on the previous chapters, the main objective of the current study is to measure 
the extent and trend of R&D voluntary disclosure in the UK firms’ annual reports. The 
study also seeks to examine the impact of corporate governance on R&D disclosure 
provided discretionarily in annual reports, with controlling for the firm characteristics 
that could influence the R&D disclosure practices. 
The current chapter outlines the methodology employed to carry out the empirical 
part of this study. This chapter consists of eight sections. Section (2) discusses the 
research approach, type and technique. Section (3) discusses the research method 
selected for the current study. Section (4) summaries the research design, including, 
the UK context, the time horizon, the population of the study, the sample selection, 
the characteristics of the disclosure index, the construction of the R&D disclosure 
checklist and finally the assessment of its reliability and validity. Section (5) presents 
the definitions and measurements of dependent and independent variables, followed 
by, model specification in section (6). Section (7) summaries the analytical 
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procedures employed in the study. Finally, section (8) introduces the main issues 
discussed in the current chapter. 
5.2. RESEARCH APPROACH,  TYPE AND TECHNIQUE 
There are two main research approaches: the inductive and the deductive. The 
main difference between the two approaches is that in the inductive approach, 
researchers move from data to theory, while they move from theory to data in the 
deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2007). In other words, The inductive research 
starts with collecting data about a particular topic. Then, the researcher looks for the 
pattern of data and analyses it, finally; from the results, it may be possible to 
construct generalizations relationships and even theories (Gray, 2009). On other 
hands, the deductive approach starts with developing hypotheses, drawing on the 
existing theories, and empirically testing them. Hence, the hypotheses are supported 
or not based on the results of analysing (Gray, 2009). Figure  5.1 outlines the steps 
involved with both inductive and deductive approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 
Inductive and Deductive Approaches  
Source: adopted from Blackstone (2012:43) 
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The current study aims to investigate the R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
and examine the relationship between the level of R&D disclosure and corporate 
governance. Therefore, the deductive approach is considered to be more suitable to 
achieve the aim of the current study. 
The research can be classified by its purpose to three types of studies: 
exploratory, descriptive and causal studies. Exploratory research is conducted 
when not enough is known about a particular phenomenon (Gray, 2009) Therefore, it 
is usually a first step, followed by additional research to provide more conclusive 
evidence (Zikmund et al., 2009). Descriptive research is conducted to identify a 
particular phenomenon by drawing a picture of it (Gray, 2009). In other words, it 
seeks to describe characteristics of objects, people, groups, organisations, or 
environment (Zikmund et al., 2009). Explanatory (causal) research aims to explain 
the descriptive information (Gray,209). Therefore, Zikmunnd et al., (2009 :57) states 
that “The different types of research discussed here are often building blocks- 
exploratory research builds the foundation for descriptive research, which usually 
establishes the basis for causal research.”.  
The current study aims to complement the pioneering exploratory study which 
conducted by Entwistle (1999) to clarify the R&D disclosure environment. 
Therefore, the current study seeks to describe the R&D disclosure practices in annual 
reports and examine the impact of corporate governance on the level of R&D 
disclosure. Accordingly, the first part of the current study is considered to be a 
descriptive research, while the second part is considered to be an explanatory study. 
Data collection techniques can be classified into quantitative and qualitative. 
Quantitative technique is based on the measurement of quantity or amount, while the 
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qualitative technique is concerned with a qualitative phenomenon (Kothari, 2004). 
Zikmund et al., (2009) tabulated the differences between the two techniques as 
shown in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1  
Comparing Quantitative and Qualitative  Research 
Research Aspect Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
Common 
purpose  
Test hypotheses or specific 
research questions. 
Discover ideas, used in 
exploratory research with 
general research objects 
Approach Measure and test. Observe and interpret 
Data collection 
approach 
Structured response, categories 
provided.  
Unstructured, free-form 
Researcher  
independence  
 
Researcher uninvolved observer, 
results are objective. 
Researcher is intimately 
involved, results are 
subjective. 
Samples Large samples . Small samples. 
 
Most often used Descriptive and causal research 
designs. 
Exploratory research designs. 
Source: adopted from Zikmund et al., (2009: 136) 
From the table, it can be noticed that quantitative technique is more suitable to 
descriptive and causal research. In addition, Greener (2008) argues that  quantitative 
technique is likely to be associated with a deductive approach. Accordingly, in line 
with the objectives of the current study, it adopted the deductive approach and 
employed descriptive and explanatory research. Therefore, it is believed that 
quantitative technique is the appropriate choice to  employ the current study. 
5.3.  RESEARCH METHOD 
The objective of the current study is to explore R&D voluntary disclosure practices 
in annual reports. Moreover, the study seeks to measure the extent of R&D voluntary 
disclosure, and investigate its trend over the period of study. Furthermore, the current 
study aims to identify the determinants of R&D voluntary disclosure in the UK 
context, especially the potential role of corporate governance.  
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As discussed in chapter four, two alternative approaches could be used to investigate 
the narrative disclosure in annual reports in order to achieve the purpose of the 
current study: The first approach quantifies the extent of disclosure by the 
frequency of a specific unit such as words, sentences, text, or page proportion. 
Although, this approach can help in capturing particular units such as words, 
sentences, or text,  it does not help in capturing other non-narrative disclosures such 
as tables and graphs. The second approach is the use of a disclosure index. 
Although Marston and Shrives (1991) acknowledge that the construction of 
disclosure index involves subjective judgment, they conclude that the value of the 
results depending on the disclosure score cannot be considered uncritically, and the 
aim of researchers should be how to minimise the subjectivity of the disclosure 
index. 
Therefore, the current study conducts content analysis as a research method and 
employs a self-constructed disclosure index to capture the R&D-related information 
in annual reports. 
5.3.1. The Content Analysis  
Krippendorf (2004:18) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful mater) to the contexts 
of their use”. Morris (1994:903) states that “content analysis is a research technique 
used to objectively and systematically make inferences about the intentions, attitudes, 
and values of individual by identifying specified characteristics in textual 
messages.”. 
Weber (1990:12) summarises the core idea of content analysis as “the central idea in 
content analysis is that the many words of the text are classified into much fewer 
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content categories, each category may consist of one, several or many words.”. 
Since the main objective of the current study is to explore the R&D disclosure 
practices in annual reports of the UK firms to make conclusions and introduce 
helpful insights about these practices, content analysis is the appropriate technique 
for conducting the current study. 
5.3.2. Manual and Computerised Content Analysis 
Several studies have used content analysis as a research method to capture different 
types of information in annual reports. The content analysis can be manually based 
on human-coding or computerised founded on computer-aided .  
The two methods have been used in prior literature. The manual method is employed 
by many researchers (e.g. Eng & Mak, 2003; Zeghal et al., 2007; La Rosa & 
Liberator, 2014), and the computerized method is used by other studies (e.g 
Hussainey et al., 2003; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Merkley, 2014). 
Although the computer-aided content analysis saves time and effort and allows 
examination of a large sample, the researchers acknowledged some concerns about 
the robustness of computerized content analysis. The electronic search is not a 
sufficient method in investigating the intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports 
(Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Hussainey (2004:53) states that “Traditional content 
analysis via manual reading is generally more effective than the computerised 
analysis in identifying certain themes in the texts.”. Therefore, the manual content 
analysis was chosen to conduct the current study.  
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5.4.  RESEARCH  DESIGN  
The next paragraphs discuss the main features of the research design that have been 
chosen by the current study, and the rationale behind these selections. 
5.4.1. The UK Context 
The choice of UK context based on three reasons: first, to the best of my knowledge, 
there is no empirical evidence from the UK context regarding R&D narrative 
disclosure in annual reports except a working paper introduced by Abdelbadie and 
Elshandidy (2013) that use computerised content analysis to investigate only the 
overall voluntary disclosure of R&D expenditures; there was no analysis of any 
R&D-related topics such as competition, tax credit, funding or patents.  
This gap is considered a motivation to improve the understanding of how the UK 
firms communicate R&D information in their annual reports. Consequently, the 
current study uses manual content analysis to explore R&D disclosure practices in 
annual reports of the UK firms, and uses a self constructed disclosure index to 
measure the level of R&D disclosure. In addition, the study identifies and analyses 
the type of R&D-related information in annual reports. Finally, it examines the 
impact of corporate governance on R&D disclosure, and considers some other 
variables that have not been addressed by Abdelbadie and Elshandidy (2013), such as 
the effectiveness of the audit committee and the number of board meetings. 
Second, there is a very recent study conducted by La Rosa and Liberatore (2014) to 
examine the impact of the regulatory regime of R&D narrative disclosure on the cost 
of capital. This study compares the regulatory regime of R&D narrative disclosure in 
eight western European countries (Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Norway, 
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France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). The study separates the countries 
with mandatory R&D disclosure requirements from the countries with a degree of 
flexibility concerning R&D disclosure requirements; the UK has only recommended 
R&D disclosure. Hence, the choice of UK context is appropriate for the current study 
which aims to examine the voluntary disclosure of R&D activities. 
Third, the UK context provides a suitable setting to examine the relationship 
between R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports and corporate governance. As 
stated by Lie et al., (2012: 99) “the’ comply or explain’ approach of corporate 
governance adopted in the UK implies that, there is a likelihood of greater variation 
in both corporate governance structure and disclosure among firms.”. In addition, 
Shirves and Brennan (2015: 1) States “The essence of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code is flexibility, with companies able to choose whether or not to fully comply.”. 
These variations in corporate governance structure introduce a good opportunity to 
examine the impact of corporate governance on the level of R&D disclosure. 
5.4.2. The R&D Disclosure in Annual Reports  
The current study focuses on the disclosure in the annual report as a statutory 
document with a formalised structure. These features help in comparing R&D 
voluntary disclosure practices over years and assessing its trend as well as  
investigating a large number of observations.  
The present study focuses on R&D voluntary disclosure provided in firms’ annual 
reports rather than other narrative information tools due to several reasons: 
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First, the disclosure introduced by firms in annual reports is an area of interest to 
many researchers (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 
2007; Bruggen et al., 2009). 
Second, the annual report is considered as a very useful source of information and 
managers commonly use it as a mechanism to signal what is important to all 
stakeholders (Guthrie et al., 2004). 
Third, annual reports are considered the most common tools of communication used 
by firms to locate themselves with different internal and external stakeholders. 
(Guthrie and petty, 2000).  
Moreover, Botosan (1997:330) states that:“Although annual report is only one 
means of corporate reporting, it should serve as a good proxy for the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across all disclosure avenues.”. Her 
argument based on the study of Lang and Lundholm (1993) who document a positive 
correlation between the disclosure score of annual reports and the disclosure score of 
other media. 
5.4.3. The Study Population   
The sample population in the current study is the top UK companies ranked by their 
R&D investments. This choice follows the same criteria used by Jones (2007) who 
ranks the firms by R&D intensity and includes only those firms in the top two 
quintiles to make sure that R&D investments are considered as an important part of 
the firm's activities.  
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The current study followed Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas (2011), and it is based on the 
R&D Scoreboards that are published by the Department of  Business Innovations and 
Skills (BIS). There are three reasons for choosing this source: 
First, many previous studies document a positive relationship between the quantity of 
R&D voluntary disclosure and the amount of R&D expenditures (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; 
Jones, 2007; Merkly, 2014). Therefore, the companies that spend more on their R&D 
activities will be expected to introduce more information about their R&D efforts. This 
affords a suitable environment to explore the voluntary disclosure of R&D activities. 
Second, the use of the BIS Scoreboards reduces the selection bias because they 
include only firms with material R&D investments. Therefore, the differences 
between firms with no substantial R&D investments (so, with no R&D disclosure) 
and firms with R&D investments, but who prefer to withhold the  information about 
their R&D activities can be considered. 
Third, a practical reason for using the BIS scoreboards is the availability of the data 
related to the amount of R&D investments. The R&D expenditures are considered an 
important explanatory variable in examining the determinants of R&D voluntary 
disclosure, which has been documented in the majority of previous studies (e.g. 
Entwistle, 1999; Zeghal et al., 2007; Jones, 2007; Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and 
Liberator, 2014; Nekhili, 2015). The BIS scoreboards provide data about R&D 
investments as reported in the firms’ annual reports. Moreover, the Scoreboards 
define R&D investments as the investments on R&D activities, which are funded by 
the firms themselves considering any additions to intangible assets and eliminating 
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any amortisation 
9
. Consequently, this calculation takes into account both expensed 
and capitalized R&D expenses. 
5.4.4. The Time Horizon  
The majority of studies that investigate R&D disclosure in annual reports employ 
cross sectional analysis and focus on one year (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007), or 
observations from two years without assessing the trend (e.g. Zeghal et al., 2007; Nor 
et al., 2010); the current study is considered to be a longitudinal study using panel 
data for three years. This choice helps to examine the trend of R&D disclosure 
practices over the years of the study. 
The annual reports of the top UK firms titled as the biggest spenders in R&D 
activities in the years 2007, 2008, and 2009 were chosen. The rationale behind 
choosing the year 2007 is the growing trend toward enhancing corporate disclosure 
in the UK, which reached its peak in 2006, when the ASB issued the report that 
introduced a set of recommendations and implementation guidance to identify the 
best practices in the preparation of the OFR. 
The rationale behind choosing the year 2009 was the cessation of publishing The 
R&D Scoreboards after the scoreboard which was published in 2010; this contained 
the required data of top 1000 UK firms ranked by their R&D investment as reported 
in their annual reports for the year 2009. So, the 2010 R&D Scoreboard was the 20th 
and final scoreboard published by the BIS and sponsored by the UK government. 
 
 
                                                          
9
  The 2010 R&D Scoreboard, Company Data. 
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5.4.5. The Sample Selection 
Following Tsoligkas and Tsalavoutas (2011), the current study depends on the 2008, 
2009, 2010 R&D Scoreboards as published by the BIS, which provide details of the 
top 1000 UK companies ranked by their R&D investment, (top 850 companies for 
2008). To ensure that all firms were subject to the same accounting rules and 
disclosure requirements, the sample selection process undertakes the next steps: 
First, the target population is the firms mentioned in the 2008, 2009 and 2010 R&D 
scoreboard, that present the biggest UK spenders in R&D activities in years 2007, 
2008, and 2009. The initial number of observations displayed in the R&D 
scoreboards for all  the three years is 2850.  
Second, the financial sector is excluded because it has specific regulations, which 
differ from other sectors. Hence the annual reports of financial companies may not 
be comparable to those of other companies. 
Third, the mining sector is also excluded because the International Accounting 
Standard IAS 38 (Intangible Assets) excludes expenditure on the development of 
non-regenerative resources from its scope (IAS 38, Para.2).  
Finally, unlisted firms and those firms that are listed in the Alternative Investment 
Markets (AIM) are excluded, because listed firms are subject to different statutory 
requirements that may affect their disclosure decisions and corporate governance 
structure. 
 Therefore, the main sample includes 612 firm-year observations. Some other firms 
are excluded from the sample due to the absence of published annual reports or 
because there were no associated corporate governance data in their annual reports, 
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or corporate characteristics data in Data Stream. Therefore, the final sample is 505 
observations. 
Table 5.2 panel A shows the sample selection process, panel B provides a breakdown 
of the sample by year and panel C presents the composition of sample by industry. 
Table 5.2 
Summary of  Sample Selection & Distribution of Observations by Year and by Industries 
Panel A: Sample Selection process 
Years 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Total Observations from the Scoreboard 850 1000 1000 2850 
Financial firms (15) (15) (16) (46) 
Mining  (4) (4) (5) (13) 
Unlisted firms (487) (626) (648) (1761) 
Listed firms in AIM (137) (152) (129) (418) 
Sample 207 203 202 612 
Firms with incomplete data (50) (30) (27) (107) 
Final Sample 157 173 175 505 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Observations by Year 
Year Freq.  Percent Cum. 
2007 157 31.09 31.09 
2008 173 34.26 65.35 
2009 175 34.65 100.00 
Total  505 100.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Observations by Industry 
Industry        Freq. Percent Cum. 
Oil & Gas   13 2.57 2.57 
Basic Materials    21 4.16 6.73 
Industrials    175 34.65 41.39 
Consumer Goods   63 12.48 53.86 
Health Care   69 13.66 67.52 
Consumer Services   46 9.11 76.63 
Telecommunications  11 2.18 78.81 
Utilities    19 3.76 82.57 
Technology 88 17.43 100.00 
Total          505 100.00  
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5.4.6. The Characteristics of  Disclosure Index  
Both weighted and unweighted indexes have been employed by the literature to 
measure the level of disclosure. While the weighted disclosure index assigns a 
weight to each item to consider the variations in the importance of each type of 
information (e.g. Botoson, 1997; Jones, 2007), the unweighted index awards each 
item the same score (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Raffournier, 1995, Oliveira et al., 2006).  
The main assumption of using the unweighted index is that each item of disclosure is 
considered equally important (Cooke, 1989). Since, the current study does not focus 
on a specific user group, therefore, the unweighted index will be the appropriate 
choice. 
The current study uses binary measurement, so each of the (26 items) included in the 
R&D disclosure index scores (1) if disclosed and (0) otherwise. This decision is 
made to avoid the subjective ordinary scale which measures items according to a 
specific content of information such as forward-looking information and backward-
looking information. 
The disclosure index employed in this study grouped the disclosure items into four 
categories: general, input, output and financial information. This classification helps 
in investigating each group of information, and expands the analysis of R&D 
disclosure by considering the differences among these groups. 
Figure 5.2 summarises the selected methodological approach employed in the current 
study. 
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Figure 5.2 
Selected Methodological Approach 
 
 
5.4.7. Construction the R&D Disclosure Checklist 
The construction of the R&D disclosure index was in five stages: Firstly, list of 
R&D information items was identified based on Entwistle (1999). Secondly, 
reviewing 100 annual reports of the UK firms which are included in the main sample 
of the current study and chosen randomly to identify the maximum possible items of 
R&D information. Thirdly, modifying the list of R&D information introduced by 
Entwistle (1999) to fit with the UK context. Next, the initial checklist was reviewed 
by two UK academics, the comments were discussed and considered. Finally, the 
R&D disclosure index is constructed and composed of (26 items). It contains four 
main groups: general, input, output and financial disclosure. Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
steps that are followed to construct the R&D disclosure index.  
 
R&D Voluntary Disclosure 
Annual Reports 
Content Analysis 
Self-Constructed Disclosure Index 
Manual (Human-Coded) 
Characteristics of the Index 
Grouping of item 
into Categories 
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Figure 5.3  
The Construction of R&D Disclosure Index 
 
The following sections describe the steps that are performed to construct the R&D 
disclosure index. 
 Step (1): Identifying R&D Related Information According to Entwistle 
(1999) 
Entwistle (1999) prepared an R&D disclosure checklist on the base of a series of 
field interviews with 15 of Canada’s top technology analysts, and with 21 executives 
from Canada’s technology-intensive firms to explore the different aspects regarding 
R&D disclosure. Furthermore, he confirms his list by conducting a content analysis 
of annual reports of 113 Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) listed firms. Hence, he 
supports his findings from the field study by exploring the firm’s management 
practices on R&D-related information in annual reports. 
Step (1)  
Using Entwistle (1999), a list of R&D-related information is identified. 
Step (2) 
Using 100 randomly selected annual reports of the UK firms, a list of other 
R&D-related information is identified (UK context). 
Step (3) 
To take into account the disclosure environment in the UK, the list prepared 
in step (1) is modified considering the list prepared in step (2). 
Step (4) 
Reviewing the initial checklist. 
 
Step (5) 
The R&D disclosure index is constructed, composed 26 items. 
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Entwistle (1999) classifies R&D disclosure into six main categories: inputs, outputs, 
future expenditure, financing, accounting and strategy.  He divided his main categories 
into 19 subcategories containing both quantitative and qualitative information. 
Table 5.3 presents the classification of R&D information according to Entwistle (1999). 
 
Table 5.3 
Types of R&D Information according to Entwistle (1999) 
Main   Subcategories (information item) 
1. Inputs  Product description. 
 People involved in performing R&D activities. 
 Physical R&D Infrastructure. 
2. Outputs  Actual Achievements (Product development) 
 Actual Achievements (Beyond Product development: 
e.g., revenue, market share) 
 Potential Achievements. 
 Timing Issues. 
3. Future Expenditures  Estimated spending. 
 Focus on future R&D spending. 
4. Financing  Source of R&D financing (past and current year). 
 Source of R&D financing (future). 
5. Accounting/Financial  Comparisons-Prior Years 
 Comparisons-Competitors 
 Comparisons-Budget 
  R&D spending Ratios 
 R&D as Explanatory of changes in other financial items. 
 Explaining R&D spending Changes. 
 Accounting Policies. 
6. Strategy  R&D information with a strategic tone. 
 Step (2): Exploring R&D Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports UK 
context 
A randomly selected 100 annual reports of the UK firms from different industries 
included in the main sample of the current study is investigated as follows: 
- Reading the narrative section in the annual report. 
- Marking any sentence, text, graph, and table provides any information related 
to R&D activities.  
- Identifying the type of information for each sentence, graph, and table.  
- Making a list for any new R&D information in annual reports that not found 
in the checklist of Entwistle (1999). 
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For example, the following sentence could be categorised as providing information in 
relation to Future R&D expenditures.“In 2010, R&D costs as a percentage of turnover 
are expected to remain at around 14%” (Source: GSK Annual Report, 2009: 33). 
For example, the table 5.4 could be categorised as providing information in relation 
to five types of R&D disclosure: Present R&D expenditures, Comparison of R&D 
expenditures to those of prior year, R&D Ratios, Funding and R&D accounting 
policy discussion outside the financial statements. 
Table 5.4  
Analysis of R&D costs (Meggitt plc, Annual Report 2009) 
Analysis of R&D Costs  2009 Group  £’m. 2008 Group £’m. 
Total R&D expenditure 85.278.8 78.8 
% of revenue 7% 7% 
Customer funded R&D (19.2) (19.4) 
Capitalised (35.1) (23.7) 
Amortisation 6.5 3.5 
Charge to income statement 37.4 39.2 
                         Source: Meggitt plc, Annual Report, 2009, p. 14 
For example, the figure 5.4 could be categorised as providing information in relation 
to three types of R&D disclosure. Present R&D expenditures, Comparison of R&D 
expenditures to those of the prior year, Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of 
prior years. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5.4 
Research & Development Expenditure  
Source: Halma plc, annual report 2008, p.3. 
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 Step (3): Modifying the Checklist of Entwistle (1999) with the R&D 
Information Identified  from the UK  Firm’s Annual Reports  
A comparison between the checklist of Entwistle (1999) in the Canadian context and 
the list of R&D information prepared based on the randomly selected annual reports 
in the UK context is employed. Then, the checklist of Entwistle (1999) is updated 
following the pilot study of the annual reports of the UK firms to ensure that the final 
checklist includes all types of R&D information that are relevant to the UK 
environment and able to capture R&D disclosure practices in annual reports. 
Finally, this process leads to adding seven more items of R&D-related information to 
the checklist introduced by Entwistle (1999): R&D as a main activity, R&D & 
competition & market, R&D and risk, Tax credit relating to R&D activities, R&D 
and future opportunities, other parties involved in R&D and firm’s patent.  
 Step (4): Reviewing the Initial Checklist 
After constructing the initial checklist, two UK academics have been asked to review it 
and refine the R&D disclosure items in order to improve the validity of the research 
instruments. All suggestions are discussed and considered to ensure the ability of the 
final checklist to capture all the R&D-related information in annual reports. 
 Step (5): Constructing the Final Checklist  
A final R&D disclosure checklist is constructed. It classifies R&D-related 
information into four main categories: general, input, output and financial 
information, and 26 subcategories, including both financial and non-financial items. 
General disclosure includes matters related to R&D activities in general that cover 
firm objectives and vision about R&D activities, risks, competition, the effect of 
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R&D spending on other financial items and explanation of that spending, future 
opportunities and tax credit.  
The input disclosure includes information about the resources used in R&D activities 
such as infrastructure, people and management, funds and financial resources and 
collaboration with other parties involved in R&D activities.  
The output information regarding the result of R&D activities includes past 
achievement from R&D activities that have already been recognised in the past, the 
achievement completed during the present year, a specific success expected in the 
future and finally R&D efforts which are in progress. 
The fourth category, financial disclosure, includes the financial information about the 
number of R&D expenditures in past, present and future. In addition, the numeric 
comparison of R&D expenditures between years or the comparison between the 
actual R&D expenditures and the target or expected expenditures. It also includes 
any ratio regarding R&D expenditures such as R&D expenses to revenue ratio. Table 
5.5 presents the final R&D disclosure checklist. 
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Table 5.5 
R&D Disclosure Checklist 
Information Item 
General Disclosure 
1 Statement of strategy or objectives or vision about R&D 
2 R&D is a main activity 
3 The focus of R&D activities 
4 R&D and competition and market 
5 R&D and Risk 
6 The effect of R&D spending on other financial items  
7 Explaining R&D spending changes 
8 R&D accounting policy discussion outside the financial statements 
9 R&D and future opportunities 
10 Tax credit  
Input 
11 Management and People 
12 Other parties involved in R&D (R&D collaboration) 
13 Infrastructure 
14 Funding 
Output: (in progress and achievement: new product or beyond product) 
15 Past achievement from R&D activities 
16 R&D progress 
17 This year achievement  
18 Potential achievement 
19 Patents 
Financial Disclosure 
20 Past R&D expenditures  
21 Present R&D expenditures 
22 Future R&D expenditures 
23 R&D Ratios  
24 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior year 
25 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior years 
26 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of target or to expectations 
Total Score 
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5.4.8. Assessment of Reliability and Validity of Disclosure Index 
Reliability and validity are considered the principal criteria used to evaluate the 
content analysis. 
5.4.8.1  Assessment of Reliability 
Neuendorf, (2002:112) defines reliability as“the extent to which a measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials.”. Three types of reliability are 
identified by Krippendorf (2004:25): (1) stability the degree to which a coding 
process produces the same results over time, (2) reproducibility: the degree to which 
a coding process can be duplicated by using different researchers and still produce 
the same results, and (3) Accuracy: the degree to which a coding process corresponds 
to a standard.  
The most common measure used to assess reliability is reproducibility because 
stability is the weakest measure and standard performance seldom exists (Beattie et 
al., 2004). 
Assessing the reliability of the coding process and resolving the disagreements 
among the coders are essential procedures in conducting the content analysis (Weber, 
1990). To ensure the coding process’ reliability, the coding should be carried out by 
two or more coders. For example, Entwistle (1999) ensures the acceptable level of 
coding reliability through coding eight randomly selected annual reports (the overall 
sample is 113 annual reports) independently by the author and other coder. The 
overall agreement rate between the two coders is 73%. This level is considered by 
the author as an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability. Moreover, Zeghal et al., 
(2007) ensures the coding reliability by coding five annual reports (the overall 
  -161 - 
sample is 150 annual reports) by all the three authors, and the results have been 
compared to resolve disagreements among coders.  
Following previous R&D content analysis literature (Entwistle, 1999 and Zeghal et 
al., 2007), a pilot study was conducted on twenty annual reports drawn randomly from the 
sample to measure the R&D voluntary disclosure score. The researcher and other PhD 
student coded twenty randomly selected annual reports, and the results were 
compared to ensure an acceptable level of inter coder reliability; areas of 
disagreement were discussed and clarified. The overall agreement rate between the 
two coders was 92%, which can be considered a high degree of agreement between 
the two coders compared with Entwistel, (1999).  Consequently, the result of the 
pilot study indicates a high degree of reliability in the content analysis procedures. 
Inter coder reliability is different from internal consistency reliability, which 
indicates how well a set of items fits together (Neuendorf, 2002). One of the 
indicators that is usually used to assess the internal consistency is Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient. Cronbach's alpha coefficient takes on a minimum value of zero and maximum 
value of one. Pallent (2005) claims that, ideally the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
should be higher than 70%. Table 5.6 shows the Cronbach's alpha coefficients for 
overall R&D disclosure and its categories. 
Table 5.6 
Internal Consistency, Reliability Test 
Items Chronbach’s Alpha 
GDIS 0.8314 
INDIS 0.8733 
OUTDIS 0.8555 
FDIS 0.8796 
RDDIS 0.7958 
Total Scale 0.8796 
  -162 - 
From the table, it can be noticed that, the Cronbach's alpha coefficients is above than 
0.70, so the research instrument can be considered reliable. 
5.4.8.2  Assessment of Validity 
Neuendorf (2002:112) defines the validity as “the extent to which the measuring 
procedure represented the intended, and only the intended concept.”. 
Following  Li et al., (2008) the initial draft of the R&D disclosure index is reviewed by 
two UK academics to refine it in order to ensure that the research instrument captured 
the intended information. 
Beattie et al., (2004:214) argue that most researchers focus on construct validity and 
define it as “the extent to which the measure is correlated with other measures of the 
same construct.”.  
Pair wise Correlation  and Spearman correlation tests are performed to assess the 
construct validity of the disclosure index. Tables 5.7 & 5.8 present the  Pair wise  and 
Spearman correlation coefficients between all the categories of R&D disclosure: 
general disclosure (GDIS), input disclosure (INDIS), output disclosure (OUTDIS), 
financial disclosure (FDIS) and non-financial disclosure (NFDIS). 
In addition, the tables show the correlation coefficients between the total R&D 
disclosure (RDDIS) and its categories. The tables illustrate that all the categories of 
R&D disclosure are highly correlated with total R&D disclosure, and they are also 
correlated with each other, indicating that the index consistently captures R&D 
disclosure across different types of information in annual reports. 
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Table 5.7  
Pair wise Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables 
Variables RDDIS GDIS INDIS OUTDIS FDIS NFDIS 
RDDIS 1 
 
     
GDIS 0.9055*** 
0.0000  
1     
INDIS 0.7099*** 
0.0000  
0.5298*** 
0.0000  
1     
OUTDIS 0.8348*** 
0.0000  
0.6760*** 
0.0000  
0.5379*** 
0.0000  
1   
FDIS 0.7149*** 
0.0000  
0.5435*** 
0.0000  
0.3583*** 
0.0000  
0.4172*** 
0.0000  
1  
NFDIS 0.9731*** 
0.0000  
0.9153*** 
0.0000  
0.7400*** 
0.0000  
0.8715*** 
0.0000  
0.5346*** 
0.0000  
1 
            *** indicates p <. 01 
Table 5.8  
Spearman Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables 
Variables RDDIS GDIS INDIS OUTDIS FDIS NFDIS 
RDDIS 1 
 
     
GDIS 0.9043*** 
0.0000  
1     
INDIS 0.6936*** 
0.0000  
0.5252*** 
0.0000  
1     
OUTDIS 0.8393*** 
0.0000  
0.6760*** 
0.0000  
0.5362*** 
0.0000  
1   
FDIS 0.7119*** 
0.0000  
0.5441*** 
0.0000  
0.3594*** 
0.0000  
0.4241*** 
0.0000  
1  
NFDIS 0.9723*** 
0.0000  
0.9147*** 
0.0000  
0.7220*** 
0.0000  
0.8758*** 
0.0000  
0.5341*** 
0.0000  
1 
                *** indicates p <. 01 
 
  Where: RDDIS total voluntary R&D disclosure score, GDIS general 
information, INDIS, input information, OUTDIS output information, 
FDIS financial information, NFDIS nonfinancial information. 
 
 
5.5.  DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES  
The next paragraphs introduce the measurement of dependent and independent variables. 
 
5.5.1. The Dependent Variable 
R&D disclosure is measured by using a self-constructed R&D disclosure index. If a 
required item is disclosed, it is scored as one and zero otherwise. The disclosure 
score for each company is calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed to the 
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maximum possible score for a company. Below is a summary of the measurement of 
the disclosure score: 
Using the final checklist, the overall R&D disclosure score for each observation is 
calculated following the next steps:  
Step 1, the narrative sections of annual reports were manually investigated. For the 
purposes of the current study, the “narrative section” of the annual report is defined 
as, all the pages in the annual report excluding the audited financial statements. 
Step 2, identifying any sentence, text, graph and table containing any R&D-related 
information.  
Step 3, using a copy of the checklist for each observation, and employing a binary 
method, every R&D disclosure item received a value equal to 1 if present, and 0 if 
absent. 
Step 4, for calculating the aggregate score for every annual report, the current study 
follows the un-weighted approach, assuming that all R&D disclosure items are 
equally important. 
Finally, the R&D disclosure score is calculated as a ratio of the total items disclosed 
in an annual report to the maximum possible score for a company. 
The same procedure has been followed to compute the R&D voluntary disclosure 
score for each of R&D financial disclosure, and R&D non-financial disclosure. 
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5.5.2. The independent variables 
Table 5.9 provides a summary of the definitions and measurements of the 
independent variables. It also illustrates the data source of each variable. 
Table 5.9   
Definitions and Measures of Independent Variables 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Data 
Source 
Data 
Stream 
Code 
Independent Variables 
BS  Board size Number of directors on the board Annual  
report 
 
DUL Role Duality Dummy variable equal to (1) if CEO is 
also chairman, (0) otherwise. 
Annual  
report 
 
BI Board  
Independence 
The number of independent directors 
on the board divided by the total 
number of directors on the board. (%) 
Annual  
report 
 
BM Board  
Meetings 
Number of board meetings held within 
the financial year of the annual report. 
Annual  
report 
 
MONR Managerial 
ownership 
The percentage of shares held by 
executive directors (%) 
Annual  
report 
 
ONRC Ownership 
Concentration 
Percentage of ordinary shares held by 
substantial shareholders, owning (5 %) 
or more of the firm’s share capital. (%) 
Annual  
report 
 
AUDQUAL Audit 
Committee 
Quality 
Dummy variable equal (1) if the audit 
committee is established at least three 
independent non-executive directors and 
one of them at least has recent and 
relevant financial experience, and there 
were no fewer than three meetings held 
during the year, (0) if otherwise. 
Annual  
report 
 
Control Variables 
SIZE Firm size Total assets Data 
Stream 
WC02999 
RD R&D Investment The total investments in R&D 
activities. 
BIS  
LEV Leverage  The percentage of total debt to total 
assets. 
Data 
Stream 
WC08236 
PROFIT Profitability Return on assets. Data 
Stream 
WC08326 
LIQUID Liquidity Current Ratio Data 
Stream 
WC08106 
GROW Firm’s Growth  Total assets growth (1 year annual 
growth) 
Data 
Stream 
WC08621 
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5.6.  MODEL SPECIFICATION  
The current study regresses seven explanatory variables representing corporate 
governance mechanisms and ownership structure, and six control variables on the 
R&D voluntary disclosure score.  
Two main models are developed to investigate the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables as follows:  
 The General Regression Model  
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13
RDDIS BS DUL BI BM MONR
ONRC AQUAL SIZE RD LEV
PROFIT LQUID GROW
     
    
   
     
    
   
 
Where:  
RDDIS   = R&D disclosure score; 
BS          = Board size; 
DUL       = Role duality; 
BI           = Board independence; 
BM         = Board meetings; 
MONR   = Managerial ownership; 
ONRC    = Ownership concentration; 
AQUAL  = Audit committee quality; 
SIZE       = Firm size; 
RD         = R&D investment; 
LEV      = Leverage;   
PROFIT = Profitability; 
LIQUID = Liquidity;  
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GROW  = Firm’s growth; 
0        = Intercept;  
1 To 13 = Coefficient of slope parameters; 
            = Error term. 
 The Regression Model with Dummy Variables   
Bruggen et al., (2009) argue that intellectual capital is more important in some 
industries than in others, hence, the value-relevance of intellectual capital 
information may differ between industries. This point of view is supported by 
Entwistle (1999), since his content analysis suggests that R&D disclosure varies by 
industry. 
Gu & Li (2003) investigate the management incentive to introduce voluntary 
disclosure concerning their innovation activities via their media news releases, and 
control for the effect of the proprietary costs by using industry dummies. This view is 
supported by Oliveira et al., (2006) who argue that the proprietary costs can explain 
the variation of voluntary disclosure among industries: because the distinctive 
characteristics of each industry affect the level of voluntary disclosure introduced by 
firms belonging to the same industry.  
In order to consider the differences between industries across years, dummy 
variables were created: two dummy variables to control for year-fixed effect, and 
eight dummy variables to control for industry-fixed effect. Therefore, the following 
model is developed. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 t ind
RDDIS BS DUL BI BM MONR
ONRC AQUAL SIZE RD LEV
PROFIT LQUID GROW
     
    
     
     
    
     
 
Where all variables have the same definitions as in the general regression model, in 
addition to t and ind  that can be defined as follows: 
t     = control for year-fixed effect, by including two dummy variables: Dy 2007, 
Dy 2008 (2009 is assumed as the base year). 
ind   = control for industry-fixed effect, by including eight dummy variables: IND 
basic materials, IND Consumer Goods, IND Consumer Services, IND 
Health Care, IND Industrials, IND Oil & Gas, IND Technology, IND 
Telecommunications (Utilities is assumed  as the base industry). 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the structure relationships between variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 
Structure Relationships Among Variables 
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5.7.  ANALYTICAL  PROCEDURES  
This section discusses the statistical methods that are employed to achieve the 
research goals and examine the research hypotheses. 
To explore R&D-related information, and measure the level of R&D voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports, the descriptive analysis is employed for the total R&D 
disclosure, its categories, its types and for each item presented in the annual reports 
and including in the disclosure index. 
To investigate whether there is a significant change in the extent of R&D disclosure 
practices over the period of the study, the level of R&D disclosure is tracked over the 
three- year period of the study, and the Kruskal-Wallis test is conducted to assess the 
significance of the changes. 
Regarding the influence of corporate governance and firm characteristics on the level of 
R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports, the OLS regression and Tobit regression 
are conducted. Before employing the tests, the descriptive analysis for dependent and 
independent variables is employed to assess the pattern of the distribution, and find the 
most suitable transformation for each variable.  
The normality, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity are tested, before running the 
multiple regression analysis. To check the normality, both graphical methods (Kernel 
density plot with the normal density, P-P plot, Q-Q plot) and numerically methods 
(Skewness/Kurtosis, Shapiro-wilk tests) are used. To check the homoscedasticity two 
tests are applied: The Breusch-pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and the White's test. The 
possible existence of multicollinearity is tested through computing the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), and also depending on Pair-wise Correlation Matrix. 
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The OLS regression and Tobit regression are conducted using STATA software to 
examine the association between the explanatory variables and each of the overall 
R&D voluntary disclosure, R&D financial disclosure, and R&D non-financial 
disclosure.  
Further analysis is conducted for the full model, the dependent variable, and for the 
independent variables. Regarding the full model, both OLS regression and Tobit 
regression are carried out with robust standard errors to ensure the goodness of the 
model, and with clustering the standard error at the firm level to account for the 
changes across individual firms. In terms of the dependent variable, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted to check the sensitivity of measuring the dependent variable by 
using the weighted disclosure score, and by using three ranked categories of the level 
of R&D voluntary disclosure. Regarding the independent variables, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted to examine the impact of each of audit committee 
characteristics on R&D voluntary disclosure separately, rather than the composite 
measure used in the main analysis. Moreover, the main analysis is repeated 
considering the cross listing to control for the non-UK regulatory influence. 
5.8.  SUMMARY  
This chapter presents the methodology employed in the current study. The current 
study conducts content analysis as a research method and employs a self-constructed 
disclosure index to capture the R&D-related information in annual reports.  
The research design illustrates the rationale behind the preferences related to the current 
study such as, the UK context, the annual reports, the time horizon, the population of the 
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study, the sample selection, the characteristics of the disclosure index, construction the 
R&D disclosure checklist and the assessment of its reliability and validity. 
The chapter presents the definitions and measurements of dependent and independent 
variables, and illustrates the data source regarding each variable, followed by the 
model specification. Finally, the analytical procedures were summarised including, 
descriptive analysis, regression methods and further analysis. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
The main target of the current study is to provide  deep insights into R&D narrative 
disclosure practices in annual reports of the UK firms, and to investigate the 
influence of corporate governance on R&D disclosure decisions. To achieve this 
goal, a self constructed disclosure index was formed. As discussed in chapter five, it 
classifies R&D-related information into four main categories: general, input, output 
and financial information, and 26 subcategories, including both financial and non-
financial items. The current chapter can be classified into two main parts:  
The first part seeks to answer the first, the second and the third research questions 
of the current study which are: 
 What type of R&D information do the UK non-financial listed firms disclose 
in their annual reports? 
 To what extent do the UK non-financial listed firms introduce discretionary 
information about their R&D activities in their annual reports? 
 How do R&D disclosure practices in annual reports of the UK non-financial 
listed firms change over time? 
The second part aims to empirically examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports, controlling for other 
variables that may affect the extent of R&D voluntary disclosure. This is based on 
the theoretical foundation which is explained in chapter three, and prior empirical 
studies, which are presented in chapter four. 
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The current chapter is organised as follows: section (2) presents the exploration of 
R&D voluntary disclosure and its categories by industry and across the three-year 
period.  Section (3) reports the descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent 
variables included in the current study. Section (4) presents the results of examining 
the normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity for the regression models. 
Section (5) presents the statistical results of multivariate analysis that was undertaken 
to test the research hypotheses, by using two methods: Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), and Tobit regression. Section (6) presents the sensitivity tests that were 
performed to check the robustness of the main analysis.  
6.2. THE EXTENT AND  TREND OF R&D VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE  
The current study conducts a manual content analysis, using a self constructed 
disclosure index containing 26 items classified into four categories. This index has 
been used to analyse 505 annual reports of the UK firms for the years 2007, 2008, 
and 2009. 
The extent and trend of R&D voluntary disclosure have been measured using four 
levels of analysis: overall R&D disclosure, R&D disclosure categories, R&D 
disclosure types and R&D disclosure items. 
6.2.1. Exploring the Overall R&D Voluntary Disclosure Practices  
The overall level of R&D voluntary disclosure was explored for 505 annual reports 
using the constructed disclosure index. The following paragraphs discuss the extent 
of total R&D voluntary disclosure for each year and for the three years all together. 
In addition, the total R&D disclosure is analysed by industry. 
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6.2.1.1. The Extent and Trend of Total R&D Voluntary Disclosure 
The averages of disclosure scores represent the extent of R&D voluntary disclosure 
and the averages of disclosure scores over the three years demonstrate the trend of 
the R&D voluntary disclosure practices in annual reports. 
Table 6.1 
The Extent and Trend of Total R&D Voluntary Disclosure 
Years No. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
2007 157 28.46 26.92 19.10 0 80.77 
2008 173 29.45 30.77 19.01 0 80.77 
2009 175 31.42 30.77 20.50 0 80.77 
Pooled 505 29.83 30.77 19.57 0 80.77 
 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics of the total R&D disclosure measured for 505 
firm-year observations for the years 2007, 2008, and 2009. The analysis has been 
employed for each year of the study and pooled for all the three years. According to 
the table, on average the UK firms introduce just fewer than 30% of the examined 
R&D disclosure index items. This result is consistent with prior studies: Nekhili et 
al., (2012) who provides evidence from France and La Rosa and Liberatore (2014) 
who examine eight western European countries. The mean of R&D disclosure score 
according to these studies is 22.64% and 28.5% respectively. 
The table also shows that, the maximum disclosure score is 80.77%, and the 
minimum disclosure score is zero for the pooled sample and as well for each year, 
indicating that at least one firm each year does not introduce any information related 
to its R&D activities. 
The table also demonstrates that the average score of R&D disclosure increases 
across time from 28.46% in 2007 to 29.45 % in 2008 and to 31.42% in 2009.  
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2007 2008 2009 
RDDIS 28.466 29.458 31.429 
The extent and trend of total R&D voluntary disclosure 
Following Li et al., (2012), the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted, and the result 
suggests that there are no significant differences in R&D disclosure scores among the 
three years of the study. The Chi-square result is 2.079 (P= 0.3537). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 
 Total R&D Disclosure Score by Years 
Figure 6.1 shows the extent of R&D voluntary disclosure over the three years of the 
current study, and illustrates a slightly increasing level of R&D-related information 
introduced voluntarily by the UK firms. 
Although, the differences in R&D disclosure scores among the three years of the 
study are insignificant, the marginal increase in the extent of R&D disclosure might 
reflect a gradually response to the professional accounting entities. That draw 
attention to the importance of narrative disclosure and emphasise the need to 
improve the corporate reporting. 
 
 
  -177 - 
6.2.1.2. The Analysing of R&D Disclosure by Industry  
The R&D disclosure practices of the UK firms were analysed for each of the nine 
industries that comprised the sample of the study. Table 6.2 presents the descriptive 
statistics of R&D disclosure score for each industry. 
Table 6.2  
Descriptive Statistics of R&D Disclosure by Industry  
Industry  Mean   Median    Std. Dev.   Min   Max   
Oil & Gas  19.23 15.38 18.91 0.00 53.85 
Basic Materials   28.75 34.62 18.19 3.85 57.69 
Industrials  29.03 26.92 18.39 0.00 73.08 
Consumer Goods  26.98 26.92 16.43 0.00 69.23 
Health Care  50.50 50.00 13.53 26.92 80.77 
Consumer Services  6.94 5.77 8.57 0.00 30.77 
Telecommunications  23.08 23.08 12.40 7.69 42.31 
Utilities  19.03 15.38 13.10 0.00 46.15 
Technology 34.22 32.69 17.30 0.00 80.77 
Total          29.83 30.77 19.57 0.00 80.77 
It can be seen from the table that, on average, the health care sector provides the 
greatest R&D disclosure scoring 50.50% followed by the firms in the technology 
sector, with an R&D disclosure score of about 34%. This result is consistent with 
prior studies: Entwistel, (1999) and Merkley, (2014). They find that the highest R&D 
disclosure score is introduced by pharmaceutical and technology sectors. It also in 
the line with the findings of the Steering Committee Report (FASB, 2001b) which 
reveals that firms in the pharmaceutical sector introduce considerable disclosures 
about their R&D activities. The committee argues that the managers realize the 
importance of R&D information as one of the key performance measurements in this 
sector, which help investors assess the firm’s plans and strategies.  
However, the Consumer Services sector produces the lowest average R&D 
disclosure score at 6.94%. In addition, the average of R&D disclosure in other 
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industries ranges from about 19% (Oil & Gas, Utilities) to less than 30% 
(Telecommunications, Consumer Goods, Basic Materials, and Industrials). 
Following Li et al., (2012), the Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted, suggesting that 
there are significant differences in R&D disclosure scores among the industrial 
sectors. The Chi-square result is 156.680 (p.= 0.0001). 
 
Figure 6.2 
 Total R&D Disclosure Score by Industry 
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the differences in the level of total R&D disclosure by industry. 
The figure shows that the R&D disclosure score varied between industries, and 
ranged from slightly more than 50% (the health care sector) to less than 10% (the 
Consumer Services sector). 
6.2.1.3. Frequency of Total R&D Disclosure Score 
To introduce more insights into R&D disclosure practices the frequencies of total 
R&D disclosure score were analysed. 
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Table 6.3 
Frequency of Total R&D Disclosure Score 
Total R&D Disclosure Score Freq. Percent % Cum. % 
0 50 9.90 9.90 
1 - 9.99 37 7.33 17.23 
10 -19.99 96 19.01 36.24 
20 – 29.99 67 13.27 49.50 
30 – 39.99 102 20.20 69.70 
40 – 49.99 51 10.10 79.80 
50 – 59.99 70 13.86 93.66 
60 – 69.99 21 4.16 97.82 
70 – 79.99 8 1.58 99.41 
˃ 80 3 0.59 100.00 
Total 505 100.00  
Table 6.3 presents the frequencies of the total R&D voluntary disclosure score. The 
table shows that, while 9.90% of the examined annual reports do not introduce any 
information related to R&D activities, only three annual reports 0.59% provide more 
than 80% of the disclosure index items. Moreover, nearly half of the examined 
observations introduce less than 30% of the maximum possible score. 
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Figure 6.3 illustrates the frequency of total R&D disclosure score.  The pie chart has 
been broken up into ten different parts. Each part depicts a specific level of overall 
disclosure. It can be clearly seen that the largest proportion (about 20% of the 
examined observations) introduced an R&D disclosure score ranged from 30% to 
30.99%. 
However, a tiny minority of the investigated annual reports 0.59% introduces over 
80% of the examined disclosure index. In addition, 4.16% and 1.58% of the sample 
provide an R&D disclosure score ranged from 60% to 60.99% and from 70% to 
70.99% respectively. That suggests, the majority of the sample reveals less than 60% 
of the R&D information identified in the disclosure index.  
6.2.2. Exploring the R&D Voluntary Disclosure Categories 
The current study classified the R&D-related information introduced by the UK non-
financial firms into four categories: general Disclosure (GDIS), Input (INDIS), 
Output (OUTDIS), and Financial Disclosure (FDIS).  
The following paragraphs discuss the extent of R&D voluntary disclosure for each 
category, and its trend over the three years of the current study. In addition, the R&D 
disclosure for each category is analysed by industry. 
6.2.2.1. The Extent and Trend of R&D Voluntary Disclosure for Each Category 
The extent of R&D disclosure for each category can be measured by its average 
disclosure score. In addition, the trend of the disclosure score can be observed over 
the three years of the study.  
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Table 6.4  
The Extent and Trend of Total R&D voluntary Disclosure and its Categories 
Years 2007 2008   2009    Pooled 
General Disclosure (GDIS) 30.38 32.77 35.03 32.81 
Input (INDIS) 24.68 23.99 24.43 24.36 
Output (OUTDIS) 37.20 38.61 42.17 39.41 
Financial Disclosure (FDIS) 21.66 21.30 22.61 21.87 
Total R&D Voluntary Disclosure (RDDIS) 28.47 29.46 31.43 29.83 
 
Table 6.4 presents the averages of R&D disclosure for each category, and for overall 
R&D disclosure. The table also illustrates the trend of each category of R&D 
disclosure from the year 2007 to the year 2009. 
It shows that the R&D output information (OUTDIS) represents the highest 
disclosure level with an average score just less than 40%, while the R&D financial 
disclosure (FDIS) represents the lowest disclosure level of 21.87%. This result could 
be explained by signalling theory, which suggests that firms may try to signal their 
successful efforts by introducing information about the outputs of their R&D 
activities.  
The second most common type of information is general disclosure (GDIS), which 
provides, on average, about 33% of the examined items. The UK firms appear to 
provide slightly greater Input (INDIS) information at 24.36%, whilst financial 
disclosures stand at 21.87%.  
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GD IN OUT FD 
2007 30.382 24.682 37.197 21.656 
2008 32.775 23.988 38.613 21.305 
2009 35.029 24.429 42.171 22.612 
Pooled 32.812 24.356 39.406 21.867 
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The extent and trend of total R&D voluntary disclosure and its categories 
 
 
Figure 6.4 
R&D Disclosure Categories by Years 
Figure 6.4 illustrates total R&D disclosure score and R&D disclosure score for each 
disclosure category by year. The figure shows a slight increase in the average of the 
disclosure score for general information and output information, while the input 
information and financial information are nearly stable over the three years.  
6.2.2.2. The Analysing of R&D Disclosure Categories by Industry  
The R&D disclosure categories were analysed for each of the nine industries. Table 
6.5 presents the analysis of the R&D disclosure score for the four categories by 
industry. 
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Table 6.5  
R&D Disclosure Categories by Industry 
 
Industry 
General 
Disclosure 
(GDIS) 
Input 
(INDIS) 
Output 
(OUTDIS) 
Financial 
Disclosure 
(FDIS) 
Total R&D 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
(RDDIS) 
Oil & Gas  15.38 23.08 26.15 17.58 19.23 
Basic Materials   32.86 36.90 41.90 8.84 28.75 
Industrials  32.40 25.00 35.54 21.88 29.03 
Consumer Goods  30.47 19.05 42.54 15.42 26.98 
Health Care  51.59 43.48 75.07 35.40 50.50 
Consumer Services   7.39 3.80 12.17 4.35 6.94 
Telecommunications  21.82 34.09 38.18 7.79 23.07 
Utilities  16.84 11.84 26.31 21.05 19.03 
Technology  41.25 21.31 35.45 30.68 34.22 
Total          32.81 24.36 39.41 21.87 29.83 
The table shows that the health care sector provides the highest average disclosure 
score in all disclosure categories. Regarding general disclosure, the technology sector 
introduces the second highest disclosure score at 41.25%; the disclosure scores in 
Consumer Goods, Industrials, and Basic Materials sectors are relatively similar 
(30.47%, 32.40%, 32.86%, respectively). The input information score ranged from 
43.48% introduced by the health care sector to 3.80% introduced by Consumer 
Services. In respect to output information, the health care sector provides the largest 
amount of information by far at 75.07%, followed by Consumer Goods and Basic 
Materials sectors (42.54%, 41.90%, respectively). Finally, financial disclosure 
represents the lowest average total disclosure score and ranged from 35.40% 
introduced by the health care sector to 4.35% that introduced by the consumer 
services sector. 
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Figure 6.5 
R&D Disclosure Categories by Industry 
Figure 6.5 illustrates R&D disclosure categories by industry. The figure shows 
noticeable differences among the R&D disclosure score for each category.  
6.2.3. Exploring the R&D Disclosure Types 
The current study classified R&D-related information introduced by the UK firms 
into two main types of information: non-financial R&D disclosure (including 
general, input and output disclosure), and Financial R&D disclosure. 
6.2.3.1. The Extent and Trend of R&D Voluntary Financial and Non-financial 
Disclosure  
The following paragraphs analyse the financial and non-financial R&D disclosure, 
and explore the trend of each type of R&D information over the three years. 
Table 6.6  
The Extent and Trend of Total R&D Voluntary Disclosure and its Types 
Years 2007 2008 2009 Pooled 
Financial Disclosure (FDIS) 21.66 21.30 22.61 21.87 
Non Financial Disclosure (NFDIS) 30.98 32.46 34.68 32.77 
Total R&D Voluntary Disclosure (RDDIS) 28.47 29.46 31.43 29.83 
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Table 6.6 presents the average financial and non-financial R&D disclosure score by 
year. It shows that, on average, the UK firms introduce 32.77% non-financial R&D 
information, which is more than financial R&D information at 21.87%. These results 
are confirmed over the period of the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 
The Types of R&D Disclosure by Year 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the extent and trend of R&D disclosure based on the type of 
information. On average, firms increase their R&D non-financial information 
gradually over the period of study from 30.98%, to 32.46%, and 34.68% for the years 
2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. Over the same time, the change in financial 
disclosure is very small. 
6.2.3.2. The Analysing of R&D Disclosure Types by Industry  
The R&D disclosure types were analysed for each of the nine industries. Table 6.7 
presents the analysing of R&D disclosure score for the two disclosure types by 
industry. 
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2007 21.656 30.976 
2008 21.305 32.461 
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Table 6.7 
The Types of R&D Disclosure by Industry 
Industry 
Financial  
Disclosure (FDIS) 
Non-financial  
Disclosure (NFDIS) 
Total R&D Voluntary 
Disclosure (RDDIS) 
Oil & Gas  17.58 19.84 19.23 
Basic Materials  8.84 36.09 28.75 
Industrials  21.88 31.67 29.03 
Consumer Goods  15.42 31.24 28.98 
Healthcare  35.40 56.06 50.50 
Consumer Services  4.35 7.89 6.94 
Telecommunications  7.79 28.71 23.08 
Utilities  21.05 18.28 19.03 
Technology 30.68 35.53 34.22 
Total          21.87 32.77 29.83 
The table shows that, the highest score for R&D financial disclosure is 35.40%, and 
for R&D non-financial disclosure is 56.06% introduced by the health care sector. 
While, the consumer services sector introduces the lowest level of both R&D 
financial and non-financial disclosure (4.35%; 7.89% respectively). 
 
Figure 6.7 
The Types of R&D Disclosure by Industry 
 
Figure 6.7 illustrates the R&D disclosure types by industry. The figure shows 
noticeable differences between R&D disclosure scores for each type by industry. 
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6.2.4. The Analysing of R&D Disclosure by Item 
The investigation of R&D disclosure practices in annual reports in detail could be 
helpful to gain deeper insights into the R&D disclosure environment in the UK. 
Therefore, it may be worth considering R&D disclosure for each item in each 
category in the disclosure checklist. 
The R&D checklist employed in the current study consists of (26 items) classified 
into four categories: general Disclosure (10 items), Input R&D disclosure (4 items), 
output R&D disclosure (5 items), and financial R&D disclosure (7 items). 
Table 6.8 presents the frequency of each R&D disclosure item in the examined 
disclosure index, and the percentage of the frequency of each item to the total 
number of examined annual reports; finally, it shows the rank of each item according 
to this percentage. 
The table shows that, In respect to General disclosure, the most common information 
introduced in the sample of the current study is related to the firm’s strategy, 
objective or vision about its R&D activities; this is followed by information about the 
competition and risks of R&D activities.  
R&D-related information about the availability of the required inputs to carry out 
R&D activities contains four items: people, collaborations, infrastructure, and funds. 
The highest percentage was awarded to the R&D collaborations, while the 
information about R&D funding gets the lowest attention in the annual reports. 
In terms of R&D outputs, the results indicate that firms in the sample tend to 
introduce information about their R&D present and past achievements more than 
their potential achievements. 
  -188 - 
Moreover, about 60% of examined annual reports introduce financial information 
about firms’ R&D expenditures in the current year, while only 1.39% and 3.96% of 
the sample disclose financial information regarding firms’ past and future R&D 
expenditures, respectively. 
Table 6.8 
R&D Disclosure by Item 
No. Information Item Freq. % Rank 
General Disclosure 
1 Statement of strategy or objectives or vision about R&D 336 66.53 1 
2 R&D is a main activity 129 25.54 15 
3 The focus of R&D activities 189 37.43 9 
4 R&D and competition and market 240 47.52 5 
5 R&D and Risk 236 46.53 6 
6 The effect of R&D spending on other financial items  133 26.34 14 
7 Explaining R&D spending changes 72 14.26 21 
8 R&D accounting policy discussion outside the financial 
statements 
146 28.91 12 
9 R&D and future opportunities 128 25.35 16 
10 Tax credit  47 9.31 23 
Input 
11 Management and People 104 20.59 18 
12 Other parties involved in R&D (R&D collaboration) 187 37.03 10 
13 Infrastructure 121 23.96 17 
14 Funding 80 15.84 20 
Output : (in progress and achievement: new product or beyond product) 
15 Past achievement from R&D activities 214 42.38 7 
16 R&D progress 195 38.61 8 
17 This year achievement  269 53.27 4 
18 Potential achievement 139 27.52 13 
19 Patents 178 35.25 11 
Financial Disclosure 
20 Past R&D expenditures  7 1.39 26 
21 Present R&D expenditures 304 60.20 2 
22 Future R&D expenditures 20 3.96 24 
23 R&D Ratios  86 17.03 19 
24 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior year 281 55.64 3 
25 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior years 61 12.08 22 
26 
Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of target or to 
expectations 
14 2.77  25 
 
From the table, it can be noticed that, 336 observations of 505 annual reports 
investigated in the current study (nearly two-thirds of the sample) introduce non-
financial information about R&D activities related to the firm’s strategy, objectives, 
and vision. These firms may be aware of the importance of introducing information 
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about their R&D plans and strategies to externals, but at the same time, they may be 
concerned about introducing proprietary information to competitors. Therefore, they 
introduce general non-financial information about their R&D strategies. This 
explanation is supported by the low level of financial information about the R&D 
expenditures planned for the future (only 3.96% of the total observations).  
Moreover, the detailed information about issues such as funding, and explaining 
R&D spending changes, does not get significant attention in the annual reports 
(15.84%, 14.26% of the total observations, respectively). 
If we refer to the time orientation, the present trend related to R&D activities has the 
second highest reporting, with an average reporting over 50%. The present trend, 
including present R&D expenditures, the comparison between this year expenditures 
of R&D activities and those of prior year and this year achievement. However, 
financial information regarding past and future orientations is in the last place. Those 
including past R&D expenditures, future R&D expenditures and comparison of R&D 
expenditures to those of target or to expectations. Approximately, fewer than 4% of 
the examined annual reports include R&D disclosure related to the past, future or 
target R&D expenditures.  
One explanation may be that, firms recognise that the disclosure benefits of 
introducing financial information about their past R&D efforts and about their plans 
in the future do not compensate for the risk of competitive disadvantage.  
The third most common R&D information, after strategy and present oriented 
information,  relates to competition and R&D risk. The table shows that,  just less 
than 50% of the sample introduces information about risk and the market. The reason 
  -190 - 
66.53 
25.54 
37.43 
47.52 
46.73 
26.34 
14.26 
28.91 
25.35 
9.31 
20.59 
37.03 
23.96 
15.84 
42.38 
38.61 
53.27 
27.52 
35.25 
1.39 
60.20 
3.96 
17.03 
55.64 
12.08 
2.77 
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 
1 
3 
5 
7 
9 
11 
13 
15 
17 
19 
21 
23 
25 
Frequency of item /total observations (%) 
N
o
. o
f 
It
em
 
Frequencies of items disclosed 
behind introducing information about the market and competition may be to signal 
the superiority of the company or even its ability to continue and achieve the success. 
Regarding risk information, a noticeable number of annual reports (236 observations) 
provide information about R&D activities connected with risk. This attitude may be 
attributed to the recommendations of the accounting entities that emphasise the 
importance of risk disclosures, for example (ASB, 2006). 
 
Figure 6.8 
Frequencies of Items Disclosed  
Figure 6.8 illustrates the frequency of each item (in the examined disclosure index) 
divided by the total number of observations. The disclosure ranges from the most 
common information in the sample (66.53% of total observations) to the lowest 
frequency (1.39% of the total observations). Eight items from 26 items in the 
examined disclosure index have been disclosed by less than 20% of the sample. 
While, seven items have been disclosed by more than 40% of the sample. 
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Table 6.9 presents the frequency of each R&D disclosure item and the percentage of 
the frequency of each item to total number of examined annual reports. This 
information is calculated for each industry. From the table, it can be noticed that, 
while all industries introduce information regarding their strategy and R&D activities 
and current R&D expenditures, most industries do not introduce any financial 
information about  their  R&D investments plans for the future. 
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Table 6.9   
R&D Disclosure by Item for each Industry 
No. Information Item 
Industry 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
General Disclosure Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1 Statement of strategy or objectives or vision about R&D 4 30.8 17 81.0 124 70.9 42 66.7 54 78.3 13 28.3 9 81.8 10 52.6 63 71.6 
2 R&D is a main activity 0 0.0 4 19.0 50 28.6 10 15.9 34 49.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 31 35.2 
3 The focus of R&D activities 5 38.5 11 52.4 62 35.4 26 41.3 41 59.4 1 2.2 2 18.2 8 42.1 33 37.5 
4 R&D and competition and market 4 30.8 9 42.9 90 51.4 32 50.8 36 52.2 6 13.0 4 36.4 2 10.5 57 64.8 
5 R&D and Risk 3 23.1 8 38.1 78 44.6 32 50.8 54 78.3 4 8.7 4 36.4 1 5.3 52 59.1 
6 The effect of R&D spending on other financial items 0 0.0 7 33.3 45 25.7 22 22.0 27 39.1 4 8.7 3 27.3 2 10.5 23 26.1 
7 Explaining R&D spending changes 2 15.4 2 9.5 11 6.3 3 4.8 35 50.7 3 6.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 16 18.2 
8 R&D accounting policy discussion outside the financial statements 0 0.0 2 9.5 50 28.6 13 20.6 25 36.2 2 4.3 1 9.1 4 21.1 49 55.7 
9 R&D and future opportunities 0 0.0 9 42.9 46 26.3 9 14.3 30 43.5 1 2.2 1 9.1 5 26.3 27 30.7 
10 Tax credit 2 15.4 0 0.0 10 5.7 3 4.8 20 29.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 13.6 
Input 
11 Management and People 1 7.7 4 19.0 34 19.4 13 20.6 22 31.9 0 0.0 4 36.4 1 5.3 25 28.4 
12 Other parties involved in R&D (R&D collaboration) 5 38.5 12 57.1 69 39.4 18 2.9 45 65.2 2 4.3 6 54.5 7 36.8 23 26.1 
13 Infrastructure 4 30.8 11 52.4 36 20.6 15 23.8 31 44.9 4 8.7 4 36.4 0 0.0 16 18.2 
14 Funding 2 15.4 4 19.0 36 20.6 2 3.2 22 31.9 1 2.2 1 9.1 1 5.3 11 12.5 
Output: (in progress and achievement: new product or beyond product) 
15 Past achievement from R&D activities 3 23.1 12 57.1 75 42.9 34 54.0 39 56.5 8 17.4 4 36.4 6 31.6 33 37.5 
16 R&D progress 4 30.8 10 47.6 55 31.4 26 41.3 58 84.1 6 13.0 4 36.4 10 52.6 22 25.0 
17 This year achievement 4 30.8 10 47.6 92 52.6 33 52.4 54 78.3 13 28.3 8 72.7 5 26.3 50 56.8 
18 Potential achievement 1 7.7 5 23.8 39 22.3 20 31.7 47 68.1 1 0.2 2 18.2 1 5.3 23 26.1 
19 Patents 5 38.5 7 33.3 50 28.6 21 33.3 61 88.4 0 0.0 3 27.3 3 15.8 28 31.8 
Financial Disclosure 
20 Past R&D expenditures 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 2.9 1 1.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.1 
21 Present R&D expenditures 5 38.5 8 38.1 103 58.9 34 54.0 62 89.9 6 13.0 3 27.3 12 63.2 71 80.7 
22 Future R&D expenditures 1 7.7 0 0.0 3 1.7 0 0.0 9 13.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 5.3 6 6.8 
23 R&D Ratios 1 7.7 0 0.0 34 19.4 5 7.9 19 27.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 27 30.7 
24 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior year 5 38.5 5 23.8 98 56.0 24 38.1 61 88.4 5 10.9 3 27.3 11 57.9 69 78.4 
25 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior years 3 23.1 0 0.0 14 8.0 2 3.2 20 29.0 3 6.5 0 0.0 4 21.1 15 17.0 
26 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of target or to expectations 1 7.7 0 0.0 11 6.3 2 3.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1= Oil & Gas; 2 = Basic Materials; 3 = Industrials; 4 = Consumer Goods; 5 = Health Care; 6 = Consumer Services; 7 = Telecommunications; 8 = Utilities; 9= Technology 
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6.3.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
The following two sections present the descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables included in the current study. 
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the R&D Disclosure Score 
The following paragraphs present the descriptive statistics of the total R&D 
disclosure, and R&D disclosure for each disclosure category and for each disclosure 
type. 
Table 6.10 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
Panel A: The Descriptive Statistics of Total R&D Disclosure Score and its Categories 
Variables Mean   Median    Std. Dev.   Min   Max   Skewness    Kurtosis 
RDDIS 29.83 30.77 19.57 0.00 80.77 0.270  2.301  
GDIS 32.81 30.00 21.94 0.00 90.00 0.220 2.242 
INDIS 24.36 25.00 27.34 0.00 100.00 0.899 2.805 
OUTDIS 39.41 40.00 31.95 0.00 100.00 0.314 1.948 
FDIS 21.87 28.57 19.82 0.00 85.71 0.343 2.238 
 
Panel B: The Descriptive Statistics of total R&D disclosure Score & its Classification 
According to type of Information 
Variables Mean   Median    Std. Dev.   Min   Max   Skewness    Kurtosis 
RDDIS 29.83 30.77 19.57 0.00 80.77 0.270  2.301  
FDIS 21.87 28.57 19.82 0.00 85.71 0.343 2.238 
NFDIS 32.77 31.58 22.16 0.00 89.47 0.302 2.263 
RDDIS = R&D disclosure score; GDIS = general disclosure score; INDIS = input 
disclosure score; OUTDIS = output disclosure score; FDIS = financial disclosure score; 
NFDIS = non-financial disclosure score. 
Table 6.10 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in the 
current study. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the total R&D disclosure 
score and its categories. As indicated in the table, the average overall R&D 
disclosure level has 29.83% of the examined disclosure index. The disclosure of the 
output of R&D activities represents the highest average disclosure score at 39.41%; 
this indicates that the UK firms made considerable disclosures about the actual and 
  -194 - 
expected achievements of their R&D activities to signal the successful efforts of the 
firm’s management. 
On the other hand, the R&D financial disclosure carries the lowest average 
disclosure score 21.87% indicating that the UK firms have some concerns regarding 
to this type of information; they may decide not to introduce financial information 
about their future plans for R&D activities and their resulting expectations.  
In respect to skewness and kurtosis, the skewness of total R&D disclosure and that of 
all disclosure categories are within the range of (±1.96) and kurtosis of total R&D 
disclosure and that of all its categories are within the range (±3). This is the 
normality range according to Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006). In addition, the skewness 
and kurtosis of total R&D disclosure are nearly within the normality range of (±0.8) 
for skewness and closer to (3) for kurtosis (Osborn, 2010). 
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of R&D disclosure scores for financial 
information and non-financial information. The results specify that the non-financial 
disclosure score is higher than the financial disclosure score, indicating that the UK 
firms prefer to introduce non-financial information about their R&D activities rather 
than financial information. This result is consistent with (Jones, 2007) who exposes 
that only 16% of the sample provides R&D numerical disclosure, while 99% of the 
firms introduce non-financial disclosure in their annual reports. Regarding skewness 
and kurtosis, the data of the two types of information (financial and non-financial) 
are within the normality range of (±0.8) for skewness closer to (3) for kurtosis 
(Osborn, 2010).  
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6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory  and Control Variables  
The following paragraphs present the descriptive statistics of the explanatory and 
control variables. 
Table 6.11 
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Panel A:  Continuous Variables 
Variables Mean  
(Median)    
Std. Dev.   Min   
(Max)   
Skewness    Kurtosis 
Explanatory Variables 
BS 8.28 
(8) 
2.61 2 
(17) 
0.888 3.772 
BI  54.76 
(57.14) 
13.95 0 
(83.3) 
- 0.75 3.97 
BM 9.20 
(9) 
3.11 1 
(24) 
0.97 5.56 
MONR 2.03 
(0.2) 
6.73 0 
(62.72) 
6.06 44.96 
ONRC 32.99 
(32.73) 
19.91 0 
(92.4) 
0.29 2.62 
Control Variables 
SIZE 4685978 
(440400) 
16089752 33250 
(156343030 ) 
6.93 57.59 
R&D  75060 
(9200) 
367823 790 
(3708000) 
8.13 72.24 
LEV 21.41 
(19.96) 
19.12 0 
(160.22) 
1.82 11.78 
PROFIT 5.01 
(6.76) 
13.04 - 86.77 
(75.09) 
-1.80 14.87 
LIQUID 1.75 
(1.44) 
1.32 0.4 
(15.38) 
4.15 31.29 
GROW 16.50 
(7.83) 
63.76 - 68.03 
(884.77) 
9.29 112.57 
 
Panel B:  Binary Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BS=Board size; BI= Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR= Managerial 
ownership; ONRC = Ownership concentration; Size= Firm size; R&D= R&D 
investments; LEV = Leverage; PROFIT = Profitability; LIQUID = Liquidity; GROW 
= Firm’s growth; DUL = Role duality; AQUAL = Audit committee quality. 
 
 
Variable Score Frequency Percentage 
DUL 
0 456 90.3% 
1 49 9.7% 
AQUAL 
0 197 39% 
1 308 61% 
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Table 6.11 presents the descriptive statistics for corporate governance and control 
variables examined in the current study. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for 
continuous variables, and Panel B presents the frequencies of the binary variables. 
Regarding corporate governance variables, the mean of board size is about 8 
members with a minimum of two members and a maximum of seventeen members. 
The mean of board independence is 54.76% indicating that more than half of the 
directors are independent non-executive. In addition, the number of board meetings 
held during the year ranges from only one meeting to 24 with a mean of 9 meetings.  
With respect to ownership variables, the mean of managerial ownership (shares held 
by executive directors) is about 2% ranging from zero to 62.72%. The mean of 
ownership concentration (shareholders owning 5% or more of the firm’s share 
capital) is 32.99% with a minimum of zero and a maximum 92.4%. 
In terms of control variables, the mean of total assets as a proxy for firm size is 
4685978 thousand pounds. The amount of R&D investments ranges widely from 
(790) to (3708000) thousand pounds with an average of 75060 thousand pounds. The 
average of profitability is 5.01 ranges from -86.77 to 75.09. While, leverage ranges 
from zero to 160.22 with an average of 21.4. The average values of growth and 
liquidity are 16.50 and 1.75 respectively. 
Panel B shows that only 9.7% of the sample have role duality. In addition, 61% of 
the sample has an effective audit committee. 
Regarding the skewness statistics, most corporate governance and control variables 
exceed the range of (±1.96) for skewness (Haniffa and Hadaib, 2006). The kurtosis 
results also confirm that most corporate governance and control variables exceed the 
  -197 - 
range of (±3) for kurtosis, (Haniffa and Hadaib, 2006), indicating that the 
observations have some outliers and most of the data are not normally distributed. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2003) argue that data transformation is recommended as a 
treatment for outliers and for failures of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. 
They advise trying several transformations until the most helpful one is found: the 
transformation that improves normality and recovers skewness and kurtosis to obtain 
the best data picture.  
Empirically, data transformation is widely used in literature (e.g. Li et al., 2012; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; La Rosa and Liberatore, 2014; Merkley, 2014). Some of the 
researchers reveal the reasons behind transforming their data. For example, Li et al., 
(2012), transforms some of the independent variables using natural logarithms and 
square roots to improve the normality of the distribution. While, Elshandidy et al., 
(2013) transform nearly all the data to natural logarithms to minimise the effect of 
outliers and to improve the variables’ distributions. Merkley (2014) uses the square 
transformation to control for nonlinearity.  
Following the prior literature, the current study has employed data transformation to 
improve the variables’ distributions and produce the best skewness and kurtosis 
values. The following steps have been followed to find the most suitable 
transformation for each variable:  
Firstly, using STATA “ladder” command which demonstrates the normality test for 
various transformations. Secondly, the transformation with the lowest (Chi
2
) 
statistics has been selected. Thirdly, using STATA “gladder” command to investigate 
the graphical views of the different transformations. Finally, as recommended by 
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Tabachnic and Fidell (2003) after applying the transformation, it should be ensured 
that there is an advantage from this transformation. 
Based on the above discussion, some of the independent variables were transformed 
as follows: firm size, R&D investments and liquidity are transformed using natural 
logarithm transformation, while square roots transformation is more effective for 
board meetings and managerial ownership. 
6.4. CHECKING NORMALITY, HOMOSCEDASTICITY, AND MULTICOLLINEARITY  
The basic assumptions of OLS regression were tested, before running the multiple 
regression analysis.  
6.4.1. Checking Normality  
Under the normality assumption, the residuals (the deviations of the observations 
from the prediction values) should be normally distributed. The normality can be 
tested by graphical and numerical methods. 
6.4.1.1. Checking Normality for the Main Model 
 (This includes the corporate governance variables and control variables) 
 Graphical Methods 
Using STATA, after running the regression analysis, the “predict” command is used 
to create residuals. After that, the “Kdensity” command is applied to produce a 
Kernel density plot with the normal density. 
  
Figure 6.9 illustrates the distribution of the residuals compared to the normal 
distribution curve. This graph allows a quick and simple evaluation of the 
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distribution.  From the graph, it can be observed that there is no major departure from 
the bell shape. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 
Normal Curve and Kernel Density Estimate for the Main Model 
 
In addition, the STATA “pnorm” command is used to graph a standardized normal 
probabilities plot (p-p) which is sensitive to non normality in the middle range of data.  
The horizontal axis shows the values of OLS residuals and the vertical axis shows 
the expected values of the residuals if it were normally distributed, consequently, if 
the residuals are from the normal distribution, the (P-P) will be approximately 
straight line (Gujarati, 2003). Figure 6.10 shows that the points plotted fall 
approximately on the straight line. 
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Figure 6.10 
P-P Plot for the Main Model 
Moreover, the STATA “qnorm” command is used to illustrate the quantiles of a 
variable against the quantiles of a normal distribution (Q-Q plot), which is sensitive 
to non normality near the tail. 
 
Figure 6.11 
Q-Q Plot for the Main Model 
Figure 6.11 shows that the points plotted fall approximately on the straight line with 
a little deviation on the tails. The graphical method for assessing the normality of 
residuals suggests that the residuals are normally distributed. 
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 Numerically Methods 
To test the residuals for normality numerically, the current study employs two tests, 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality and Shapiro-wilk W test for normal data. The 
assumption of the both tests is that the distribution is normal.  
Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality 
Variable Obs. Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) Adj Chi
2
 (2) Prob ˃ Chi2 
Residuals 505 0.8819 0.5539 0.38 0.8287 
Shapiro-wilk W Test for Normal Data 
Variable Obs. W V Z Prob ˃ Z 
Residuals 505 0.99635 1.238 0.513 0.30389 
From the table, we can notice that the probability is more than  0.05%, indicating that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results validate the conclusion of the graphical 
method for assessing the normality of residuals. Consequently, the normality of the 
errors, as an important assumption of OLS regression, is confirmed.  
6.4.1.2. Checking Normality for the Model with Year & Industry Dummy Variables 
(This includes the corporate governance variables and control variables, in addition 
to dummy variables to control for year and industry fixed effect). 
 Graphical Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 
Normal curve and kernel density estimate for the model  
with year & industry dummy variables. 
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Figure 6.12 demonstrates the distribution of the residuals compared to the normal 
distribution curve.  From the graph, it can be observed that there is no major departure 
from the bell shape. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13 
P-P Plot for the Model with Year & Industry Dummy Variables 
Figure 6.13 shows the standardized normal probabilities plot (P-P), and it can be seen 
that, the points plotted fall approximately on the straight line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14 
Q-Q Plot for the Model with Year & Industry Dummy Variables 
Figure 6.14 illustrates the quantiles of the residuals against the quantiles of a normal 
distribution (Q-Q plot), and shows that while, there is a slight curved trend in the 
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plot; the points are still close enough to the line to not disqualify the residuals from 
being normal distribution. 
The graphical method for assessing the normality of residuals suggests that the 
residuals are normally distributed. 
 Numerically Methods 
The assumption of the Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality and Shapiro-wilk W 
test for normal data is that the distribution is normal.  
Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality 
Variable Obs. Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) Adj Chi
2
 (2) Prob ˃ Chi2 
Residuals 505 0.4457 0.1053 3.21 0.2010 
Shapiro-wilk W Test for Normal Data 
Variable Obs. W V Z Prob ˃ Z 
Residuals 505 0.99436 1.916 1.563 0.05899 
From the table, we can notice that the probability is more than 0.05%, indicating that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results validate the conclusion of the 
graphical method for assessing the normality of residuals. 
6.4.2. Checking Homoscedasticity 
Homoscedasticity of residuals means the variance of the residuals is constant for 
each observation. 
6.4.2.1 Checking  Homoscedasticity for the Main Model 
 (This includes the corporate governance variables and control variables). 
To check the homoscedasticity two tests have been applied. The Breusch-
pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and the White’s test. The null hypothesis of both tests is 
that the error variances are constant. 
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Breusch-pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskasticity 
Chi
2
 (1) Prob. ˃ chi2 
0.33 0.5673 
According to the result of the test, the chi-square value is small and the probability is 
large 0.56 indicating Heteroskedasticity is probably not a problem.  
White’s Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Chi 
2
 (102) Prob. ˃ chi2 
124.73 0.0627 
The results of White’s test also confirm that we cannot reject the null hypnosis. 
6.4.2.2. Checking Homoscedasticity for the Model Year & Industry Dummy Variables 
(This includes the corporate governance variables and control variables, in addition 
to dummy variables to control for year and industry fixed effect) 
  Breusch-pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskasticity 
Chi
2
 (1) Prob. ˃ chi2 
0.15 0.7004 
White’s Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Chi
2 
(248) Prob. ˃ chi2 
235.47 0.7062 
From the table, we can notice that, the probability is more than 0.05% for both 
Breusch-pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and White’s test, indicating that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis, and Heteroskedasticity is probably not a problem. 
6.4.3. Checking for Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity implies the existence of a linear relationship between two or more 
independent variables. The possible existence of multicollinearity is tested through 
computing the variance inflation factor (VIF).  
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Table 6.12 
 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)  
Variable VIF 1/VIF (Tolerance) 
SIZE 4.28 0.233429 
BS 2.48 0.403233 
RD 1.66 0.603110 
BI 1.54 0.648849 
ONRC 1.52 0.658829 
LIQUID 1.44 0.692128 
AQUAL 1.39 0.718754 
MONR 1.36 0.735338 
LEV 1.31 0.766271 
DUL 1.23 0.814403 
PROFIT 1.14 0.873468 
GROW 1.11 0.904444 
BM 1.09 0.920168 
Mean VIF 1.66 
 
The multicollinearity is suggested to be a problem, if the variance inflation factor for 
any variable is more than 10, or if the tolerance of any variable is less than 0.1 
(Gujarati, 2003). 
The table 6.12 shows that the highest VIF is 4.28, and the mean VIF is 1.66. In 
addition, the lowest value of Tolerance is 0.233. Therefore, the results indicate that 
there is no intercorrelation among the independent variables.  
Multicollinearity is also tested depends on Pair-wise Correlation Matrix. A rule of thumb 
suggested by (Gujarati, 2003) is that, if the Pair-wise Correlation coefficient between 
two regressors is higher than 0.8, then multicolinearity is a serious problem. 
 Table 6-13 shows the Pair wise Correlation coefficients. It can be noticed from the 
table that the correlation coefficients of all independent variables are less than 0.80. 
The correlation coefficient of 0.713 between board size and log total assets is the 
highest in the correlation matrix, which is still smaller than 0.80. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that there is no need to be concerned about multicollinearity problem in 
this study. 
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Table 6.13  
Pair wise Correlation Matrix for Dependent and Independent Variables  
Variables RDDIS FDIS NFDIS BS DUL BI BM MONR ONRC AQUAL SIZE RD LEV PROFIT LIQUID GROW 
RDDIS 
1 
 
               
FDIS 0.714*** 
0.000 
1               
NFDIS 0.973*** 
0.000 
0.534*** 
0.000 
1              
BS 0.021 
0.636 
0.104** 
0.018 
-0.009 
0.840 
1             
DUL -0.134*** 
0.002 
-0.173*** 
0.000 
-0.105** 
0.018 
0.037 
0.406 
1            
BI 0.020 
0.646 
0.060 
0.176 
0.004 
0.912 
0.066 
0.133 
-0.300*** 
0.000 
1           
BM 0.045 
0.310 
0.064 
0.147 
0.033** 
0.453 
-0.128*** 
0.003 
-0.058 
0.191 
0.071 
0.108 
1          
MONR -0.103** 
0.020 
-0.062 
0.160 
-0.104** 
0.019 
-0.098** 
0.027 
0.335*** 
0.000 
-0.304*** 
0.000 
-0.209*** 
0.000 
1         
ONRC -0.021** 
0.635 
-0.088** 
0.045 
0.003 
0.933 
-0.313*** 
0.000 
0.118*** 
0.007 
-0.246*** 
0.000 
0.012 
0.774 
0.153*** 
0.000 
1        
AQUAL 0.095** 
0.032 
0.089** 
0.044 
0.085* 
0.055 
0.206*** 
0.000 
-0.094** 
0.033 
0.450*** 
0.000 
0.061 
0.166 
-0.172*** 
0.000 
-0.258*** 
0.000 
1       
SIZE -0.148*** 
0.008 
-0.017 
0.690 
-0.173*** 
0.000 
0.713*** 
0.000 
-0.029 
0.508 
0.313*** 
0.000 
-0.047 
0.287 
-0.226*** 
0.000 
-0.540*** 
0.000 
0.357*** 
0.000 
1      
RD 0.413*** 
0.000 
0.426*** 
0.000 
0.359*** 
0.000 
0.514*** 
0.000 
-0.050 
0.262 
0.197*** 
0.000 
-0.022 
0.613 
-0.189*** 
0.000 
-0.388*** 
0.000 
0.285*** 
0.000 
0.549*** 
0.000 
1     
LEV -0.120*** 
0.006 
-0.093** 
0.036 
-0.115*** 
0.009 
0.174*** 
0.000 
0.033 
0.447 
0.079* 
0.073 
-0.061 
0.168 
-0.136*** 
0.002 
-0.183*** 
0.000 
0.131*** 
0.003 
0.362*** 
0.000 
0.031 
0.487 
1    
PROFIT -0.043 
0.329 
0.080* 
0.069 
-0.079* 
0.075 
0.133*** 
0.002 
-0.030 
0.498 
0.054 
0.220 
-0.023 
0.598 
0.012 
0.784 
-0.232*** 
0.000 
0.160*** 
0.000 
0.263*** 
0.000 
0.177 
0.000 
-0.004 
0.915 
1   
LIQUID 0.311*** 
0.000 
0.184*** 
0.000 
0.315*** 
0.000 
-0.307*** 
0.000 
-0.006 
0.891 
-0.151*** 
0.000 
-0.034 
0.433 
0.165*** 
0.002 
0.216*** 
0.000 
-0.223*** 
0.000 
-0.498*** 
0.000 
-0.164*** 
0.000 
-0.337*** 
0.000 
-0.138*** 
0.001 
1  
GROW 0.031 
0.480 
0.011 
0.798 
0.034 
0.441 
-0.064 
0.149 
-0.003 
0.930 
-0.030 
0.493 
-0.041 
0.348 
0.171*** 
0.000 
0.013 
0.769 
-0.058 
0.186 
0.042 
0.336 
-0.003 
0.943 
-0.075* 
0.091 
0.082* 
0.064 
0.080* 
0.071 
1 
 
*** indicates p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.10 
Variables: BS = board size; DUL = role duality; BI = board independence; BM = board meetings; MONR = managerial ownership; ONRC = ownership concentration; 
 AQUAL= audit committee quality; SIZE = firm size; RD = R&D investments; LEV = leverage; PROFIT = profitability; LIQUID = liquidity; GROWTH = firm’ growth. 
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6.5.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
The current study employs two methods to examine the relationship between R&D 
voluntary disclosure and the independent variables: 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
 Tobit regression.  
 6.5.1. OLS Regression Analysis (Total R&D Disclosure) 
This study employs (OLS) regression to examine the relationship between R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports and the explanatory variables. 
Table 6.14 presents the results of OLS regression of the association between R&D 
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance, controlling for corporate 
characteristics, and considering the year and industry fixed effects by including two 
dummy variables for year effect and eight dummy variables for industry effect. 
Although the test of multicollinearity indicates that there is no unacceptable level of 
correlation between explanatory variables, the analysis still considers any concerns 
regarding the potential hidden correlations among the corporate governance 
variables. Accordingly, the corporate governance variables are grouped into three 
sets: board characteristics, ownership structure, and audit committee quality, so, six 
models are produced. 
Model (1) examines the relationship between the level of R&D disclosure and the 
control variables.  Model (2) examines the same relationship after considering the impact 
of board characteristics on R&D voluntary disclosure. Model (3) includes board 
characteristics and ownership structure in addition to, the control variables. Finally, 
 -208- 
 
model (4) which is the main model includes all the corporate governance variables 
and control variables that are examined in the current study. 
Moreover, two further models are employed to consider the year and industry fixed 
effects.  Model (5) controls for the year fixed effect by adding two dummy variables to 
the main model. Model (6) controls for the year and industry fixed effects by including 
two dummy variables for year effect and eight dummy variables for industry effect. 
The following sections introduce a discussion of the results of the six models. 
Model (1) presents the association between R&D disclosure and the six control 
variables. The adjusted R Square of model (1) is 41.07%, indicating that 41.07 of the 
changes in R&D voluntary disclosure can be explained by the control variables. 
The results reveal that firm size (SIZE) has a significant negative influence on R&D 
voluntary disclosure at the 1% level. However, a significant positive association 
between R&D disclosure and each of R&D investments (RD), Leverage (LEV), and 
liquidity (LIQUID) is found at the 1% level. The results cannot detect any significant 
influence of both profitability (PROFIT) and firm’s growth (GROW) on R&D voluntary 
disclosure.  
Model (2) includes the board characteristics, in addition to the control variables. The 
adjusted R Square slightly increases from  41.07%  in model (1) to 43.02%  in model 
(2). The results show a strong significant positive association between R&D 
voluntary disclosure and board size (BS) at the 1% level. The results also reveal that 
role duality (DUL) has a significant negative association with R&D disclosure at the 
1% level. While board meetings (BM) have a marginally positive impact on R&D 
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disclosure at the 10% level, no significant association is found between board 
independence (BI) and R&D voluntary disclosure.  
Model (3) shows the effects of ownership structure, including managerial ownership 
(MONR) and ownership concentration (ONRC), in addition to, control variables and 
board characteristics on R&D voluntary disclosure. While, managerial ownership 
(MONR) has a significant negative impact on R&D disclosure at the 5% level, no 
significant association between ownership concentration (ONRC) and R&D 
voluntary disclosure is detected. 
Model (4) is the full model that includes all the corporate governance variables and 
control variables that are examined in the current study. The audit committee quality 
is added in model (4), hence a slightly increases in adjusted R Square (R
2
) from 
43.39% in model (3) to 44.20% in model (4) is noticed. The results show a strong 
positive association between the audit committee quality and R&D voluntary 
disclosure at the 1% level. 
Model (5) explains the association between the same variables that are included in 
model (4), with considering the year fixed effect by including two dummy variables 
for the year effect.  
Model (6) presents the results of the relationship between R&D voluntary disclosure 
and corporate governance, controlling for corporate characteristics, and considering 
the year and industry fixed effects by including two dummy variables for year effect 
and eight dummy variables for industry effect. 
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Table 6.14  
OLS Regression Analysis (Total R&D Disclosure)  
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Model (4) 
Full  Model 
Model (5) 
Model (6) 
Full Model with 
Year, Industry 
Dummies 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.036*** 0.009 1.131*** 0.004 1.118*** 0.005 1.239*** 0.002 1.193*** 0.001 
DUL    -7.163*** 0.002 -5.458** 0.026 -5.685** 0.020 -5.751** 0.018 -2.930 0.195 
BI   0.061 0.258 0.044 0.411 -0.015 0.790 -0.004 0.942 -0.062 0.246 
BM   2.296* 0.081 1.749 0.191 1.542 0.246 1.636 0.217 1.751 0.163 
MONR     -1.374** 0.038 -1.404** 0.033 -1.390** 0.034 -0.916 0.128 
ONRC     -0.040 0.315 -0.037 0.357 -0.043 0.283 0.039 0.292 
AQUAL       4.492*** 0.004 4.305*** 0.006 4.772*** 0.001 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.341*** 0.000 -5.401*** 0.000 -5.753*** 0.000 -5.840*** 0.000 -6.046*** 0.000 -4.127*** 0.000 
RD 8.481*** 0.000 8.169*** 0.000 7.992*** 0.000 7.824*** 0.000 7.819*** 0.000 6.942*** 0.000 
LEV 0.104*** 0.008 0.126*** 0.001 0.119*** 0.002 0.115*** 0.003 0.115*** 0.003 0.027 0.459 
PROFIT -0.022 0.670 -0.007 0.893 -0.004 0.940 -0.017 0.737 -0.004 0.930 0.033 0.502 
LIQUID 8.325*** 0.000 8.268*** 0.000 8.276*** 0.000 8.541*** 0.000 8.431*** 0.000 5.988*** 0.000 
GROW 0.013 0.210 0.018* 0.077 0.023** 0.030 0.025** 0.020 0.029*** 0.006 0.023** 0.016 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 3.289 0.558 1.477 0.837 11.903 0.189 15.851* 0.082 19.231** 0.036 7.519 0.464 
Adj. R Square (R
2 
) 0.4107 0.4302 0.4339 0.4420 0.4483 0.5464 
F-Statistics 59.54 39.05 33.19 31.71 28.31 27.39 
Prob. (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS=Board size; DUL=Role duality; BI=Board independence; BM=Board meetings ; MONR=Managerial ownership; ONRC = Ownership 
concentration; AQUAL=Audit committee quality; SIZE=Firm size; RD=R&D investments; LEV=Leverage; PROFIT=Profitability; LIQUID =Liquidity; 
GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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The adjusted R Square  of model (6) is 54.64% indicating that 54.64 of the changes 
in R&D disclosure score are explained by the changes in the examined variables; this 
suggests that the overall model has a reasonably strong explanatory power. The 
explanatory power of the overall model is comparable to Entwistle, (1999) 50.5%, 
and higher than Jones (2007) 35% and Nekhili, et al., (2012) 33.85%, but it is lower 
than Merkly, (2014) 89.6%. 
In terms of the impact of corporate governance on overall R&D disclosure, three 
main aspects were examined: The Board characteristics, Ownership Structure, and 
Audit Committee quality. 
The results show that board size (BS) is significantly and positively associated with 
the overall R&D disclosure at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the findings 
of Abdelbadi and Elshandidy (2013) which provide evidence that UK firms with 
large board sizes tend to introduce more R&D information in their annual reports. 
However, it is not in the line with the findings of Nekhili et al., (2015), who does not 
find any significant impact of board size on R&D narrative disclosure in France 
context. 
The positive influence of large board size on intellectual capital disclosure is 
supported by the findings of Hidalgo et al., (2011). In contrast, Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) find a negative relationship between board size and intellectual 
capital disclosure.  
The findings of the current study confirm the effective role of the large board size in 
enhancing R&D voluntary disclosure; this supports the  positive influence of large 
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board size on the board’s monitoring capacity by increasing the group of expertise 
and skills in the board. Consequently, the hypothesis H1 is supported. 
The role duality (DUL) shows a significant negative impact on R&D disclosure in 
models 2, 3, 4, and 5; whereas after considering the industry effect, model (6) does 
not reveal any significant influence of role duality on R&D disclosure. This result 
could be explained by the impact of proprietary cost, captured by industry type, 
which moderate the influence of role duality on the level of R&D disclosure. 
The insignificant association between role duality and R&D disclosure is in the line 
with the findings of Nor et al., (2012), Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, (2013) and 
Nekhili et al., (2015). However, the negative impact of role duality on R&D 
disclosure is documented by Zeghal et al., (2007). 
Consequently, the findings do not support agency theory regarding the expected 
positive impact of separating the roles of chairman of the board and CEO on the level 
of disclosure. So, the hypothesis H2 is not supported. 
Surprisingly, the results do not confirm any significant relationship between board 
independence (BI) and R&D narrative disclosure. Hence, hypothesis (H3) is not 
supported. Regarding R&D disclosure, this result does not validate the argument that 
supports the role of independent directors as a mechanism to monitor management's 
performance and decrease the information asymmetry between managers and owners 
(Lim et al., 2007).  
Although this unexpected result contradicts many previous studies that consider the 
overall corporate disclosure or other types of disclosure rather than R&D information 
(e.g.  Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Li 
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et al., 2012; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013), it is in the line with the most studies that 
investigate the relationship between board independence and R&D disclosure. These 
studies also cannot detect any significant relationship between board independence 
and R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Zegal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 
2010; Abdelbadi and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
These mixed findings support the argument of Merkly (2014) who suggests that 
narrative disclosure should not be generalised as a whole and every type of 
disclosure should be considered in the development of hypotheses and in the 
empirical investigations. 
Regarding the frequency of board meetings (BM), the results do not show any 
significant influence of the square root of frequency of board meetings on R&D 
disclosure. This result does not support the hypothesis (H4). This result does not 
support the positive role of frequency of board meetings on the board’s effectiveness 
in implementing its monitoring role. Empirically, to the best of my knowledge, the 
relationship between the number of board meetings and R&D disclosure has not been 
previously examined.   
On the subject of Ownership Structure, the relationship between the square root of 
managerial ownership (MONR) and overall R&D disclosure is negative and 
significant at the 5% level in models 3, 4, and 5. Furthermore, it is negative but not 
significant in model 6.  
Accordingly, the result of the current study, after controlling for industry effect,  
does not support agency theory regarding the negative influence of higher managerial 
ownership on the level of R&D disclosure. So, hypothesis (H5) is not supported.  
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The insignificant association between managerial ownership and the level of 
disclosure is not consistent with (Eng and Mak, 2003), but consistent with the studies 
that examined the impact of managerial ownership on the level of R&D disclosure 
(e.g. Nor et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2015). These studies cannot 
detect any significant association between managerial ownership and voluntary R&D 
disclosure in annual reports.  
The results for ownership structure do not support the existence of any significant 
relationship between ownership concentration (ONRC) and R&D voluntary 
disclosure. This result is conflicted with the prior expectation of the current study, 
based on agency theory; it is also inconsistent with prior studies that found a negative 
association between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Gracia-
Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010). However, it is consistent with other studies that 
also do not confirm any significant association between disclosure and ownership 
concentration (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Hidalgo et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; 
Abdelbadi and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015).  Hence, hypothesis (H6) is 
not supported. 
Finally, the relationship between audit committee quality (AQUAL) and R&D 
voluntary disclosure is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that the 
interaction effect between the audit committee characteristics that captures a 
committee’s overall quality has a significant influence on R&D disclosure.  
Therefore, hypothesis (H7) is supported. This result also supports the monitoring role 
of the audit committee, which can be considered as a tool to mitigate the agency 
costs (Ho and Wong, 2001), and reduce the information asymmetry problem (Li et 
al., 2012). 
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In respect to control variables, six corporate characteristics have been considered in 
the current study. Firm size (SIZE), R&D investment (RD), leverage (LEV), 
profitability (PROFIT), liquidity (LIQUID), and firm’s growth (GROW). Three control 
variables have a strong significant influence on R&D disclosure at the 1% level, 
according to the findings of the six models. These are: Firm size (SIZE), R&D 
investment (RD), and liquidity (LIQUID). 
The results show a negative and significant association between firm size measured 
by the logarithm of total assets, and R&D disclosure. This unexpected relationship 
contradicts the arguments that suggested a positive influence of firm size on 
voluntary disclosure (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Raffournier, 1995  
Chavent et al., 2006) and also disagrees with previous studies that confirm a positive 
relationship between firm size and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Cooke 1989; Hossain et 
al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Watson et al., 2002; Merkley, 2014). 
However, in the R&D context, the negative relationship between firm size and R&D 
disclosure is documented by Nor et al., (2010) and Nekhili et al., (2015). 
The logarithm R&D investments shows a significant positive association with R&D 
disclosure. Consequently, the firms with higher level of R&D investments are more 
likely to introduce more R&D-related information in their annual reports. These 
findings support the argument that R&D activities are associated with the existence 
of considerable information asymmetry (Tasker, 1998; Barth et al., 1998; Aboody 
and Lev, 2000, Merkly, 2014), and management uses R&D voluntary disclosure to 
signal positive prospects to the market to reduce the information gap between 
managers and stakeholders (Percy, 2000; Jones, 2007; Zeghal et al., 2007).  
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This result is consistent with most empirical studies that addressed R&D disclosure. 
A significant positive relationship is found between R&D disclosure and each of, 
R&D expenditures to total sales (Zeghal et al., 2007; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et 
al., 2015), R&D expense to total operating expense (Entwistle, 1999; Abdelbadi and 
Elshandidy, 2013; Merkley, 2014). However, other studies cannot find a significant 
association between R&D disclosure, and each of R&D capitalised over total assets 
(Nor et al., 2010), amount of R&D expenses (La Rosa and Liberatore, 2014), R&D 
expenditures to total sales (Jones, 2007). 
Liquidity measured by the logarithm of current ratio is positively associated with 
overall R&D disclosure at the 1% level. This result is in the line with the argument 
that managers of highly-liquid firms will introduce more disclosure to signal their 
ability in managing liquidity compared with managers in companies with low 
liquidity ratios (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). It is also consistent with the findings 
of Elshandidy et al., (2013) who confirm a positive association between the liquidity 
and voluntary risk disclosure. However, it is not consistent with Nor et al., (2010) 
who are not able to confirm any significant influence of liquidity on the level of 
R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
The results also show a positive relationship between a firm’s growth and R&D 
disclosure. This association is significant at the 5% level in both model (4) and 
model (6). This result supports the argument that firms with higher growth rates may 
have higher information asymmetry; so they have a greater incentive to disclose 
more information to reduce this information gap (Gul and Leung, 2004). 
However, it is not consistent with the findings of La Rosa and Liberattore (2014)  
who confirm a negative association between the firm’s growth, measured by market 
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to book ratio, and the level of R&D voluntary disclosure. It is also not in the line 
with Nekhili et al., (2012) who find a marginally negative impact of a firm’s growth, 
measured by sales growth, on the level of R&D disclosure. 
While the results indicate a strong positive relationship between R&D disclosure and 
leverage (LEV) in all models, which do not consider the industry effect, model (6) 
that controls for industry effect does not reveal any significant influence of leverage 
on R&D disclosure. The insignificant impact of leverage on R&D disclosure in 
annual reports is confirmed by many studies (e.g Entwistle, 1999; Zegal et al., 2007; 
Nor et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2015). However, other studies 
document a positive association between leverage and R&D disclosure (e.g. 
Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014). 
The current study cannot find any significant association between R&D voluntary 
disclosures and profitability. Although the insignificant association between 
profitability and corporate disclosure does not support the arguments of signalling 
theory, which would suggest that a firm is more likely to provide information about 
its high profitability to investors (Watson et al., 2002). This result is in the line with 
the findings of  Ahmed and Courtis, (1999) and La Rosa and Liberator, (2014).  
However, it is inconsistent with some studies that provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between profitability and the level of disclosure (e.g. Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2012), and other studies that find a negative association 
between profitability and R&D disclosure (e.g. Abdelbadie & Elshandidy, 2013; 
Merkly, 2014). Table 6.15 presents a comparative summary of the results of the prior 
studies that examined the determinants of R&D disclosure in annual reports based 
only on the corporate governance variables and  corporate characteristics that are 
considered in the current study. 
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Table 6.15 
Summary of the Findings of Prior Studies  
Variables 
Corporate Governance Variables Control Variables 
BS DUL BI BM MONR ONRC AQUAL SIZE RD LEV PROFIT LIQUID GROW 
Entwistle (1999), Canada NC NC NC NC NC NC NC None (+) None NC NC NC 
Zeghal et al., (2007), Canada NC (-) None NC NC NC NC (+) (+) None NC NC NC 
Jones (2007) , US NC NC NC NC NC NC NC None None NC NC NC NC 
Nor et al., (2010), Malaysia NC None None NC None NC NC (-) None None None None NC 
Nekhili et al., (2012), France NC NC NC NC None None NC (+) (+) None (-) NC (-) 
Abdelbadie and Elshandidy (2013) UK (+) None None NC NC None NC (+) (+) (-) (-) NC NC 
Merkely (2014), US NC NC NC NC NC NC NC (+) (+) (+) (-) NC NC 
La Rosa and Liberator, (2014) 8 countries NC NC NC NC NC NC NC (+) None (+) None NC (-) 
Nekhili et al., (2015), France None None None NC None None NC (-) (+) None None NC NC 
 
(+) = positive ;  
(-)  = negative ;  
None = not significant ; 
 NC = not considered in the study. 
 
Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI= Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD= R&D investments; LEV = Leverage; PROFIT = 
Profitability; LIQUID = Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. 
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 6.5.2. Tobit Regression Analysis (Total R&D Disclosure) 
The Tobit model is known as a censored regression model, also called a limited 
dependent variable regression model because of the restriction put on the values of 
the dependent variable (Gujarati, 2003). It is assumed that a number of values of the 
dependent variable are grouped at a limiting value, usually zero (McDonald and 
Moffitt, 1980). The dependent variable in the current study is censored because 9.9% 
of the sample did not introduce any R&D disclosure in annual reports, therefore, 
their disclosure score is zero.  
Table 6.16 presents the results of Tobit regression of the association between R&D 
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance, controlling for corporate 
characteristics, and considering the year and industry fixed effects. 
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Table 6.16 
Tobit Regression Analysis (Total R&D Disclosure) 
Independent Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model  (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-Value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.066** 0.014 1.175*** 0.007 1.166*** 0.007 1.292*** 0.003 1.427*** 0.000 
DUL    -7.565*** 0.003 - 5.730** 0.033 -5.984** 0.025 -6.010** 0.023 -2.500 0.303 
BI   0.081 0.165 0.064 0.273 -0.003 0.953 0.007 0.904 -0.052 0.356 
BM   1.998 0.161 1.431 0.323 1.184 0.410 1.272 0.373 1.130 0.398 
MONR     -1.413** 0.049 -1.445** 0.042 -1.434** 0.042 -0.930 0.145 
ONRC     - 0.049 0.261 -0.045 0.299 -0.052 0.231 0.039 0.326 
AQUAL       5.205*** 0.002 4.997*** 0.003 5.274*** 0.001 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.836*** 0.000 -5.944*** 0.000 - 6.347*** 0.000 -6.466*** 0.000 -6.677*** 0.000 -4.843*** 0.000 
RD 9.090*** 0.000 8.743*** 0.000 8.543*** 0.000 8.354*** 0.000 8.344*** 0.000 7.456*** 0.000 
LEV 0.121*** 0.005 0.143*** 0.001 0.135*** 0.001 0.131*** 0.002 0.130*** 0.002 0.039 0.328 
PROFIT -0.013 0.818 0.002 0.962 0.004 0.932 -0.011 0.845 0.002 0.969 0.041 0.439 
LIQUID 8.591*** 0.000 8.491*** 0.000 8.488*** 0.000 8.786*** 0.000 8.658*** 0.000 5.913*** 0.000 
GROW 0.015 0.175 0.212* 0.064 0.026** 0.025 0.028** 0.015 0.032*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 2.793 0.647 1.557 0.842 13.177 0.180 17.805* 0.071 21.396** 0.031 12.105 0.270 
LR (chi2-Statistics) 260.96 280.39 285.39 294.63 301.37 420.65 
Prob (chi2-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R2 0.0622 0.0668 0.0680 0.0702 0.0718 0.1002 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 50 left-censored observations RDDIS <=0           - 455 uncensored observations          - 0 right-censored observations 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS=Board size; DUL=Role duality; BI= Board independence; BM = Board meetings ; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC=Ownership 
concentration; AQUAL=Audit committee quality ; SIZE= Firm size ; RD =R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT=Profitability; LIQUID=Liquidity 
; GROWTH= Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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The results of Tobit regression support the results of OLS regression. In terms of the 
main explanatory variables, there is a strong statistically significant positive 
influence of both board size and audit committee quality on the total R&D disclosure 
at the 1% level. Moreover, the role duality (DUL) shows a significant negative 
impact on R&D disclosure in all the models that have been examined in the current 
study except model, (6) which does not reveal any significant influence of role 
duality on R&D disclosure. 
While the results cannot document any significant influence of board independence, 
board meetings, and ownership concentration on R&D disclosure, the findings reveal 
a moderate negative relationship between managerial ownership and R&D 
disclosure. This relationship is significant at the level 5% in all examined models, 
except in model (6) that controls for industry effect.   
Considering control variables, two were found to have a strong positive significant 
association with R&D disclosure. These variables are R&D investments, and 
liquidity. However, a strong negative relationship is detected between firm size and 
R&D disclosure.  Furthermore, the results are also identical with the results of OLS 
regression regarding to the leverage and profitability. The only difference is related 
to the coefficient of firm’s growth that was found to be significant at the 1%  level 
according to the results of Tobit regression, and at the 5% level according to the 
results of OLS regression. 
A summary of the results of the statistical techniques that have been employed in the 
current study is presented in table 6.17. 
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Table 6.17 
Summary of Hypotheses Test 
 Variables H  
Expected 
Sign 
Model (4) Model (6) 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
Corporate Governance 
BS H1 + + (S) + (S) + (S) +(S) 
DUL H2 - - (M) - (M) None None 
BI H3 + None None None None 
BM H4 + None None None None 
MONR H5 - - (M) - (M) None None 
ONRC H6 - None None None None 
AQUAL H7 + + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
Control Variables 
SIZE   - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) 
RD   + (S) + (S) +(S) + (S) 
LEV   + (S) +(S) None None 
PROFIT   None None None None 
LIQUID   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
GROW   + (M) + (M) + M) + (S) 
 
(S)   = significant at 0.01 level;  
(M)  = significant at 0.05 level; 
(W)  = significant at 0.10 level; 
None = no significant association. 
 
 6.5.3. Regression Analysis of R&D Disclosure Types 
This section presents the results of regression analysis of the association between 
corporate governance and each of R&D financial disclosure and R&D non-financial 
disclosure. 
 6.5.3.1. R&D Financial Disclosure  
The next paragraphs discuss the findings of the analysis of the relationship between 
R&D financial disclosure and corporate governance, controlling for firm 
characteristics and considering the year and industry effects. Both OLS and Tobit 
regressions are employed. Table 6.18 reports the results of OLS regression. The table 
shows the following results: 
Model (1) presents the association between R&D financial disclosure and the six 
control variables. The results show a significant negative association between firm 
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size and R&D financial disclosure at the 1% level. The results also indicate a 
significant positive relationship between R&D financial disclosure and each of R&D 
investments at the 1% level, profitability at the 5% level, and liquidity at 1% level. 
However, leverage and firm growth have no significant influence on R&D financial 
disclosure. 
Model (2) includes the board characteristics, in addition to the control variables, the 
adjusted R Squared increases from 28.79% in model (1) to 32% in model (2). 
Regarding the influence of board characteristics on R&D financial disclosure, the 
results reveal that there is a strong positive association between board size and R&D 
financial disclosure at the 1% level. Moreover, the R&D financial disclosure is 
negatively related to role duality at the 1% level, while, the frequency of board 
meetings is positively associated with the R&D financial disclosure at the 5% level. 
No significant impact of board independence on R&D financial disclosure is 
detected.  
Model (3) shows the impact of ownership structure, in addition to, board 
characteristics and control variables on R&D financial disclosure. The results 
indicate that, both managerial ownership and ownership concentration have 
insignificant association with the R&D financial disclosure. 
Model (4) includes audit committee quality, as well as all other corporate 
governance and control variables, which are examined in the current study. 
Surprisingly, while the results show a strong positive association between the audit 
committee quality and the overall R&D voluntary disclosure at the 1% level, the 
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audit committee quality does not have any significant influence on the R&D 
financial disclosure. 
Model (5) explains the association between the same variables that are included in 
model (4), with a consideration of the year fixed effect by including two dummy 
variables for year.  
Model (6) presents the results of the relationship between R&D financial disclosure 
and corporate governance, controlling for corporate characteristics, and considering 
the year and industry fixed effects. 
Regarding the effects of corporate governance on R&D financial disclosure, the 
results show that, both board size and frequency of board meetings have a positive 
association with R&D financial disclosure at the 1% level and 10% level 
respectively. Role duality is associated negatively with R&D financial disclosure at 
the 1% level. However, no significance is detected for other corporate governance 
variables. 
The results concerning the control variables show that, both R&D investments and 
liquidity are positively associated with R&D financial disclosure at the 1% level. 
Profitability is also positively associated with R&D financial disclosure but at the 5% 
level. Finally, Firm size is negatively associated with R&D financial disclosure at the 1% 
level.  However, no significance is detected for other control variables. 
Table 6.19 reports the results of Tobit regression concerning the relationship between 
R&D financial disclosure and corporate governance, controlling for firm characteristics, 
and considering the effects of the year and industry. 
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Table 6.18 
OLS Regression (R&D Financial Disclosure) 10 
Independent Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.167*** 0.008 1.198*** 0.007 1.195*** 0.007 1.270*** 0.004 1.275*** 0.003 
DUL    -9.856*** 0.000 -10.148*** 0.000 -10.215*** 0.000 -10.259*** 0.000 -7.877*** 0.003 
BI   0.048 0.417 0.051 0.391 0.034 0.597 0.041 0.520 -0.014 0.811 
BM   3.080** 0.034 3.265** 0.028 3.205** 0.031 3.245** 0.030 2.521* 0.083 
MONR     0.432 0.557 0.423 0.565 0.432 0.557 0.703 0.313 
ONRC     -0.034 0.449 -0.033 0.463 -0.036 0.419 0.018 0.668 
AQUAL       1.308 0.458 1.177 0.505 1.958 0.243 
Control Variables 
SIZE -3.105*** 0.000 -4.254*** 0.000 -4.408*** 0.000 -4.434*** 0.000 -4.560*** 0.000 -2.561*** 0.003 
RD 7.507*** 0.000 7.149*** 0.000 7.120*** 0.000 7.071*** 0.000 7.068*** 0.000 6.021*** 0.000 
LEV 0.059 0.179 0.085** 0.050 0.086** 0.047 0.085* 0.051 0.085** 0.050 0.060 0.162 
PROFIT 0.122** 0.042 0.138** 0.019 0.131** 0.027 0.127** 0.033 0.135** 0.024 0.122** 0.035 
LIQUID 5.672*** 0.001 5.634*** 0.001 5.511*** 0.001 5.588*** 0.001 5.527*** 0.001 4.149*** 0.009 
GROW 0.003 0.747 0.009 0.398 0.009 0.436 0.009 0.414 0.012 0.293 0.007 0.535 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant -10.576* 0.091 -13.375 0.093 -11.198 0.266 -10.048 0.324 -7.847 0.445 -14.385 0.227 
Adj. R Square (R
2
) 0.2879 0.3200 0.3185 0.3179 0.3185 0.4077 
F-Statistics 34.96 24.71 20.63 19.07 16.70 16.08 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS=Board size;DUL=Role duality; BI=Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR=Managerial ownership;ONRC=Ownership 
concentration; AQUAL=Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD=R&D investments; LEV= Leverage ; PROFIT=Profitability ; LIQUID=Liquidity; 
GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.19   
Tobit Regression (R&D Financial Disclosure) 11 
Independent Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-Value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.615** 0.018 1.657** 0.016 1.165** 0.016 1.758** 0.011 2.302*** 0.001 
DUL    -18.845*** 0.000 -19.597*** 0.000 -19.811*** 0.000 -19.677*** 0.000 -14.723*** 0.001 
BI   0.126 0.180 0.129 0.169 0.093 0.353 0.101 0.314 0.033 0.722 
BM   4.640** 0.043 4.984** 0.033 4.855** 0.038 4.895** 0.036 2.666 0.226 
MONR     0.838 0.475 0.820 0.485 0.844 0.471 1.053 0.339 
ONRC     -0.056 0.433 -0.054 0.447 -0.061 0.395 0.034 0.615 
AQUAL       2.911 0.286 2.736 0.315 2.983 0.240 
Control Variables 
SIZE -5.108*** 0.000 -6.756*** 0.000 -6.995*** 0.000 -7.081*** 0.000 -7.250*** 0.000 -5.405*** 0.000 
RD 11.429*** 0.000 10.820*** 0.000 10.791*** 0.000 10.704*** 0.000 10.689*** 0.000 9.717*** 0.000 
LEV 0.111 0.104 0.144** 0.031 0.147** 0.028 0.145** 0.031 0.144** 0.031 0.112* 0.089 
PROFIT 0.180* 0.056 0.205** 0.027 0.193** 0.038 0.184** 0.049 0.193** 0.039 0.175** 0.050 
LIQUID 7.530*** 0.003 7.573*** 0.003 7.411*** 0.003 7.546*** 0.003 7.396*** 0.003 3.809 0.119 
GROW 0.002 0.889 0.009 0.634 0.008 0.690 0.009 0.649 0.013 0.508 0.011 0.577 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant -29.448*** 0.003 -35.395*** 0.005 -32.229** 0.042 -29.640* 0.064 -26.412 0.101 -21.813 0.229 
LR (chi
2
-Statistics) 164.69 196.12 197.31 198.45 200.23 293.88 
Prob (chi
2
-Statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R
2
 0.0492 0.0586 0.0589 0.0593 0.0598 0.0878 
No. of observations 505 505 55 505 505 505 
 193 left-censored observations F-DIS<=0       -      312 uncensored observations            -   0 right-censored observations 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS=Board size; DUL= Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM = Board meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC = Ownership 
concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD = R&D investments; LEV = Leverage; PROFIT = Profitability; LIQUID = 
Liquidity; GROWTH= Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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In general, the results of Tobit regression support the findings of OLS regression 
regarding the impact of most independent variables. In terms of corporate 
governance variables, the results of Tobit regression show that the board size is 
significantly positively associated with R&D financial disclosure at the 5% level in 
all models except model (6) which reveals the same relationship but at the 1% level. 
The results of OLS regression suggest a positive relationship between board size and 
R&D financial disclosure at the 1% level in all models. 
Both OLS regression and Tobit regression show a significant positive relationship 
between the frequency of board meetings and R&D financial disclosure at the 5% 
level. However, after controlling for the industry effect, this relationship turns out to 
be insignificant (as suggested by Tobit regression), and less significant (as suggested 
by OLS regression). 
The results of OLS regression and Tobit regression are identical regarding the strong 
negative association between role duality and R&D financial disclosure and the 
insignificant impact of other corporate governance variables on the R&D financial 
disclosure. 
In respect to control variables, the results of Tobit regression show a positive 
significant association between R&D financial disclosure and each of R&D 
investments, and profitability at the level 1% and 5% respectively. The results of 
Tobit regression also confirm the findings of OLS regression concerning the strong 
negative influence of firm size on R&D financial disclosure. Both OLS regression 
and Tobit regression could not find any association between the R&D financial 
disclosure and firm growth. 
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The main difference between the results of the two techniques is related to liquidity. 
While, after controlling for the industry effect, the findings of OLS regression show a 
strong positive influence of liquidity on R&D financial disclosure, the results of 
Tobit regression could not find any significant association between R&D financial 
disclosure and liquidity. A summary of the results regarding R&D financial 
disclosure is summarised in table 6.20. 
Table 6.20 
Summary of the Results of R&D Financial Disclosure 
Variables  
Model (4) 
Full Model 
Model (6) Full Model 
with the Year and 
Industry Dummies 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
Corporate Governance 
BS + (S) + (M) + (S) + (S) 
DUL - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) 
BI None None None None 
BM + (M) +(M) + (W) None 
MONR None None None None 
ONRC None None None None 
AQUAL None None None None 
Control Variables 
SIZE - (S) - (S) - (S) -  (S) 
RD + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
LEV + (W) + (M) None + (W) 
PROFIT + (M) + (M) + (M) + (M) 
LIQUID + (S) + (S) + (S) None 
GROW None None None None 
 
(S)   = significant at 0.01 level ;  
(M)  = significant at 0.05 level ;  
(W)  = significant at 0.10 level ;  
None = no significant association. 
 
 
 6.5.3.2. R&D Non-financial Disclosure. 
The next paragraphs discuss the findings of the analysis of the relationship between 
R&D non-financial disclosure and corporate governance, controlling for firm 
characteristics and considering the year and industry effects. Both OLS and Tobit 
regressions are employed. Table 6.21 reports the results of OLS regression. The table 
shows the following results: 
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 Model (1) presents the association between R&D non-financial disclosure and the 
six control variables. The results indicate a significant positive relationship between 
R&D non-financial disclosure and each of R&D investments, leverage and liquidity 
at the 1% level. The results also show a strong significant negative association 
between firm size and R&D non-financial disclosure. Other control variables do not 
have any significant influence on R&D non-financial disclosure.  
Model (2) includes board characteristics, in addition to, control variables. Regarding 
the influence of board characteristics on R&D non-financial disclosure, board size is 
positively associated with R&D non-financial disclosure at the 5% level.  Moreover, 
there is a significant negative relationship between role duality and R&D non-
financial disclosure at the 5% level. However, no significant association is found 
between R&D non-financial disclosure and each of board independence and 
frequency of board meetings. 
Model (3) shows the impact of ownership structure, in addition to, board characteristics 
and control variables on R&D non-financial disclosure. While, managerial ownership 
is negatively significantly associated with the R&D non-financial disclosure at the 1% 
level, the coefficient of ownership concentration is negative but not significant. 
Model (4) includes audit committee quality, as well as, all other corporate 
governance and control variables considered in the current study. In the line with the 
results regarding the overall R&D disclosure, audit committee quality has a 
significant positive influence on R&D non-financial disclosure at the 1% level.  
Model (5) shows the association between the same variables that are included in model 
(4), considering the year fixed effect by including two dummy variables for year.  
 -230- 
 
Model (6) presents the results of the relationship between R&D non-financial 
disclosure and corporate governance, controlling for corporate characteristics, and 
considering the year and industry fixed effects. 
In terms of the impact of corporate governance on R&D non-financial disclosure, the 
results show that, both board size and audit committee quality have a significant 
positive influence on R&D non-financial disclosure at the 1% level. A significant 
negative association is found between managerial ownership and R&D non-financial 
disclosure. However, no significance is detected for other corporate governance 
variables. 
Finally, for control variables, three variables have a strong significant association 
with R&D non-financial disclosure at the 1% level. These variables are firm size, 
R&D investments and liquidity. While, firm size is negatively associated with R&D 
non-financial disclosure, both R&D investments and liquidity have a positive 
influence on it. There is also a relatively less significant positive association between 
R&D non-financial disclosure and firm’s growth at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.21 
OLS Regression (R&D Non-financial Disclosure) 12  
Independent Variables 
Model (1) Model(2) Model(3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   0.987** 0.035 1.106** 0.019 1.090** 0.019 1.227*** 0.009 1.163*** 0.008 
DUL    -6.171** 0.026 -3.730 0.199 -4.016 0.163 -4.090 0.154 -1.107 0.681 
BI   0.065 0.304 0.042 0.512 -0.033 0.622 -0.021 0.757 -0.080 0.213 
BM   2.007 0.197 1.191 0.451 0.929 0.553 1.043 0.505 1.467 0.326 
MONR     -2.040*** 0.009 -2.077*** 0.008 -2.061*** 0.008 -1.513** 0.035 
ONRC     -0.043 0.368 -0.038 0.417 -0.045 0.337 0.047 0.290 
AQUAL       5.666*** 0.002 5.457*** 0.003 5.808*** 0.001 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.796*** 0.000 -5.823*** 0.000 -6.248*** 0.000 -6.358*** 0.000 -6.594*** 0.000 -4.704*** 0.000 
RD 8.840*** 0.000 8.545*** 0.000 8.313*** 0.000 8.101*** 0.000 8.096*** 0.000 7.282*** 0.000 
LEV 0.121*** 0.009 0.141*** 0.002 0.131*** 0.005 0.126*** 0.006 0.126*** 0.006 0.015 0.727 
PROFIT -0.076 0.228 -0.060 0.336 -0.054 0.394 -0.071 0.257 -0.056 0.371 0.0009 0.987 
LIQUID 9.303*** 0.000 9.238*** 0.000 9.295*** 0.000 9.629*** 0.000 9.501*** 0.000 6.665*** 0.000 
GROW 0.016 0.178 0.022* 0.080 0.028** 0.025 0.030** 0.015 0.035*** 0.005 0.030** 0.011 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 8.397 0.203 6.949 0.415 20.414 * 0.057 25.393** 0.018 29.207*** 0.007 15.589 0.204 
Adj. R Square (R
2)
 0.3652 0.3757 0.3825 0.3927 0.3990 0.4969 
F-Statistics 49.32 31.33 27.02 26.07 23.30 22.64 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables:BS = Board size; DUL= Role duality; BI= Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC = Ownership 
concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD =R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT= profitability; LIQUID = 
Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.22 reports the results of Tobit regression concerning the relationship between 
R&D non-financial disclosure and corporate governance, controlling for firm 
characteristics, and considering the effects of the year and industry. 
In terms of the impact of corporate governance on R&D non-financial disclosure, 
both board size and audit committee quality have a positive significant association 
with R&D non-financial disclosure. Moreover, managerial ownership has a 
marginally negative association with R&D non-financial disclosure. However, the 
results of Tobit regression do not reveal any significant influence of other corporate 
governance variables on R&D non-financial disclosure. 
Regarding control variables, the results of Tobit regression show a significant 
positive association between R&D non-financial disclosure and each of, R&D 
investments and liquidity at the 1% level in all models. Moreover, R&D non-
financial disclosure is negatively associated with firm size at the 1% level in all 
models. 
While the results reveal that leverage has a positive significant influence on R&D 
non-financial disclosure, this significant relation is not detected after controlling for 
the effect of industry. 
Furthermore, the results indicate a positive significant association between R&D 
non-financial disclosure and firm’s growth. However, no significant association is 
found between R&D non-financial disclosure and profitability. A summary of the 
results regarding R&D non-financial disclosure is found in table 6.23. 
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Table 6.22 
Tobit Regression (R&D non-financial Disclosure) 13 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-Value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   0.949* 0.066 1.089** 0.036 1.077** 0.036 1.222** 0.017 1.343*** 0.005 
DUL    -6.479** 0.034 -3.874 0.224 -4.194 0.185 -4.225 0.178 -0.365 0.900 
BI   0.090 0.198 0.066 0.348 -0.021 0.776 -0.008 0.908 -0.073 0.285 
BM   1.621 0.341 0.782 0.650 0.467 0.785 0.576 0.735 0.738 0.645 
MONR     -2.080** 0.015 -2.121** 0.012 -2.107** 0.012 -1.498* 0.051 
ONRC     -0.556 0.292 -0.050 0.334 -0.058 0.262 0.046 0.337 
AQUAL       6.648*** 0.001 6.414*** 0.002 6.628*** 0.000 
Control Variables 
SIZE -5.409*** 0.000 -6.439*** 0.000 -6.932*** 0.000 -7.082*** 0.000 -7.328*** 0.000 -5.411*** 0.000 
RD 9.551*** 0.000 9.243*** 0.000 8.979*** 0.000 8.736*** 0.000 8.726*** 0.000 7.827*** 0.000 
LEV 0.136*** 0.008 0.156*** 0.002 0.145*** 0.004 0.139*** 0.006 0.138*** 0.006 0.019 0.690 
PROFIT -0.065 0.342 -0.050 0.462 -0.045 0.510 -0.066 0.334 -0.050 0.459 0.006 0.924 
LIQUID 9.582*** 0.000 9.483*** 0.000 9.521*** 0.000 9.904*** 0.000 9.748*** 0.000 6.571*** 0.000 
GROW 0.019 0.150 0.024* 0.070 0.031** 0.022 0.034** 0.013 0.039*** 0.004 0.036*** 0.004 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 8.318 0.250 7.216 0.439 22.277* 0.057 28.199** 0.016 32.288*** 0.006 20.320 0.123 
LR (chi
2
-Statistics) 224.93 236.01 242.85 253.47 259.75 372.64 
Prob (chi
2
-Statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R
2
 0.0525 0.0550 0.0566 0.0591 0.0606 0.0869 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 54  left-censored observations NF-DIS< =0       - 451 uncensored observations      - 0 right-censored observations 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS=Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL=Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size ; RD =R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT=Profitability ; 
LIQUID =Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.23 shows that there is an agreement between the results of OLS regression 
and Tobit regression. The sign of the coefficients is identical according to the results 
of the two techniques. The only difference is related to the level of significance of 
some relations. 
Table 6.23 
Summary of the Results of the R&D Non-financial Disclosure 
Variables 
Model (4) Model (6) 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
Corporate Governance 
BS + (M) + (M) + (S) + (S) 
DUL None None None None 
BI None None None None 
BM None None None None 
MONR - (S) - (M) - (M) - (W) 
ONRC None None None None 
AQUAL + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
Control Variables 
SIZE - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) 
RD + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
LEV + (S) + (S) None None 
PROFIT None None None None 
LIQUID + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
GROW + (M) + (M) + (M) + (S) 
 
(S) = significant at 0.01 level;  
(M) = significant at 0.05 level;  
(W)= significant at 0.10 level;   
None = no significant association. 
 
6.6. FURTHER ANALYSIS  
The next paragraphs introduce the sensitivity analysis for the full model, dependent 
and independent variables. 
6.6.1. Sensitivity Tests for the Full Model 
The sensitivity analysis of the full model includes carrying out the analysis using 
robust standard errors, in addition to clustering the standard errors at the firm level. 
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6.6.1.1. The Analysis with Robust Standard Error 
King and Roberts (2015:177), state that“The bigger the difference robust Standard 
errors make, the stronger the evidence for misspecification”. And added (p.177) “If 
you have succeeded in choosing a better model, your robust and classical standard 
errors should now approximately coincide.”. 
In this sensitivity analysis, the analysis is carried out using robust standard errors.  
Table 6.24 presents the results of OLS regression with robust standard errors. Table 
6.25 presents the results of Tobit regression with robust standard errors. Table 6.26 
presents the comparison between the results of the main analysis using both OLS 
regression and Tobit regression, and the results of the sensitivity analysis using both 
OLS regression and Tobit regression with robust standard errors.  
Regarding model (4) that contains all corporate governance variables and control 
variables, there are no considerable differences between the main OLS regression 
findings and the results of OLS regression using robust standard errors. The 
coefficients show the same direction for all variables. The significance levels are the 
same for all variables except for role duality and firm’s growth, where the 
significance level increases from the 5% level to the 1% level after employing robust 
standard errors.  
Moreover, there are no substantial differences between the main Tobit regression 
findings and the results of Tobit regression using robust standard errors. The 
coefficients show the same direction for all variables. The significance levels differ 
for only two variables: board size and firm’s growth. After using robust standard 
errors, the significance level for board size decreases from the 1% level to the 5% 
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level and the significance level for firm growth increase from the 5% level to the 1% 
level. 
Regarding model (6) which includes all corporate governance and control variables, 
in addition to the year and industry dummy variables, the results of OLS regression 
with robust standard errors confirm the findings of the main analysis regarding the 
sign of the coefficients and the levels of the significance for all variables. The 
findings of Tobit regression with robust standard errors also confirm the results of 
the main analysis.  
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that, there is agreement between the 
results of the analysis performed using classical standard error, and the findings of 
the analysis carried out with robust standard error. As indicating by King and 
Roberts (2015), this agreement can be considered as an indicator of the robustness of 
the findings. 
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 Table 6.24 
 OLS Regression Analysis with Robust Standard Error 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
P-value 
(t) 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.036** 0.012 1.131*** 0.005 1.118*** 0.006 1.239*** 0.002 1.193*** 0.001 
DUL    -7.163*** 0.000 -5.548*** 0.007 -5.685*** 0.005 -5.751** 0.018 -2.930 0.195 
BI   0.061 0.194 0.044 0.349 -0.015 0.756 -0.004 0.942 -0.062 0.246 
BM   2.296* 0.052 1.749 0.158 1.542 0.216 1.636 0.217 1.751 0.163 
MONR     -1.374** 0.017 -1.404** 0.012 -1.390** 0.034 -0.916 0.128 
ONRC     -0.040 0.268 -0.037 0.314 -0.043 0.283 0.039 0.292 
AQUAL       4.492*** 0.005 4.305*** 0.006 4.772*** 0.001 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.341*** 0.000 -5.401*** 0.000 -5.753*** 0.000 -5.840*** 0.000 -6.046*** 0.000 -4.127*** 0.000 
RD 8.481*** 0.000 8.169*** 0.000 7.992*** 0.000 7.824*** 0.000 7.819*** 0.000 6.942*** 0.000 
LEV 0.104*** 0.006 0.126*** 0.001 0.119*** 0.001 0.115*** 0.001 0.115*** 0.003 0.027 0.459 
PROFIT -0.022 0.622 -0.007 0.872 -0.004 0.928 -0.017 0.692 -0.004 0.930 0.033 0.502 
LIQUID 8.325*** 0.000 8.268*** 0.000 8.276*** 0.000 8.541*** 0.000 8.431*** 0.000 5.988*** 0.000 
GROW 0.013 0.144 0.018** 0.034 0.023*** 0.001 0.025*** 0.000 0.029*** 0.000 0.023** 0.016 
Year Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 3.289 0.543 1.477 0.824 11.903 0.141 15.851** 0.050 19.231** 0.036 7.519 0.464 
R- Squared (R
2
) 0.4177 0.4415 0.4474 0.4564 0.4483 0.5671 
F-Statistics 74.44 49.94 44.08 40.49 28.31 27.39 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI= Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD =R&D investments; LEV = Leverage; PROFIT = 
Profitability; LIQUID =Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.25  
Tobit Regression with Robust Standard Error 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-Value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.066** 0.024 1.175** 0.011 1.166** 0.012 1.292*** 0.006 1.427*** 0.000 
DUL    -7.565*** 0.001 -5.73** 0.016 -5.984** 0.011 -6.010** 0.012 -2.500 0.316 
BI   0.081 0.117 0.064 0.218 -0.003 0.944 0.007 0.888 -0.052 0.323 
BM   1.998 0.119 1.413 0.289 1.184 0.382 1.272 0.349 1.130 0.414 
MONR     -1.413** 0.024 -1.445** 0.019 -1.434** 0.021 -0.930 0.130 
ONRC     -0.049 0.234 -0.045 0.276 -0.052 0.210 0.039 0.287 
AQUAL       5.205*** 0.003 4.997*** 0.004 5.274*** 0.001 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.836*** 0.000 -5.944*** 0.000 -6.347*** 0.000 -6.466*** 0.000 -6.677*** 0.000 -4.843*** 0.000 
RD 9.092*** 0.000 8.743*** 0.000 8.543*** 0.000 8.354*** 0.000 8.344*** 0.000 7.456*** 0.000 
LEV 0.121*** 0.002 0.143*** 0.000 0.135*** 0.001 0.131*** 0.001 0.130*** 0.001 0.039 0.272 
PROFIT -0.013 0.792 0.002 0.955 0.004 0.920 -0.011 0.819 0.002 0.964 0.041 0.318 
LIQUID 8.591*** 0.000 8.491*** 0.000 8.488*** 0.000 8.786*** 0.000 8.658*** 0.000 5.913*** 0.000 
GROW 0.015* 0.078 0.021** 0.015 0.026*** 0.000 0.028*** 0.000 0.032*** 0.000 0.029*** 0.000 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 2.793 0.628 1.557 0.829 13.177 0.133 17.805** 0.043 21.396** 0.014 12.105 0.254 
F-Statistics 63.73 43.15 38.25 34.90 32.08 33.87 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R
2
 0.0622 0.0668 0.0680 0.0702 0.0718 0.1002 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
  50   left-censored observations RDDIS < =0         - 455  uncensored observations          -  0  right-censored observations 
  *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
  Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI= Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC = Ownership 
concentration; AQUAL =Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD = R&D investments; LEV = Leverage; PROFIT = Profitability; LIQUID = 
Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.26 
Summary of the Results of Analysis with Robust Standard Error 
Variables H  
Expected 
Sign 
 
Model (4) Model (6) 
OLS 
OLS 
(Robust) 
Tobit 
Tobit 
(Robust) 
OLS 
OLS 
(Robust) 
Tobit 
Tobit 
(Robust) 
Corporate Governance 
BS H1 + + (S) + (S) + (S) + (M) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
DUL H2 - -  (M) - (S) -  
(M) 
- (M) None None None None 
BI H3 + None None None None None None None None 
BM H4 + None None None None None None None None 
MONR H5 - - (M) - (M) - (M) - (M) None None None None 
ONRC H6 - None None None None None None None None 
AQUAL H7 + + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
Control Variables 
SIZE   - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) 
RD   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
LEV   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) None None None None 
PROFIT   None None None None None None None None 
LIQUID   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
GROW   + (M) + (S) + 
(M) 
+ (S) + (M) + (M) + (S) + (S) 
 
(S)   = significant at 0.01 level; 
(M)  = significant at 0.05 level; 
(W)  = significant at 0.10 level; 
None = no significant association. 
 
6.6.1.2. The Analysis with Clustering the Standard Error at the Firm Level  
To account for the changes associated with the individual firms, a sensitivity analysis 
is carried out with clustering the standard error at the firm level. 
Petersen (2009) argues that, in the panel data set the residual may be correlated 
across time and across firms, so the clustered standard error is used to account for 
this possible correlation. He suggests that when the panel data set has more firms 
than years, it is common to include dummy variables for each year and then clustered 
by the firm . This approach will be used in the following analysis. 
Petersen (2009) suggestes that, since the OLS standard errors can be biased because 
the  residuals may be correlated across time or across firms, the researchers can use 
techniques such as fixed effect or GLS to test whether their model is correctly 
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specified. After evaluating the methods that are applied in the empirical literature to 
estimate the standard error when the residuals are correlated across years or firms. 
Petersen (2009:475) stated that “The standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased 
and produce correctly sized confidence intervals whether the firm effect is permanent 
or temporary, The fixed effect and random effects model also produces unbiased 
standard errors but only when the firm effect is permanent ”. 
Table 6.27 presents the results of OLS regression with clustering the standard error at 
the firm level. Table 6.28 presents the results of Tobit regression with clustering the 
standard error at the firm level. Table 6.29 presents the comparison between the 
results of the main analysis using both OLS regression and Tobit regression, and the 
results of the sensitivity analysis using both OLS regression and Tobit regression 
with clustering the standard error at the firm level. 
From table 6.29, it can be noticed that, generally, there is agreement between the 
results of the analysis performed using classical standard error, and the findings of 
the analysis carried out with clustering the standard error at the firm level. 
This agreement can be considered as an indicator that the model is correctly 
specified, and the unobserved time effect or firm effect does not influence the 
findings.   
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Table 6.27 
 OLS Regression Analysis with (Clustering the Standard Error at the Firm Level) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
P-value 
(t) 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.036* 0.092 1.131* 0.058 1.118* 0.063 1.239** 0.043 1.193** 0.013 
DUL    -7.163*** 0.005 -5.458** 0.034 -5.685** 0.025 -5.751** 0.028 -2.930 0.274 
BI   0.061 0.301 0.044 0.451 -0.015 0.789 -0.004 0.943 -0.062 0. 270 
BM   2.296 0.144 1.749 0.295 1.542 0.357 1.636 0.329 1.751 0.305 
MONR     -1.374* 0.089 -1.404* 0.076 -1.390* 0.090 -0.916 0.242 
ONRC     -0.040 0.419 -0.037 0.459 -0.043 0.394 0.039 0.364 
AQUAL       4.492** 0.025 4.305** 0.032 4.772*** 0.007 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.341*** 0.000 -5.401*** 0.000 -5.753*** 0.000 -5.840*** 0.000 -6.046*** 0.000 -4.127*** 0.000 
RD 8.481*** 0.000 8.169*** 0.000 7.992*** 0.000 7.824*** 0.000 7.819*** 0.000 6.942*** 0.000 
LEV 0.104* 0.054 0.126** 0.015 0.119** 0.020 0.115** 0.024 0.115** 0.026 0.027 0.562 
PROFIT -0.022 0.680 -0.007 0.892 -0.004 0.939 -0.017 0.734 -0.004 0.929 0.033 0.450 
LIQUID 8.325*** 0.000 8.268*** 0.000 8.276*** 0.000 8.541*** 0.000 8.431*** 0.000 5.988*** 0.001 
GROW 0.013 0.140 0.018** 0.033 0.023*** 0.001 0.025*** 0.000 0.029*** 0.000 0.023*** 0.000 
Year Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 3.289 0.678 1.477 0.869 11.903 0.282 15.851 0.153 19.231* 0.083 7.519 0.595 
R- Squared (R
2
) 0.4177 0.4415 0.4474 0.4564 0.4648 0.5671 
F-Statistics 32.61 23.62 21.09 19.40 18.71 20.64 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 
- *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
- Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL=Audit committee quality; SIZE= Firm size; RD =R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT=Profitability; 
LIQUID =Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.28 
Tobit Regression with (Clustering the Standard Error at the Firm Level) 
Independent Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-Value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.066 0.123 1.175* 0.080 1.166* 0.084 1.292* 0.059 1.427*** 0.008 
DUL    -7.565** 0.011 -5.730* 0.058 -5.984** 0.045 -6.010** 0.048 -2.500 0.434 
BI   0.081 0.223 0.064 0.332 -0.003 0.953 0.007 0.906 -0.052 0.385 
BM   1.998 0.236 1.413 0.427 1.184 0.512 1.272 0.480 1.130 0.528 
MONR     -1.413 0.107 -1.445* 0.092 -1.434 0.105 -0.930 0.278 
ONRC     -0.049 0.375 -0.045 0.413 -0.052 0.352 0.039 0.404 
AQUAL       5.205** 0.017 4.997** 0.022 5.274*** 0.004 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.836*** 0.000 -5.944*** 0.000 -6.347*** 0.000 -6.466*** 0.000 -6.677*** 0.000 -4.843*** 0.000 
RD 9.092*** 0.000 8.743*** 0.000 8.543*** 0.000 8.354*** 0.000 8.344*** 0.000 7.456*** 0.000 
LEV 0.121** 0.031 0.143*** 0.008 0.135** 0.012 0.131** 0.014 0.130** 0.015 0.039 0.424 
PROFIT -0.013 0.825 0.002 0.962 0.004 0.932 -0.011 0.844 0.002 0.969 0.041 0.379 
LIQUID 8.591*** 0.000 8.491*** 0.000 8.488*** 0.000 8.786*** 0.000 8.658*** 0.000 5.913*** 0.001 
GROW 0.015* 0.079 0.021** 0.016 0.026*** 0.000 0.028*** 0.000 0.032*** 0.003 0.029*** 0.000 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 2.793 0.740 1.557 0.872 13.177 0.272 17.805 0.139 21.396* 0.076 12.105 0.414 
F-Statistics 28.68 20.61 18.41 16.87 16.33 18.04 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R
2
 0.0622 0.0668 0.0680 0.0702 0.0718 0.1002 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 50   left-censored observations RDDIS < = 0    -  455  uncensored observations  -   0  right-censored observations 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM = Board meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD = R&D investments; LEV = Leverage; PROFIT = 
Profitability; LIQUID = Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.29 
Summary of the Results of Analysis (Clustering the Standard Error at the Firm Level) 
Variables 
 
H  
 
Expected 
Sign 
 
Model (4) Model (6) 
OLS 
OLS 
 (Clustering  
the Standard  
Error at the 
 Firm Level ) 
Tobit 
 
Tobit  
(Clustering 
 the Standard 
 Error at the 
 Firm Level ) 
OLS 
OLS  
(Clustering 
 the Standard  
 Error at the  
Firm Level ) 
Tobit 
Tobit  
(Clustering  
the Standard 
 Error at the 
 Firm Level ) 
Corporate Governance 
BS H1 + + ( S) + (W) + (S) + (W) + (S) + (M) + (S) + (S) 
DUL H2 - - (M) - (M) - (M) - (M) None None None None 
BI H3 + None None None None None None None None 
BM H4 + None None None None None None None None 
MONR H5 - - (M) - (W) - (M) - (W) None None None None 
ONRC H6 - None None None None None None None None 
AQUAL H7 + + (S) + (M) + (S) + (M) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
Control Variables 
SIZE   - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) 
RD   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
LEV   + (S) + (M) + (S) + (M) None None None None 
PROFIT   None None None None None None None None 
LIQUID   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
GROW   + (M) + (S) + (M) + (S) + (M) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
 
(S)   = significant at 0.01 level;  
(M)  = significant at 0.05 level; 
(W)  = significant at 0.10 level;   
None = no significant association. 
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6.6.2. Sensitivity Analysis for the Dependent Variable  
The next paragraphs introduce the sensitivity analysis for the dependent variable. 
Two further analysis are carried out: first, conducting the analysis using the weighted 
disclosure score to measure the dependent variable and second, conducting the 
analysis using ordered logistic regression where three levels of the dependent 
variable can be identified. 
6.6.2.1. Weighted Disclosure Score 
This study measures the dependent variable using a self-constructed unweighted 
disclosure index. The next section presents the sensitivity analysis that was 
conducted to check the sensitivity of measuring the dependent variable by using the 
weighted disclosure score. The weighted score calculated by giving a score of (one) 
to each item has non-financial information, and a score of (two) to each item has 
financial information.    
Table 6.30 presents the results of OLS regression of the association between R&D 
voluntary disclosure weighted score and corporate governance, controlling for 
corporate characteristics, and considering the year and industry fixed effects. The 
same relationship is also examined using Tobit regression and the results are 
presented in table 6.31. Table 6.32 summarises the results of OLS and Tobit 
regression analysis employing both weighted and unweighted R&D disclosure score 
to calculate the dependent variable.  From the table, it can be noticed that, generally, 
there is agreement between the results of the analysis performed using the weighted 
and unweighted R&D disclosure score. 
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Table 6.30  
OLS Regression Analysis (Weighted Score) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef P-value 
(t) 
Coef P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.064*** 0.004 1.145*** 0.002 1.134*** 0.002 1.246*** 0.001 1.210*** 0.001 
DUL    -7.734*** 0.000 -6.453*** 0.005 -6.645*** 0.004 -6.707*** 0.004 -3.979* 0.063 
BI   0.058 0.251 0.046 0.367 -0.004 0.929 0.005 0.919 -0.052 0.302 
BM   2.462** 0.047 2.071 0.101 1.895 0.131 1.977 0.114 1.914 0.106 
MONR     -0.991 0.113 -1.016 0.102 -1.003 0.105 -0.573 0.313 
ONRC     -0.039 0.304 -0.036 0.340 -0.041 0.272 0.035 0.321 
AQUAL       3.817** 0.010 3.641** 0.014 4.175*** 0.002 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.078*** 0.000 -5.157*** 0.000 -5.467*** 0.000 -5.542*** 0.000 -5.731*** 0.000 -3.795*** 0.000 
RD 8.275*** 0.000 7.953*** 0.000 7.807*** 0.000 7.664*** 0.000 7.660*** 0.000 6.747*** 0.000 
LEV 0.094** 0.011 0.117*** 0.001 0.112*** 0.002 0.108*** 0.003 0.108*** 0.003 0.034 0.326 
PROFIT 0.007 0.878 0.023 0.637 0.024 0.624 0.012 0.798 0.025 0.618 0.052 0.268 
LIQUID 7.763*** 0.000 7.710*** 0.000 7.691*** 0.000 7.916*** 0.000 7.816*** 0.000 5.599*** 0.000 
GROW 0.011 0.261 0.016* 0.091 0.020** 0.045 0.021** 0.031 0.026** 0.011 0.020** 0.030 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 0.341 0.949 -1.677 0.804 6.998 0.412 10.353 0.228 13.483 0.118 -2.866 0.767 
Adj. R Square (R
2
) 0.4195 0.4445 0.4462 0.4524 0.4582 0.5554 
F-Statistics 61.70 41.33 34.84 33.03 29.42 28.38 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS = Board size; DUL= Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM = Board meetings; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC = 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD = R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT = 
Profitability; LIQUID = Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
 -246- 
 
Table 6.31  
Tobit Regression Analysis (Weighted Score) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model  (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-Value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.093*** 0.007 1.187*** 0.004 1.179*** 0.004 1.296*** 0.001 1.437[ 0.000 
DUL    -8.159*** 0.001 -6.770*** 0.008 -6.990*** 0.006 -7.013*** 0.005 -3.639 0.113 
BI   0.077 0.160 0.065 0.242 0.006 0.916 0.016 0.777 -0.043 0.425 
BM   2.179 0.104 1.773 0.194 1.560 0.250 1.637 0.225 1.318 0.296 
MONR     -1.020 0.131 -1.047 0.119 -1.038 0.119 -0.581 0.334 
ONRC     -0.047 0.252 -0.044 0.286 -0.050 0.222 0.034 0.355 
AQUAL       4.483*** 0.006 4.289*** 0.008 4.635*** 0.002 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.550*** 0.000 -5.670*** 0.000 -6.029*** 0.000 -6.131*** 0.000 -6.326*** 0.000 -4.474*** 0.000 
RD 8.859*** 0.000 8.497*** 0.000 8.332*** 0.000 8.170*** 0.000 8.161*** 0.000 7.233*** 0.000 
LEV 0.111*** 0.006 0.133*** 0.001 0.127*** 0.001 0.123*** 0.002 0.123*** 0.002 0.045 0.228 
PROFIT .0170 0.758 0.033 0.539 0.033 0.539 0.019 0.719 0.031 0.556 0.060 0.231 
LIQUID 8.015*** 0.000 7.920*** 0.000 7.890*** 0.000 8.147*** 0.000 8.030*** 0.000 5.517*** 0.000 
GROW - 0.135 0.215 0.019* 0.074 0.023** 0.036 0.024** 0.023 0.029*** 0.008 0.025*** 0.009 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant -0.156 0.978 -1.626 0.825 8.141 0.379 12.122 0.193 15.452* 0.098 7.264 0.482 
LR (chi
2
-Statistics) 267.98 292.06 295.54 303.25 309.66 429.80 
Prob (chi
2
-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R
2
 0.0645 0.0703 0.0712 0.0730 0.0746 0.1035 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 54  left-censored observations RDDIS < = 0    - 451 uncensored observations     -  0 right-censored observations 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM = Board meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC = 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE = Firm size; RD =R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT = 
Profitability; LIQUID = Liquidity ; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.32 
Summary of the Results of Analysis (Weighted Score) 
Variables H 
 
Expected 
Sign 
 
Model (4) Model (6) 
OLS 
OLS 
(weighted 
Score) 
Tobit 
Tobit 
(weighted 
Score) 
OLS 
OLS 
(weighted 
Score) 
Tobit 
Tobit 
(weighted 
Score) 
Corporate Governance 
BS H1 + + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
DUL H2  - - (M) - (S) - (M) - (S) None - (W) None None 
BI H3 + None None None None None None None None 
BM H4 + None None None None None None None None 
MONR H5 - - (M) None - (M) None None None None None 
ONRC H6 - None None None None None None None None 
AQUAL H7 + + (S) + (M) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
Control Variables 
SIZE   - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) 
RD   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
LEV   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) None None None None 
PROFIT   None None None None None None None None 
LIQUID   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
GROW   + (M) + (M) + (M) + (M) + (M) + (M) + (S) + (S) 
 
 
 (S) = significant at 0.01 level;  (M) = significant at 0.05 level; (W)  = significant at 0.10 level;  
None = no significant association. 
 
6.6.2.2. Ordered Logistic Regression 
Howell (2013:556) defines Logistic regression as“a technique for fitting a regression 
surface to data in which the dependent variable is a dichotomy”, and states (p.556) 
“Logistic regression can also be applied in situations where there are three or more 
levels of the dependent variable.”.                           
 The level of R&D disclosure introduced by the UK firms can be classified into three 
categories: 
 Firms that do not introduce any R&D-related information. 
 Firms that introduce a low level of R&D disclosure (less than the average of 
R&D disclosure score for firms that introduced R&D-related information in 
their annual reports). 
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 Firms that introduce a high level of R&D disclosure (more than the average 
of R&D disclosure score for firms that introduced R&D-related information 
in their annual reports). 
To examine R&D disclosure, the bivariate logit model can be extended to take into 
account the three ranked categories of the level of R&D disclosure. Therefore, the 
firms that do not introduce any R&D-related information were coded (zero), the 
firms that introduce low level of R&D disclosure were coded (one), and the firms 
that introduce high level of R&D disclosure were coded (two). 
 
Table 6.33 
R&D Disclosure Ranking 
Disclosure Level  Order Freq. Percent Cum. 
No R&D Disclosure 0 50 9.90 9.90 
Low level of R&D disclosure. 1 235 46.53 56.44 
High level of R&D disclosure 2 220 43.56 100 
Total  505 100  
 
Table 6.34 presents the results of ordered logistic regression, it shows that board size 
has a significant positive association with R&D disclosure; the coefficient is 
significant at the level of 5% in models 2, 3 and 4 (at the 1% level as suggested by 
OLS regression and Tobit regression) and at the 1% level in model 5 and 6 (as 
suggested by OLS regression and Tobit regression). 
Role duality and managerial ownership have a marginally negative impact on R&D 
disclosure at the 10% level in model 4 (at the 5% level as suggested by OLS 
regression and Tobit regression), while, this influence is not found in model 6 after 
controlling for the industry effect (as suggested by OLS regression and Tobit 
regression). 
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The results of ordered logistic regression confirm the absence of any significant 
association between R&D disclosure and board meetings or ownership 
concentration. 
Regarding the audit committee quality, the results of ordered logistic regression are 
identical with both OLS regression and Tobit regression. The only difference is 
related to model (6); while both OLS regression and Tobit regression confirm a 
positive association between audit committee quality and R&D voluntary disclosure 
at the 1% level, the ordered logistic regression suggests that the coefficient is 
significant at the 5% leve. 
In terms of control variables, the results of the three models are similar in general.  A 
summary of the results of OLS regression, Tobit regression and ordered logistic 
regression are summarized in table 6.35. 
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Table 6.34 
Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis 
Independent Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Model (4) 
Full Model 
Model (5) 
Model (6) 
Full Model 
Coef. 
P-
value 
(z) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(z) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(z) 
Coef. 
P-
Value 
(z) 
Coef. 
P-
value 
(z) 
Coef. 
P-
value 
(z) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   0.121** 0.041 0.141** 0.019 0.148** 0.015 0.171*** 0.006 0.216*** 0.002 
DUL    -0.785** 0.020 -0.567 0.110 -0.612* 0.087 -0.633* 0.076 -0.176 0.668 
BI   0.013* 0.089 0.011 0.157 0.002 0.738 0.005 0.557 0.0003 0.972 
BM   0.235 0.204 0.177 0.350 0.150 0.432 0.167 0.386 0.215 0.316 
MONR     -0.158* 0.091 -0.161* 0.088 -0.163* 0.082 -0.104 0.318 
ONRC     -0.009 0.107 -0.009 0.124 -0.010* 0.093 0.004 0.447 
AQUAL       0.640*** 0.007 0.620** 0.010 0.651** 0.014 
Control Variables 
SIZE -0.552*** 0.000 -0.697*** 0.000 -0.772*** 0.000 -0.801*** 0.000 -0.845*** 0.000 -0.696*** 0.000 
RD 0.923*** 0.000 0.905*** 0.000 0.886*** 0.000 0.867*** 0.000 0.877*** 0.000 0.953*** 0.000 
LEV 0.013** 0.028 0.016** 0.011 0.015** 0.015 0.014** 0.024 0.014** 0.024 -0.0003 0.967 
PROFIT 8.251 0.999 0.001 0.892 -0.0007 0.934 -0.002 0.744 -0.00003 0.997 0.005 0.587 
LIQUID 0.984*** 0.000 1.023*** 0.000 1.038*** 0.000 1.062*** 0.000 1.061*** 0.000 0.784*** 0.003 
GROW 0.001 0.315 0.002 0.139 0.003* 0.057 0.003** 0.043 0.004** 0.016 0.004** 0.013 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
LR (chi
2
-Statistics) 193.29 208.39 213.66 220.95 229.52 327.45 
Prob (chi
2
-Statistics) 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R
2
 0.2021 0.2179 0.2234 0.2310 0.2400 0.3424 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
 
 *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL = Audit committee quality; SIZE= Firm size; RD =R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT = 
Profitability; LIQUID = Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.35 
Summary of the Results of Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis 
Variables H  
Expected 
Sign 
Model (4) Model (6) 
OLS Tobit Logistic  OLS Tobit Logistic 
Corporate Governance 
BS H1 + + (S) + (S) + (M) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
DUL H2 - - (M) - (M) - (W) None None None 
BI H3 + None None None None None None 
BM H4 + None None None None None None 
MONR H5 - - (M) - (M) - (W) None None None 
ONRC H6 - None None None None None None 
AQUAL H7 + + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) +(M) 
Control Variables 
SIZE   - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) - (S) 
RD   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
LEV   + (S) + (S) + (M) None None None 
PROFIT   None None None None None None 
LIQUID   + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) + (S) 
GROW   + (M) + (M) + (M) + ( M) + (S) + (M) 
 
(S) = significant at 0.01 level;  
(M) = significant at 0.05 level; 
(W) = significant at 0.10 level; 
 None = no significant association. 
 
6.6.3. Sensitivity Analysis for the Independent Variables  
The next paragraphs introduce the sensitivity analysis of the independent variables. 
Two  further analysis are carried out: first, conducting the analysis using the audit 
committee characteristics rather than the composite score of the audit committee 
quality, and second, conducting the analysis considering the impact of cross listing 
on R&D disclosure. 
6.6.3.1. Audit Committee Characteristics 
The current study measures the audit committee effectiveness using a composite 
measure based on four audit committee characteristics: audit committee size, the 
frequency of audit committee meetings, the number of independent directors on the 
audit committee, and the number of financial experts on the audit committee. 
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In this sensitivity analysis, the impact of each of these characteristics on R&D 
voluntary disclosure is examined separately. This test aims to investigate whether the 
audit committee characteristics affect R&D voluntary disclosure individually or as a 
composite score. 
Table 6.36 presents the impact of board characteristics, ownership structure, and four 
audit committee characteristics (audit committee size, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings, the number of independent directors on the audit committee, 
and the number of financial experts on the audit committee) on R&D voluntary 
disclosure using OLS regression. The same relationship is examined using Tobit 
regression, and the results introduced in table 6.37. 
The results indicate that both audit committee size (AS) and audit committee experts 
number (AE) do not have any significant influence on R&D voluntary disclosure. 
While, the frequency of audit committee meetings (AM) has a marginal effect on 
R&D voluntary disclosure according to OLS regression (not significant according to 
Tobit regression). Audit committee independence (AI) is positively associated with 
R&D voluntary disclosure at the 5% level, after considering the year and industry 
fixed effect. 
These findings indicate that, in general, when the audit committee components were 
tested separately, they do not have a significant association with R&D voluntary 
disclosure. The exception is the audit committee independence which is positively 
associated with R&D voluntary disclosure. This result is consistent with Nekhili et 
al., (2015) that addressed only audit committee independence, and concluded that 
audit committee independence is one of the most important drivers of R&D 
disclosure in annual reports of a sample of French firms. 
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Table 6.36 
OLS Regression Analysis (Audit Committee Characteristics) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS 0.944** 0.031 1.052** 0.016 1.145*** 0.005 
DUL -5.882** 0.017 -5.931** 0.016 -2.897 0.205 
BI -0.023 0.719 -0.010 0.866 -0.054 0.352 
BM 0.961 0.486 1.069 0.436 1.193 0.357 
MONR -1.315** 0.048 -1.315** 0.047 -0.744 0.221 
ONRC -0.050 0.225 -0.056 0.170 0.025 0.505 
AS 0.644 0.473 0.702 0.433 0.099 0.904 
AM 0.776 0.135 0.814 0.115 0.888* 0.075 
AI 0.073* 0.070 0.065 0.102 0.079** 0.032 
AE 0.017 0.589 0.018 0.568 -0.002 0.943 
Control Variables 
SIZE -6.006*** 0.000 -6.233*** 0.000 -4.384*** 0.000 
RD 7.843*** 0.000 7.829*** 0.000 7.022*** 0.000 
LEV 0.107*** 0.007 0.107*** 0.007 0.018 0.636 
PROFIT -0.015 0.767 -0.002 0.965 0.033 0.510 
LIQUID 7.869*** 0.000 7.771*** 0.000 5.477*** 0.000 
GROW 0.024** 0.021 0.029*** 0.006 0.024** 0.015 
Year Dummies Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 12.485 0.185 16.508* 0.082 5.616 0.601 
Adj. R Square (R
2 
) 0.4364 0.4432 0.5408 
F-Statistics 25.39 23.29 23.83 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better; 
**  Significant at the 5% level or better;  
*    Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 
Variables: BS = Board size; DUL= Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM = Board 
meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC = Ownership concentration; AS 
= Number of directors on audit committee; AM = Total number of audit 
committee meetings held within the year; AI = Proportion of independent non 
executive directors on audit committee; AE = Proportion of  financial expertise 
directors on the audit committee; SIZE = Firm size; RD = R&D investments; LE V 
=Leverage; PROFIT = Profitability; LIQUID = Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’ 
growth. 
 
- All variables are as defined in table 5.9. 
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Table 6.37 
Tobit Regression Analysis (Audit Committee Characteristics) 
Independent Variables 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Coef. 
P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS 1.050** 0.027 1.163** 0.014 1.462*** 0.001 
DUL -6.251** 0.020 -6.250** 0.019 -2. 432 0.321 
BI -0.007 0.915 0.004 0.942 -0.039 0.527 
BM 0.624 0.674 0.724 0.624 0.578 0.674 
MONR -1.312* 0.067 -1.318* 0.064 -0. 712 0.269 
ONRC - 0.060 0.180 -0.067 0.132 0.021 0.593 
AS 0.431 0.657 0.480 0.619 -0.304 0.732 
AM 0.681 0.223 0.725 0.192 0.873 0.101 
AI 0.089** 0.043 0.081* 0.063 0.093** 0.018 
AE 0.021 0.540 0.022 0.519 0.0007 0981 
Control Variables 
SIZE -6.587*** 0.000 -6.819*** 0.000 -5.064*** 0.000 
RD 8.411*** 0.000 8.388*** 0.000 7.550 *** 0.000 
LEV 0.124*** 0.004 0.123*** 0.004 0.031 0.448 
PROFIT - 0.008 0.889 0.005 0.922 0.042 0.435 
LIQUID 8.066*** 0.000 7.954*** 0.000 5.403*** 0.000 
GROW 0.027** 0.017 0.032*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 
Year Dummies Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 12.700 0.211 16.999* 0.096 8.914 0.435 
LR (chi
2 
-Statistics) 291.59 298.59 417.85 
Prob (chi
2 
-Statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo  R
2
 0.0695 0.0711 0.0995 
No. of observations 505 505 505 
 
50 left-censored observations    RDDIS < = 0     
455 uncensored observations    
0 right-censored observations 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better; 
**  Significant at the 5% level or better;  
*    Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 
Variables: BS= Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI =Board independence; BM= Board 
meetings; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC=Ownership concentration; 
AS = Number of directors on audit committee; AM =Total number of audit 
committee meetings held within the year; AI = Proportion of independent non 
executive directors on audit committee; AE = Proportion of  financial expertise 
directors on the audit committee; SIZE = Firmsize; RD=R&D investments; 
LEV = Leverage; PROFIT = Profitability; IIQUID = Liquidity; GROWTH = 
Firm’ growth. 
 
- All variables are as defined in table 5.9. 
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6.6.3.2. Cross Listing 
To control for the non-UK regulatory influence, the main analysis is repeated 
considering the cross listing by adding a dummy variable coded (zero) if the firm is 
listed in London Stock Exchange only, and coded (one) if the firm listed in multiple 
stock exchanges. 
Table 6.38 presents the results of OLS regression considering the impact of cross 
listing, and table 6.39 presents the results of Tobit regression. 
By comparing the results of the main analysis and the results of the analysis after 
controlling for cross listing, it can be noticed that the results are identical.  
Moreover, there is no significant association between cross listing and the level of 
R&D disclosure according to the results of both OLS regression and Tobit 
regression, suggesting the insignificant influence of the cross listing on R&D 
disclosure.  
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Table 6.38  
OLS Regression Analysis (Cross Listing) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef P-value 
(t) 
Coef P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.081 *** 0.006 1.185 *** 0.003 1.156 *** 0.004 1.276 *** 0.001 1.218 *** 0.001 
DUL    -7.208*** 0.002 -5.450 ** 0.027 -5.670** 0.020 -5.736** 0.018 -2.939 0.194 
BI   0.060 0.261 0.043 0.421 -0.013 0.815 -0.002 0.966 -0.062 0.249 
BM   2.369 * 0.072 1.812 0.175 1.594 0.231 1.687 0.203 1.797 0.152 
MONR     -1.424 ** 0.032 -1.437** 0.030 -1.423** 0.030 -0.947 0.117 
ONRC     -0.041 0.306 -0.037 0.348 -0.043 0.276 0.038 0.303 
AQUAL       4.304*** 0.007 4.121*** 0.009 4.638 *** 0.002 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.275*** 0.000 -5.341*** 0.000 -5.694*** 0.000 -5.796 *** 0.000 -6.003 *** 0.000 -4.055*** 0.000 
RD 8.516 *** 0.000 8.210 *** 0.000 8.033 *** 0.000 7.859 *** 0.000 7.854 *** 0.000 6.944 *** 0.000 
LEV 0.103 *** 0.009 0.126 *** 0.001 0.118 *** 0.003 0.114 *** 0.003 0.114 *** 0.003 0.027 0.464 
PROFIT -0.021 0.684 -0.005 0.924 -0.001 0.979 -0.015 0.771 -0.002 0.965 0.036 0.470 
LIQUID 8.354 *** 0.000 8.308 *** 0.000 8.324 *** 0.000 8.563*** 0.000 8.452 *** 0.000 6.026*** 0.000 
GROW 0.012 0.225 0.018 * 0.084 0.023 ** 0.032 0.024** 0.021 0.029 *** 0.007 0.023** 0.019 
LS  -1.689 0.468 -2.504 0.277 -2.837 0.218 -1.965 0.395 -1.915 0.404 -1.704 0.418 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude Exclude Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 2.268 0.695 -0.005 0.999 10.519 0.249 14.726 0.110 18.126 ** 0.050 6.279 0.546 
Adj. R Square (R
2 
) 0.4101 0.4304 0.4345 0.4417 0.4480 0.5460 
F-Statistics 51.06 35.62 30.78 29.48 26.57 26.26 
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
           *** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better. 
Variables: BS = Board size; DUL= Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR= Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL=Audit committee quality ; SIZE = Firm size; RD =R&D investments; LEV= Leverage ; PROFIT=Profitability; 
LIQUID = Liquidity; GROWTH = Firm’s growth; LS = Dummy variable coded (0) if the firm is listed in London Stock Exchange only, and coded (1) 
if the firm listed in multiple stock exchanges. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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Table 6.39  
Tobit Regression Analysis (Cross Listing) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model  (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-Value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Coef. P-value 
(t) 
Corporate Governance 
BS   1.105** 0.011 1.223 *** 0.005 1.192 *** 0.006 1.318*** 0.002 1.439*** 0.000 
DUL    -7.602*** 0.003 -5.725** 0.033 -5.975** 0.025 -6.002** 0.023 -2.509 0.301 
BI   0.081 0.167 0.063 0.281 - 0.002 0.968 0.008 0.890 -0.052 0.358 
BM   2.063 0.148 1.490 0.303 1.222 0.395 1.310 0.359 1.157 0.387 
MONR     -1.455** 0.043 -1.467** 0.040 -1.455** 0.040 -0.944 0.140 
ONRC     -0.050 0.256 -0.045 0.295 -0.052 0.228 0.039 0.329 
AQUAL       5.071*** 0.003 4.867*** 0.005 5.203*** 0.001 
Control Variables 
SIZE -4.787*** 0.000 -5.894*** 0.000 -6.295*** 0.000 -6.433*** 0.000 -6.640*** 0.000 -4.804*** 0.000 
RD 9.114 *** 0.000 8.771 *** 0.000 8.572 *** 0.000 8.375 *** 0.000 8.364 *** 0.000 7.453 *** 0.000 
LEV 0.121 *** 0.005 0.143 *** 0.001 0.135 *** 0.002 0.130 *** 0.002 0.130 *** 0.002 0.039 0.329 
PROFIT  - 0.012 0.827 0.004 0.938 0.007 0.902 -0.009 0.867 0.003 0.948 0.042 0.426 
LIQUID 8.612 *** 0.000 8.524 *** 0.000 8.529 *** 0.000 8.800 *** 0.000 8.672 *** 0.000 5.932 *** 0.000 
GROW 0.015 0.184 0.020 * 0.068 0.025 ** 0.026 0.027 ** 0.016 0.032 *** 0.005 0.029 *** 0.005 
LS -1.208 0.633 -2.046 0.413 -2.383 0.339 -1.302 0.602 -1.273 0.670 -0.810 0.719 
Year Dummies Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude  Exclude Include Include 
Industry Dummies Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude Include 
Constant 2.059 0.743  0.341 0.966 11.986 0.225 17.034* 0.087 20.637** 0.039 11.461 0.302 
LR (chi
2
-Statistics) 261.18 281.06 286.30 294.90 301.63 420.78 
Prob (chi
2
-Statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0622 0.0670 0.0682 0.0703 0.0719 0.1002 
No. of observations 505 505 505 505 505 505 
54   left-censored observations RD-DIS<=0     451 uncensored observations          0    right-censored observations 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better;      **   Significant at the 5% level or better;     *    Significant at the 10% level or better. 
Variables: BS = Board size; DUL = Role duality; BI = Board independence; BM= Board meetings; MONR = Managerial ownership; ONRC= 
Ownership concentration; AQUAL=Audit committee quality; SIZE=Firm size; RD=R&D investments; LEV= Leverage; PROFIT= 
Profitability; LIQUID=Liquidity ; GROWTH = Firm’s growth; LS = Dummy variable coded (0) if the firm is listed in London Stock 
Exchange only, and coded (1) if the firm listed in multiple stock exchanges. (all variables are as defined in table 5.9). 
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6.7.  SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the results of investigating the extent and trend of R&D 
voluntary disclosure. Four levels of analysis are considered: overall R&D disclosure, 
R&D  disclosure categories, R&D disclosure types and R&D disclosure items. This 
followed by descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. It also 
presents the examining of the basic assumptions of OLS regression. 
Finally, the chapter reports the results of the empirical findings of the association 
between corporate governance and R&D voluntary disclosure introduced by the UK 
firms in their annual reports over the three years from 2007 to 2009. Two techniques, 
OLS regression and Tobit regression have been employed to examine the data in the 
current study. 
Based on the findings of the empirical analysis, it is concluded that the variations of 
the level of R&D voluntary disclosure in the UK firms can be explained by the 
variations in board size and the effectiveness of the audit committee. However, after 
controlling for the effect of the year and industry, the other board characteristics and 
ownership structure, do not have any significant influence on the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure.  
Regarding the control variables, four variables can explain the differences in the 
level of R&D voluntary disclosure. While R&D voluntary disclosure is negatively 
related to firm size, it has a positive association with each of R&D investments, 
liquidity, and firm’s growth. 
 
 
 -259- 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -260- 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION  
7.1.  INTRODUCTION  
The distinctive nature of R&D investments and the limited of mandated informative 
disclosure requirements concerning R&D activities create an information problem 
(Lev, 1999; Merkley, 2014). Moreover, the formal requirements and recommendations 
concerning enhancement of narrative reporting, that have come into force for UK listed 
companies with the Companies ACT 2006, are too generic and difficult to interpret 
(Deloitte, 2009).  In addition, these requirements do not identify specific needs in order 
to enhance the narrative disclosure of R&D activities.  
This situation has led to deviations in R&D disclosure practices between firms. 
Moreover, managers need to make difficult decisions in order to determine the type 
and the level of R&D disclosure, depending on the trade-off between the costs and 
benefits of disclosure. 
Therefore, studying R&D narrative disclosure practices in annual reports is 
considered a useful research area. The current study explored R&D narrative 
disclosure practices in annual reports of a sample of the UK firms. In addition, it 
investigated the influence of corporate governance on R&D disclosure decisions, 
considering the other potential drivers of R&D reporting. 
This chapter introduces the concluding remarks of this study. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised as follows: section (2) summarizes the research methodology; 
section (3) presents a summary of the findings of the study, and section (4) outlines 
the implications of the study; section (5) highlights the limitations of the research, 
and section (6) introduces some suggestions for future research. 
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7.2.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The next paragraphs summarize the methodology employed to carry out the 
empirical part of this study.  
A self constructed disclosure index was established by considering the list of R&D 
information items introduced by Entwistle (1999), and reviewing 100 annual reports 
of the UK non-financial listed firms.  Hence, the final checklist includes all types of 
R&D information that are relevant to the UK environment. 
Manual content analysis was used to identify every piece of information that 
revealed any R&D disclosure. This information was classified into the relevant item 
in the disclosure index. The research instrument was employed to calculate the 
disclosure score for a sample of 505 annual reports across three years 2007, 2008, 
and 2009. 
The first two research questions were answered by applying a descriptive analysis of 
the total R&D disclosure; its categories (general, input, output, financial); its types  
(financial and non-financial); and of each item presented in annual reports and 
included in the disclosure index (26 items). 
The third research question was answered by tracking the R&D disclosure score over 
the examined period. A statistical test  was applied to investigate whether there is a 
significant change in the extent of R&D disclosure practices over the period of the 
study.  
The fourth research question was answered by reviewing the relevant literature to 
identify the potential impact of corporate governance on R&D voluntary disclosure. 
Firm characteristics that may influence the management decision to introduce more 
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or less R&D information are considered. Finally, drawing on agency and signalling 
theories and on understanding the benefits and costs involved in R&D disclosure 
decision, seven explanatory variables and six control variables are identified. 
The study formulated the hypotheses based on the proposed integrated theoretical 
framework and prior studies in order to answer the fourth question. These hypotheses 
have been tested using OLS regression and Tobit regression. 
Further analysis is conducted using a sensitivity analysis for the full model, the 
dependent variable, and the independent variables. For the full model, the analysis is 
carried out using robust standard errors; in addition, it is conducted with clustering 
the standard error at the firm level. Regarding the dependent variable, the analysis is 
carried out using the weighted disclosure score to measure the level of R&D 
voluntary disclosure. Moreover, the level of R&D disclosure is classified into three 
categories and Logistic regression is performed. In terms of the independent 
variables, the impact of audit committee characteristics on R&D voluntary disclosure 
is examined separately. Moreover, the main analysis is repeated considering cross 
listing to control for the possible influence of cross listing on R&D disclosure. 
7.3. RESEARCH  FINDINGS   
This section introduces the main findings of the current study:  
The first part of the empirical analysis aims to explore and identify R&D-related 
information introduced discretionarily by the UK firms in annual reports. It also 
seeks to track the variations in the level of R&D narrative disclosure across the 
period of the study. Applying a descriptive analysis of the total R&D disclosure, its 
categories, its types and for each R&D information item presented in annual reports 
reveals the following main findings:  
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 In terms of the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports, the findings reveal 
that, in average the UK firms introduce about 30% of the examined R&D 
disclosure index items. This result is in line with Nekhili et al., (2012) who 
provides evidence from France and La Rosa and Liberatore (2014) who 
examine eight western European countries. The average R&D disclosure 
score according to these studies is 22.64 and 28.5 respectively. 
 The R&D disclosure score in the current study increases gradually over the 
examined period. However, the variations in R&D disclosure score among the 
three years of the study are insignificant. On the other hand, the deviations in 
R&D disclosure score according to the industry type are significant, and 
ranged from slightly more than 50% for the health care sector to slightly less 
than 7% for the consumer services sector.  
 Regarding the frequency of each item that has been disclosed by the UK 
firms, the most common R&D information is related to the firm’s strategy, 
objective and vision. This is followed by the competition and the risk of R&D 
activities. However, financial information about past and future R&D 
expenditures is in last place, suggesting that the disclosure benefits of 
introducing such information do not compensate the risk of competitive 
disadvantage.  
The second part of the empirical analysis aims to investigate the potential drivers of 
R&D narrative disclosure practices, particularly the impact of corporate governance 
and ownership structure on the level of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
Examining the research hypotheses using OLS regression and Tobit regression 
shows the following main findings:  
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 In terms of the influence of corporate governance on the overall level of R&D 
disclosure, the statistical results indicate that, board size does affect positively 
R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. This result validates the 
argument that a large number of directors on the board increases the diversity 
of the experience and skills (Hidalgo et al., 2011). This variety may help in 
gaining a clear understanding of R&D activities. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Abdelbadi and Elshandidy (2013); however, it is not in the 
line with Nekhili et al., (2015) who did not find any significant impact of 
board size on R&D narrative disclosure.  
 Regarding the role duality, after considering the industry effect, no significant 
impact of it is detected on the level of R&D disclosure. This result is in the 
line with most studies that address the association between role duality and 
the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Nor et al., 2012; 
Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). However, Zeghal et 
al., (2007) introduce evidence from Canada on the association between the 
role duality and R&D disclosure in annual reports at the 5% level. 
 Interestingly, the results do not confirm any significant influence of board 
independence on the level of R&D disclosure. Although this result 
contradicts the expected monitoring role of the independent directors which is 
grounded in agency theory, it is similar to the findings of other studies that 
address this variable in examining the drivers of R&D voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports (e.g. Zegal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 2010; Abdelbadi and 
Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015).  Moreover, no significant association 
is found between the frequency of board meetings and the level of R&D 
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disclosure in annual reports. To the best of my knowledge, this relationship 
has not been previously examined. 
 In respect of the ownership structure, the results do not support the existence 
of a significant association between R&D disclosure in annual reports and 
managerial ownership or ownership concentration. This result is similar to 
that found by (e.g. Nor et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2015) 
that addressed the managerial ownership. It is also comparable to studies that 
consider the ownership concentration (e.g. Nekhili et al., 2012; Abdelbadi 
and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). 
 Finally, the results reveal that, the audit committee quality does affect 
positively R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports. This result validates 
the audit committee role regarding narrative reporting, which was identified 
by the FRC (2012) which recommended that the audit committee should 
review the annual report and assess whether it provides the essential 
information for shareholders to evaluate the firm’s performance and strategy. 
To the best of my knowledge, the only study examining the association 
between audit committee characteristics and R&D voluntary disclosure is 
Nekhili et al., (2015). The study addressed only audit committee 
independence. It concludes that audit committee independence is one of the 
most important drivers of R&D disclosure in annual reports of a sample of 
French firms. 
 In addition to the composite measure that is employed in the current study to 
assess the audit committee quality; the impact of these characteristics on 
R&D voluntary disclosure is examined separately as one of the sensitivity 
analysis employed in the current study. The results indicate that, the audit 
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committee independence is positively associated with R&D voluntary 
disclosure at the 5% level. This result confirms the findings of Nekhili et al., 
(2015). However, other audit committee characteristics did not have any 
significant influence on R&D disclosure. 
 The most interesting results are related to the impact of audit committee 
quality on R&D financial disclosure and R&D non-financial disclosure. 
While the findings confirm a positive association between the audit 
committee quality and R&D non-financial disclosure, no significant impact 
of audit committee quality on R&D financial disclosure is found. A possible 
explanation for these results might be the nature of financial R&D 
information.  Some financial R&D information that is introduced in narrative 
reporting is already mentioned in the financial statements in the back of the 
annual reports. This information is already reviewed by the audit committee 
within its judgement of the financial statements, for example, current R&D 
expenditure. Other types of R&D financial disclosure, for example, future 
estimates of R&D expenditure, may include proprietary information. 
Introducing this kind of information could lead to competitive disadvantage 
such as, R&D expenditure in the future. Consequently, the audit committee 
may not consider repeated or confidential financial information. 
To sum up, board size, and audit committee quality have a positive significant 
association with the level of R&D disclosure in annual reports of the UK firms. The 
other variables (role duality, board independence, frequency of board meetings, 
ownership concentration, managerial ownership) did not have a significant impact on 
R&D disclosure.   
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In general, the results of the current study do not validate the monitoring role of 
corporate governance concerning board independence, role duality, and frequency of 
board meetings. Moreover, the results do not support the suggestions of agency 
theory regarding the association between the level of R&D disclosure in annual 
reports and each of ownership concentration and managerial ownership.  
Interestingly, although, these findings do not confirm the majority of  theoretical 
arguments drawing on agency theory, they are in the line with the majority of the 
studies that addressed the association between corporate governance and R&D 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Zegal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 2010; 
Abdelbadi and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). A possible explanation for 
these results could be the effect of the disclosure costs which may work as forces 
against informative voluntary disclosure that is supported by the corporate 
governance. A consideration of disclosure costs is emphasised by Steering 
Committee (FASB, 2001b), and highlighted by most prior studies that addressed 
R&D disclosure practices in annual reports (e.g. Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007; 
Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2015).  
These findings support the view of The Companies Act 2006 that does not mandate 
any particular disclosures related to R&D activities. It also, guarantees the firm’s 
flexibility to withhold the information that could be seriously harmful to the interests 
of the company according to the opinion of the directors (Part 15, chapter 5, Section 
417, 10). 
 Finally, in terms of the control variables, the findings indicate that the level of 
R&D disclosure is associated with the majority of firm characteristics that are 
examined in the current study. Of the six firm characteristics that have been 
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examined in the current study, four variables were found to be associated with 
the level of R&D voluntary disclosure. Firm size was found to have a 
negative significant association with the level of R&D voluntary disclosure. 
R&D investments, liquidity, and firm growth were found to have a positive 
association with the level of R&D voluntary disclosure. However, no 
significance is detected for both leverage and profitability after controlling for 
the year and industry effects. 
In general, these results are consistent with the arguments that suggest the possibility 
of using disclosure as an effective tool to decrease information asymmetry measured 
by R&D intensity (e.g. Lev, 2000; Aboody and Lev, 2000).  
7.4. THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS   
The next paragraphs present the theoretical and practical implications of the current 
study. 
7.4.1. Theoretical Implications 
Previous studies employed many theories and concepts to explain R&D disclosure 
practices in annual reports, and to draw their hypotheses about its drivers. Drawing 
on agency and signalling theories, many researchers examine R&D disclosure in 
annual reports (e.g. Zegal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 2010; Abdelbadie and Elshandidy, 
2013; Nekhili et al., 2015), while other studies employ a theoretical base such as 
cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Entwistle, 1999), or proprietary costs and information 
asymmetry (e.g. Jones, 2007; Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili 
et al., 2015).  
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The current study employs an integrated theoretical framework based on agency and 
signalling theories. It also considers cost-benefit analysis and pays more attention to 
proprietary costs and information asymmetry. 
In general, the results reveal that, R&D voluntary disclosure decisions could not be 
explained drawing on agency or signalling theory without considering the costs of 
R&D disclosure. These findings are consistent with the vision of the professional 
accounting entities; they consider the complexity of the trade-off between costs and 
benefits of disclosure decisions (e.g. FASB, 2001b; The Companies Act 2006). 
To sum up, whilst the theoretical framework based on agency and signalling theories 
claim that corporate governance attributes are highly associated with the managers’ 
incentives to provide greater disclosure, this claim needs to be made with care 
regarding R&D disclosure. 
The current study highlights the importance of considering the cost-benefit analysis 
of the disclosure decisions to get a better explanation of R&D disclosure practices. 
The findings of the current study suggested that researchers should pay more 
attention to the impact of disclosure costs on the managers’ incentives to provide 
R&D voluntary disclosure. 
This conclusion may be also helpful when researchers investigate voluntary 
disclosure of other types of activities rather than R&D activities. 
7.4.2. Practical Implications  
Investigating the types of information introduced discretionarily by firms, is one of 
the recommended research areas that suggested by the Jenkins Committee. The 
committee believes that this type of study would provide helpful information to 
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standard setters, regulators, and other parties interested in improving business 
reporting (AICPA, 1994). The current study contributes to this research area as 
follows:  
The results of this study increase the understanding of R&D voluntary disclosure 
introduced by UK firms in annual reports. Providing the accounting standard setters 
and financial market regulators with better insights about R&D disclosure practices 
in the UK may be useful in enhancing the guidelines regarding the disclosure of this 
type of information leading to greater transparency.  
In addition, the study provides a deep investigation of the R&D-related information 
introduced discretionarily in annual reports of the UK firms by analysing the overall 
R&D disclosure, its categories, its types and each item in the constructed disclosure 
index. This helpful insight into the R&D disclosure practices provides managers with 
a benchmark to improve business reporting regarding R&D activities disclosure. 
Moreover, the current study introduces a valid and reliable measure of R&D 
disclosure in annual reports by constructing an R&D disclosure index that considers 
the UK context. To the best of my knowledge, there is no previous R&D disclosure 
index established to measure R&D disclosure practices in annual reports of the UK 
firms, providing this index can help interested parties to assess R&D disclosure 
practices in annual reports. 
The study provides evidence of the significant association between R&D disclosure 
in annual reports and each of firm size, liquidity, R&D investments and growth rate.  
The empirical results reveal a weak influence of corporate governance attributes on 
R&D disclosure in annual reports (only board size and audit committee quality have 
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a significant impact on R&D disclosure). While these  results contradict the control 
role of corporate governance that draws on the agency theory, they are in the line 
with the majority of studies that addressed the impact of corporate governance on 
R&D disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Zegal et al., 2007; Nor et al., 2010; Abdelbadi 
and Elshandidy, 2013; Nekhili et al., 2015). These findings could be explained by 
R&D disclosure costs, which moderate the influence of corporate governance. 
Understanding the incentives of managers to disclose or not disclose R&D 
information in firms’ annual reports can help the standard setters, regulators, and 
other parties interested in improving business reporting to enhance R&D narrative 
disclosure.  
To sum up, the findings of this study provide standard setters, regulators in the UK 
with a deep investigation of the R&D information introduced by UK firms in their 
annual report. This could help them to improve the disclosure recommendations 
leading to enhance the firm’s transparency. 
The study also analysis the disclosure practices in the UK annual reports. This could 
help managers of the UK firms to understand the best practices regarding R&D 
disclosure.  
Moreover, the R&D disclosure index introduced in the current study could be valid 
and reliable measure of R&D disclosure in other countries rather than the UK after 
considering the regulations of each country. 
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7.5. THE RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The current study has some limitations, so some restrictions should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting its findings. Firstly, the disclosure index used in this 
study applies the quantity of disclosure as a proxy of the quality. Secondly, the 
current study focuses on only one disclosure means, that is firm’s annual report, 
while research and development disclosure can be made through a range of channels 
of communications such as conference calls, press releases and announcements. 
Therefore, firms can use different kinds of communications to introduce a particular 
type of information to various external stakeholder groups rather than annual reports. 
Thirdly, there are other variables that may affect R&D disclosure practices in annual 
reports that have not been examined in the current study. These include institutional 
ownership and  family ownership. 
7.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 
According to Beattie (2014) the framework of research in narrative disclosure can be 
classified into five types of studies. These types include exploring the narrative 
disclosure practices, investigating the determinants of disclosure, the author’s 
explanations of the observed practices, the consequences of the existence practices 
and recommendations on what should be reported. The current study contributes to 
the literature by addressing the first and second research areas. Hence, the current 
study explores R&D disclosure practices in annual reports in the UK firms and 
examines the determinants of the observed practices. 
Further research in this field is needed to complement the current study, by 
considering the consequences of R&D voluntary disclosure in annual reports, such as 
the influence of R&D disclosure on market value, cost of capital and on information 
asymmetry. In addition, the management’s explanation of the existence disclosures 
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and the researchers’ recommendations for the best practices of R&D disclosure in 
annual reports are important issues for future research. 
The current study suggests that the focus needs to be expanded to the impact of 
proprietary costs on the managers’ incentives to introduce R&D-related information 
discretionarily. Graham et al., (2005) concluded from their survey that the concern 
about proprietary information is one of the biggest obstacles to providing voluntary 
disclosure. 
The majority of studies that investigate R&D disclosure in annual reports highlight 
the importance of proprietary costs on managers’ disclosure decisions (e.g. Jones, 
2007; Merkley, 2014; La Rosa and Liberator, 2014; Nekhili et al., 2015). Therefore, 
a systematic evidence of the impact of proprietary costs on the management 
incentive to introduce R&D voluntary disclosure is required. Moreover, Beyer et al., 
(2010) recommend that additional work is required to assess the importance of 
proprietary costs on firms’ disclosure decisions in general, and argue that the main 
challenge in this area is measuring and quantifying proprietary costs.    
In future research, considering the textual properties such as R&D disclosure 
readability and tone could introduce a better understanding of R&D disclosure 
practices. To the best of my knowledge, the only study addressing this issue is 
Merkly (2014) who uses computerised content analysis to measure R&D disclosure  
tone and readability in US. Therefore, additional work is required in this area to gain 
a better assessment of R&D-related information introduced discretionarily by firms 
in annual reports.  
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Appendix A Types of R&D Disclosure Information 
Main &  Subcategories  Examples (taken from annual reports) 
General Disclosure  
Statement of strategy or 
objectives or vision about 
R&D. 
 
“ Our success depends on our ability to identify where new 
value can be created, to encourage the search for new products 
and services, to endorse bold strategies within our Group, to 
win new alliances, acquire successful businesses and attract 
farsighted people to our side. In this way we innovate 
constantly ”. UMECO plc, annual report 2008, p. 6.  
“Our strategy is to become the world leader in pyrotechnics, 
through focused investment in new products that displace 
existing incumbents and better meet our customers’ 
requirements ”. Chemring Group plc, annual report 2008, p. 
25. 
R&D is the main activity. 
 
“ We design, develop and supply the technology that allows 
people, organisations and electronic devices to connect 
effectively and efficiently, locally and globally – key 
requirements in today’s increasingly connected world.”  Laird 
Group plc , annual report 2008, p.4. 
The focus of R&D 
activities. 
 
“ As part of the Group’s commitment to ongoing product 
development, Victrex is focused on bringing customers new 
material solutions”. Victrex plc, annual report 2007, p. 2. 
R&D and competition and 
market. 
“ Competitive advantage and market share in OPE is driven 
through product innovation ”. Torotrak plc, annual report 
2007, p. 8. 
“ rapid response to the changed market environment, Infinitrak 
has developed a new, complementary and lower cost 
transmission, the Single Toroidal Transmission (STT), which 
is now being tested in prototype form for intended market 
introduction in time for next year’s grass-cutting season – an 
extremely challenging timetable ”. Torotrak plc, annual report 
2009, p.4. 
R&D and Risk. 
 
“ If the Group is not successful in developing competitive new 
products and services, its revenues may decline”. UMECO plc, 
annual report 2007, p. 22. 
“ Robust research and development processes, both in house 
and where undertaken in co-operation with our customers 
minimise product development risks”. Morgan plc, annual 
report 2008,p.44. 
The effect of R&D spending 
on other financial items. 
“ Return on sales in the division fell from 15.4% in 2007 to 
12.1% in 2008, with the decline due to a number of factors. 
These included the effect of adverse currency movements in 
the first half of 2008, reduced volumes in the second half, 
temporarily higher materials and sales administration costs 
resulting from our North American restructuring, increased 
investment in 2008 in engineering, R&D and account 
management, and pricing pressure in signal integrity 
products”.  Laird plc, annual report 2008, p. 14. 
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Appendix  A  (Continued) 
Main & Subcategories Examples (taken from annual reports) 
Explaining R&D 
spending changes. 
 
“ Research and development expenditure in 2009 was £15.6m 
(2008: £16.5m), the decrease reflecting the completion of the 
Cerepro ® study 904 during 2008 offset partially by the 
additional depreciation following the opening of the GMP3 
biologics manufacturing facility in Finland ”.  Ark Therapeutics 
Group plc, annual report 2009, p.12. 
R&D accounting policy 
discussion outside the 
financial statements. 
“ The Group’s policy is to write-off capitalised development 
costs over a three year period. Amortisation of development 
costs was £1.5 million (2008: £0.7 million) ”. Chemring Group 
plc, annual report 2009, p. 23.  
R&D and future 
opportunities. 
“ This leading edge technology increases disk drive capacity by 
15-20%, opening up opportunities for Morgan and its 
customers”. Morgan plc, annual report 2008, p.7. 
Input 
Management & People.   “The Group has also announced a new and simplified 
organisational structure which will enhance business 
Performance, leverage divisional capabilities and accelerate 
research and development activities”. Cobham plc, annual report 
2007, p. 4. 
“ We have over 280 people in our R&D team worldwide 
working to develop innovative ingredients from renewable 
resources”.  Tate & Lyle plc, annual report 2009, p. 20. 
Other parties involved 
in R&D (R&D 
collaboration). 
 
“We are participating in an ongoing collaborative project 
evaluating the prospects of using biodegradable oils in power 
transformers. The project is investigating the extent to which 
existing transformer designs would need to be modified, as well 
as considering the use of biodegradable oils to retro-fill existing 
units”.   National grid plc, annual report 2008, p.11. 
Infrastructure. 
 
“Our investment in a new cheese packing facility at Nuneaton is 
progressing well. This gives us the opportunity to develop new 
and innovative packaging formats as it becomes operational this 
year”. Dairy Crest  plc, annual report 2009, p. 8. 
“Thermal Ceramics is building on its success in high 
temperature bio-soluble insulating ﬁbre having invested in 2008 
in a new global R&D centre at Bromborough,UK”.    
Morgan Advanced Materials plc, annual report 2008, p. 6. 
Funding. 
 
“The Board believes that the Group has more than adequate 
financial resources to meet its current expansion plans, including 
significant planned capital expenditure and continuing research 
and development investment”. Chemring Group plc, annual 
report 2008, p. 3. 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
Main & Subcategories Examples (taken from annual reports) 
Output : (in progress and achievement : new product or beyond product) 
Past achievement from 
R&D activities. 
 
“Your company has continued to benefit from its long term 
commitment to investment in R&D and capital expenditure and its 
focus on products and technologies that benefit the environment and 
help to make the most efficient use of increasingly expensive energy 
resources”.  Johnson Matthey plc, annual report 2007, p. 3. 
R&D progress. 
 
“The significant engineering programme being undertaken by 
Torotrak with this customer is progressing to plan and is now 
moving from the design stage into the procurement phase which 
will, in turn, lead to prototype transmission build”. Torotrak plc, 
annual report 2009, p. 8. 
This year achievement.  
 
"Johnson Matthey introduced new MEA products in 2006/07 that 
significantly improve the durability and cost of fuel cells used in the 
very demanding transport sector  " . Johnson Matthey plc, plc, annual 
report 2007,p.11. 
“In sales terms, we out-performed the British soft drinks market, 
building on the strength of our brands, and our innovation 
programme delivered in line  with expectations”. Britvic plc , annual 
report 2007,p. 8. 
Potential achievement. 
 
“A number of potential applications are being explored with 
automotive VMs which will increase the powder metallurgy content 
of automatic transmissions”. GKN plc, annual report 2007,p. 27. 
“Going forward into 2008, sales revenue is expected to continue to 
grow organically as a result of new programmes moving into 
production, notably the B787 and the A380, together with increased 
levels of development work including the CH-53K and the A350 
XWB.”  GKN plc, annual report 2007,p. 35. 
Patents. 
 
"We maintain a significant number of patents to support our 
businesses and protect our competitive advantage ". Tate & Lyle plc, 
annual report 2007,p. 28. 
“During the year, Dialight’s technical staff filed 19 patents and had 7 
granted with 47 pending approval”. Dialight plc, annual report 
2007,p. 18. 
Financial Disclosure 
Past R&D 
expenditures.  
“Over the past five years, we have invested £4 billion in R&D”.  
Rolls-Royce plc, annual report 2009,p. 6. 
present R&D 
expenditures. 
“In 2009, Rolls-Royce invested a total of £864 million in research 
and development”.  Rolls-Royce plc, annual report 2009, p. 25. 
Future R&D 
expenditures. 
“Our target is to spend 4% to 5% of value added turnover on 
research and development” . Tate & Lyle plc, annual report 2007, p. 
29. 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
Main & Subcategories Examples (taken from annual reports) 
Amount of tax credit.  “The tax credit of £328k (2006: £434k) reflects mainly the claim to be 
made for research and development tax credits net of overseas 
withholding taxes” . Torotrak plc, annual report 2007,p. 13. 
R&D Ratios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meggitt  plc, annual report 2009, p. 14. 
Comparison of R&D 
expenditures to those of 
prior year. 
“Expenditure on research and development during 2007 was €8.9 
million (2006: €6.8 million)”. Mondi Group plc, annual report 2007, 
p. 37. 
Comparison of R&D 
expenditures to those of 
prior years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolls-Royce plc, annual report  2009, p.11. 
Comparison of R&D 
expenditures to those of 
target or to expectations 
“R&D as a percentage of revenue 2009:5.0%Target > 4%”. Halma 
plc, annual report 2009, p. 19. 
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Appendix B  R&D Disclosure Checklist 
Company Name  
General Disclosure 
1 Statement of strategy or objectives or vision about R&D   
2 R&D is a main activity   
3 The focus of R&D activities   
4 R&D and competition and market   
5 R&D and Risk   
6 The effect of R&D spending on other financial items    
7 Explaining R&D spending changes   
8 R&D accounting policy discussion outside the financial statements   
9 R&D and future opportunities   
10 Tax credit    
Input   
11 Management and People   
12 Other parties involved in R&D (R&D collaboration)   
13 Infrastructure   
14 Funding   
Output : (in progress and achievement : new product or beyond product)   
15 Past achievement from R&D activities   
16 R&D progress   
17 This year achievement    
18 Potential achievement   
19 Patents   
Financial Disclosure   
20 Past R&D expenditures    
21 Present R&D expenditures   
22 Future R&D expenditures   
23 R&D Ratios    
24 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior year   
25 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of prior years   
26 Comparison of R&D expenditures to those of target or to expectations   
Total Score   
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Appendix C Sample Companies List  (Year 2007) 
N0. Company Name 
DATA 
STREAM 
CODE 
INDUSTRY  
1 Rolls-Royce Holdings plc 940793 Industrials 
2 BAE Systems plc 901419 Industrials 
3 Cobham plc 904313 Industrials 
4 Meggitt plc 910509 Industrials 
5 Ultra Electronics Holdings plc 882275 Industrials 
6 Qinetiq Group plc 29088D Industrials 
7 Chemring Group plc 914073 Industrials 
8 UMECO plc 940763 Industrials 
9 GKN plc 900754 Consumer Goods 
10 Torotrak plc 681961 Consumer Goods 
11 Diageo plc 900251 Consumer Goods 
12 SAB Miller plc 695504 Consumer Goods 
13 Britvic plc 32480C Consumer Goods 
14 Johnson Matthey plc 901152 Basic Materials 
15 Croda International plc 900476 Basic Materials 
16 Yule Catto & Co plc 74653N Basic Materials 
17 Elementis plc 901023 Basic Materials 
18 Victrex plc 870364 Basic Materials 
19 Porvair plc 940860 Industrials 
2 Marshalls plc 910500 Industrials 
21 Low & Bonar plc 901352 Industrials 
22 Balfour Beatty plc 900494 Industrials 
23 British Energy plc 29905D Utilities 
24 Scottish & Southern Energy plc 928738 Utilities 
25 Invensys plc 905110 Technology 
26 Spectris plc 953203 Industrials 
27 Laird Group plc 901107 Technology 
28 Renishaw plc 917076 Industrials 
29 Halma plc 910821 Industrials 
30 Oxford Instruments plc 940013 Industrials 
31 Domino Printing Sciences plc 910043 Industrials 
32 TT Electronics plc 901830 Industrials 
33 MORGAN ADVANCED MATERIAL plc 900408 Industrials 
34 Xaar plc 896457 Industrials 
35 Chloride Group plc 900930 Industrials 
36 Pv Crystalox Solar plc 50604X Oil & Gas 
37 Dialight plc 312742 Industrials 
38 Volex Group plc 900528 Industrials 
39 BT Group plc 900888 Telecommunications 
40 Tesco plc 900803 Consumer Services 
41 Unilever plc 900789 Consumer Goods 
42 Tate & Lyle plc 900819 Consumer Goods 
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43 Devro plc 319802 Consumer Goods 
44 Premier Foods plc 28961T Consumer Goods 
45 Dairy Crest Group plc 882065 Consumer Goods 
46 Mondi plc 50629V Basic Materials 
47 Centrica plc 888276 Utilities 
48 Severn Trent plc 904373 Utilities 
49 National Grid plc 870181 Utilities 
50 Northumbrian Water Group plc 27057U Utilities 
51 United Utilities Group plc 904367 Utilities 
52 Smiths Group plc 900943 Industrials 
53 Tomkins plc 911258 Industrials 
54 Cookson Group plc 13946T Industrials 
55 Rexam plc 901065 Industrials 
56 Avon Rubber plc 900925 Industrials 
57 Marks & Spencer Group plc 901207 Consumer Services 
58 Kesa Electricals plc 29046E Consumer Services 
59 DIXONS RETAIL  plc (DSG international)  900906 Consumer Services 
60 Photo-Me International plc 900917 Consumer Goods 
61 Smith & Nephew plc 900487 Health Care 
62 Biocompatibles International plc 135215 Health Care 
63 Consort Medical plc 926114 Health Care 
64 Corin Group plc 258023 Health Care 
65 Puricore plc 36204R Health Care 
66 Optos plc 870841 Health Care 
67 Bioquell plc 903495 Health Care 
68 Reckitt Benckiser Group plc 900484 Consumer Goods 
69 McBride plc 134982 Consumer Goods 
70 Aga Rangemaster Group plc 900737 Consumer Goods 
71 IMI plc 901704 Industrials 
72 Vitec Group plc 926712 Industrials 
73 Weir Group plc 900699 Industrials 
74 SENIOR plc 900600 Industrials 
75 Spirax-Sarco Engineering plc 900741 Industrials 
76 Rotork plc 910649 Industrials 
77 Fenner plc 900575 Industrials 
78 Molins plc 900558 Industrials 
79 Manganese Bronze plc 901155 Industrials 
80 600 Group 900589 Industrials 
81 Hill & Smith Hldgs plc 911998 Industrials 
82 BBA Aviation plc 900293 Industrials 
83 Games Workshop Group plc 136751 Consumer Goods 
84 Hornby plc 917541 Consumer Goods 
85 British Sky Broadcasting Group plc 135116 Consumer Services 
86 Daily Mail and General Trust plc 904283 Consumer Services 
87 Aegis Group plc 917597 Consumer Services 
88 Centaur Media plc 28571L Consumer Services 
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89 Moneysupermarket Com GP. 50869K Consumer Services 
90 Vodafone Group plc 953133 Telecommunications 
91 Inmarsat plc 30877H Telecommunications 
92 BP plc 900995 Oil & Gas 
93 BG Group plc 911488 Oil & Gas 
94 Wellstream Holdings plc 50450V Oil & Gas 
95 SSL International plc 914579 Consumer Goods 
96 PZ Cussons plc 910580 Consumer Goods 
97 Alexandra plc 900780 Consumer Goods 
98 GlaxoSmithKline plc 900479 Health Care 
99 AstraZeneca plc 319608 Health Care 
100 SHIRE  plc    870593 Health Care 
101 SkyePharma plc 953686 Health Care 
102 Oxford Biomedica plc 870449 Health Care 
103 Protherics plc 914555 Health Care 
104 Vernalis plc 507526 Health Care 
105 Genus plc 296734 Health Care 
106 Vectura Group plc 29100H Health Care 
107 Ark Therapeutics Group plc 29295U Health Care 
108 Prostrakan Group plc 30234L Health Care 
109 BTG plc 139996 Health Care 
110 Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 32273L Health Care 
111 Axis-Shield plc 323592 Health Care 
112 Phytopharm plc 29264D Health Care 
113 Dechra Pharmaceuticals plc 264572 Health Care 
114 Sage Group plc 904649 Technology 
115 Misys plc 914192 Technology 
116 Autonomy Corporation plc 269281 Technology 
117 Logica plc 901940 Technology 
118 AVEVA GROUP plc 882839 Technology 
119 Fidessa Group plc 897412 Technology 
120 Anite plc 917534 Technology 
121 Kofax plc (Dicom ) 870805 Technology 
122 Intec Telecom Systems plc 295610 Technology 
123 Micro Focus International plc 30857U Technology 
124 Kewill plc 910520 Technology 
125 Microgen plc 926005 Technology 
126 Innovation Group Plc 290355 Technology 
127 Alterian plc 296870 Technology 
128 DRS Data & Research Services plc 135564 Technology 
129 Gresham Computing plc 940372 Technology 
130 Service Power Technologies plc 291795 Technology 
131 Serco Group plc 943663 Industrials 
132 Experian plc 410124 Industrials 
133 De La Rue plc 901343 Industrials 
134 Ricardo PLC 902791 Industrials 
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135 Fiberweb plc 413032 Industrials 
136 BSS Group plc  900578 Industrials 
137 STHREE plc 32301X Industrials 
138 G4S PLC 871674 Industrials 
139 Xchanging plc 50420K Industrials 
140 Rentokil Initial plc 906480 Industrials 
141 Hogg Robinson Group plc 412630 Industrials 
142 Brammer plc 901815 Industrials 
143 Premier Farnell plc 905498 Industrials 
144 Latchways plc 892927 Industrials 
145 ARM Holdings plc 679297 Technology 
146 CSR plc 28541P Technology 
147 Spirent Communications plc 900493 Technology 
148 Imagination Technologies Group plc 135869 Technology 
149 Wolfson Microelectronics plc 27886E Technology 
150 Filtronic plc 136904 Technology 
151 Psion plc 943529 Technology 
152 Plasmon plc 876296 Technology 
153 Trafficmaster plc 135522 Technology 
154 British American Tobacco plc 901295 Consumer Goods 
155 888 Holdings plc 31762D Consumer Services 
156 Thomas Cook Group plc 30059W Consumer Services 
157 easyjet plc 280641 Consumer Services 
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Appendix C Sample Companies List (Continued) (Year 2008) 
No. Company Name 
DATA 
STREAM 
CODE 
INDUSTRY  
1 BAE Systems plc 901419 Industrials 
2 Cobham plc 904313 Industrials 
3 Meggitt plc 910509 Industrials 
4 Ultra Electronics Holdings plc 882275 Industrials 
5 Qinetiq Group plc 29088D Industrials 
6 Chemring Group plc 914073 Industrials 
7 SENIOR plc 900600 Industrials 
8 UMECO plc 940763 Industrials 
9 GKN plc 900754 Consumer Goods 
10 Torotrak plc 681961 Consumer Goods 
11 Diageo plc 900251 Consumer Goods 
12 SAB Miller plc 695504 Consumer Goods 
13 Britvic plc 32480C Consumer Goods 
14 Johnson Matthey plc 901152 Basic Materials 
15 Croda International plc 900476 Basic Materials 
16 Yule Catto & Co plc 74653N Basic Materials 
17 Elementis plc 901023 Basic Materials 
18 Victrex plc 870364 Basic Materials 
19 Dyson plc 901370 Basic Materials 
2 Porvair plc 940860 Industrials 
21 Carclo plc 905952 Basic Materials 
22 Balfour Beatty plc 900494 Industrials 
23 Marshalls plc 910500 Industrials 
24 Low & Bonar plc 901352 Industrials 
25 Norcros plc 50802U Industrials 
26 Scottish & Southern Energy plc 928738 Utilities 
27 Spectris plc 953203 Industrials 
28 Laird Group plc 901107 Technology 
29 Renishaw plc 917076 Industrials 
30 Halma plc 910821 Industrials 
31 Oxford Instruments plc 940013 Industrials 
32 e2v technologies plc 29109J Industrials 
33 Domino Printing Sciences plc 910043 Industrials 
34 TT Electronics plc 901830 Industrials 
35 MORGAN ADVANCED MATERIAL plc 900408 Industrials 
36 Chloride Group plc 900930 Industrials 
37 PV Crystalox Solar 50604X Oil & Gas 
38 Xaar plc 896457 Industrials 
39 Dialight plc 312742 Industrials 
40 Volex Group plc 900528 Industrials 
41 BT Group plc 900888 Telecommunications 
42 KCOM Group plc 671467 Telecommunications 
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43 Tesco plc 900803 Consumer Services 
44 Unilever plc 900789 Consumer Goods 
45 Cadbury plc 900286 Consumer Goods 
46 Tate & Lyle plc 900819 Consumer Goods 
47 Devro plc 319802 Consumer Goods 
48 Premier Foods plc 28961T Consumer Goods 
49 Dairy Crest Group plc 882065 Consumer Goods 
50 Mondi plc 50629V Basic Materials 
51 Severn Trent plc 904373 Utilities 
52 National Grid plc 870181 Utilities 
53 Centrica plc 888276 Utilities 
54 Northumbrian Water Group plc 27057U Utilities 
55 United Utilities Group plc 904367 Utilities 
56 Smiths Group plc 900943 Industrials 
57 Tomkins plc 911258 Industrials 
58 Cookson Group plc 13946T Industrials 
59 Rexam plc 901065 Industrials 
60 Avon Rubber plc 900925 Industrials 
61 Marks & Spencer Group plc 901207 Consumer Services 
62 Kesa Electricals plc 29046E Consumer Services 
63 BROWN (N) GROUP plc 914327 Consumer Services 
64 Findel plc 905712 Consumer Services 
65 Debenhams plc 35793C Consumer Services 
66 Pendragon plc 904302 Consumer Services 
67 Dixons Retail plc (DSG International) 900906 Consumer Services 
68 Smith & Nephew plc 900487 Health Care 
69 Biocompatibles International plc 135215 Health Care 
70 Consort Medical plc 926114 Health Care 
71 Puricore plc 36204R Health Care 
72 Optos plc 870841 Health Care 
73 Corin Group plc 258023 Health Care 
74 Bioquell plc 903495 Health Care 
75 Celsis International plc 319938 Health Care 
76 Reckitt Benckiser Group plc 900484 Consumer Goods 
77 McBride plc 134982 Consumer Goods 
78 Aga Rangemaster Group plc 900737 Consumer Goods 
79 Taylor Wimpey plc 900345 Consumer Goods 
80 IMI plc 901704 Industrials 
81 Vitec Group plc 926712 Industrials 
82 Weir Group plc 900699 Industrials 
83 Spirax-Sarco Engineering plc 900741 Industrials 
84 Rotork plc 910649 Industrials 
85 Melrose plc 27922U Industrials 
86 Hill & Smith Hldgs plc 911998 Industrials 
87 Molins plc 900558 Industrials 
88 Fenner plc 900575 Industrials 
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89 Clean Air Power 32779E Consumer Goods 
90 600 Group plc 900589 Industrials 
91 Manganess Bronze plc 901155 Industrials 
92 BBA Aviation plc 900293 Industrials 
93 UK Mail Group plc 319875 Industrials 
94 Photo-Me International plc 900917 Consumer Goods 
95 Games Workshop Group plc 136751 Consumer Goods 
96 Hornby plc 917541 Consumer Goods 
97 British Sky Broadcasting Group plc 135116 Consumer Services 
98 Pearson plc 914021 Consumer Services 
99 ITV plc 931524 Consumer Services 
100 Daily Mail and General Trust plc 904283 Consumer Services 
101 Aegis Group plc 917597 Consumer Services 
102 MONEY SUPERMARKET COM GP. 50869K Consumer Services 
103 Vodafone Group plc 953133 Telecommunications 
104 Inmarsat plc 30877H Telecommunications 
105 BP plc 900995 Oil & Gas 
106 BG Group plc 911488 Oil & Gas 
107 Wellstream Holdings plc 50450V Oil & Gas 
108 SSL International plc 914579 Consumer Goods 
109 PZ Cussons plc 910580 Consumer Goods 
110 Alexandra plc 900780 Consumer Goods 
111 Glaxo SmithKline plc 900479 Health Care 
112 Astra Zeneca plc 319608 Health Care 
113 Vectura Group plc 29100H Health Care 
114 Oxford Biomedica plc 870449 Health Care 
115 BTG  plc   139996 Health Care 
116 Renovo Group plc 30850M Health Care 
117 Genus plc 296734 Health Care 
118 Ark Therapeutics plc 29295U Health Care 
119 Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 32273L Health Care 
120 SkyePharma plc 953686 Health Care 
121 Vernalis plc 507526 Health Care 
122 Prostrakan Group plc 30234L Health Care 
123 Axis-Shield plc 323592 Health Care 
124 Dechra Pharmaceuticals plc 264572 Health Care 
125 Phytopharm plc 29264D Health Care 
126 Sinclair Pharma plc 28188Q Health Care 
127 Sage Group plc 904649 Technology 
128 Invensys plc 905110 Technology 
129 Misys plc 914192 Technology 
130 Autonomy Corporation plc 269281 Technology 
131 AVEVA GROUP plc 882839 Technology 
132 Micro Focus International plc 30857U Technology 
133 Fidessa Group plc 897412 Technology 
134 Kofax plc (Dicom ) 870805 Technology 
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135 Logica plc 901940 Technology 
136 Intec Telecom Systems plc 295610 Technology 
137 Anite plc 917534 Technology 
138 SDL plc 278833 Technology 
139 Innovation Group PLC 290355 Technology 
140 Kewill plc 910520 Technology 
141 Microgen plc 926005 Technology 
142 Alterian plc 296870 Technology 
143 DRS Data & Research Services plc 135564 Technology 
144 Gresham Computing plc 940372 Technology 
145 Electronic Data Processing plc 911389 Technology 
146 Serco Group plc 943663 Industrials 
147 Experian plc 410124 Industrials 
148 De La Rue plc 901343 Industrials 
149 G4S PLC 871674 Industrials 
150 Xchanging plc 50420K Industrials 
151 MITIE Group plc 910407 Industrials 
152 Ricardo PLC 902791 Industrials 
153 BSS Group plc 900578 Industrials 
154 Fiberweb plc 413032 Industrials 
155 Mouchel Group plc 25718M Industrials 
156 Rentokil Initial plc 906480 Industrials 
157 Premier Farnell plc 905498 Industrials 
158 Tribal Group plc 255285 Industrials 
159 Brammer plc 901815 Industrials 
160 Latchways plc 892927 Industrials 
161 CSR plc 28541P Technology 
162 ARM Holdings plc 679297 Technology 
163 Pace plc (Pace Micro Technology )  875854 Technology 
164 Spirent Communications plc 900493 Technology 
165 Imagination Technologies Group plc 135869 Technology 
166 Wolfson Microelectronics plc 27886E Technology 
167 Sepura plc 50887P Technology 
168 Filtronic plc 136904 Technology 
169 Trafficmaster plc 135522 Technology 
170 CML Microsystems plc 974825 Technology 
171 British American Tobacco plc 901295 Consumer Goods 
172 888 Holdings plc 31762D Consumer Services 
173 TUI Travel plc 911448 Consumer Services 
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Appendix C Sample Companies List (Continued) (Year 2009) 
No. Company Name 
DATA 
STREAM 
CODE 
INDUSTRY  
1 BAE Systems plc 901419 Industrials 
2 Cobham plc 904313 Industrials 
3 Meggitt plc 910509 Industrials 
4 Ultra Electronics Holdings plc 882275 Industrials 
5 Chemring Group plc 914073 Industrials 
6 Senior plc 900600 Industrials 
7 Qinetiq Group plc 29088D Industrials 
8 UMECO plc 940763 Industrials 
9 Hampson Industries plc 910379 Industrials 
10 Pv Crystalox Solar plc 50604X Oil & Gas 
11 Porvair plc 940860 Industrials 
12 GKN plc 900754 Consumer Goods 
13 Torotrak plc 681961 Consumer Goods 
14 Diageo plc 900251 Consumer Goods 
15 SAB Miller plc 695504 Consumer Goods 
16 Britvic plc 32480C Consumer Goods 
17 Johnson Matthey plc 901152 Basic Materials 
18 Croda International plc 900476 Basic Materials 
19 Yule Catto & Co plc (( XETRA )) 74653N Basic Materials 
2 Elementis plc 901023 Basic Materials 
21 Victrex plc 870364 Basic Materials 
22 Carclo plc 905952 Basic Materials 
23 Balfour Beatty plc 900494 Industrials 
24 Low & Bonar plc 901352 Industrials 
25 Marshalls plc 910500 Industrials 
26 Norcros plc 50802U Industrials 
27 Scottish & Southern Energy plc 928738 Utilities 
28 Spectris plc 953203 Industrials 
29 Laird Group plc 901107 Technology 
30 Renishaw plc 917076 Industrials 
31 Halma plc 910821 Industrials 
32 MORGAN ADVANCED MATERIAL plc 900408 Industrials 
33 Oxford Instruments plc 940013 Industrials 
34 Domino Printing Sciences plc 910043 Industrials 
35 e2v technologies plc 29109J Industrials 
36 TT Electronics plc 901830 Industrials 
37 Chloride Group plc 900930 Industrials 
38 Dialight plc 312742 Industrials 
39 Volex Group plc 900528 Industrials 
40 BT Group plc 900888 Telecommunications 
41 KCOM Group plc 671467 Telecommunications 
42 Tesco plc 900803 Consumer Services 
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43 Unilever plc 900789 Consumer Goods 
44 Tate & Lyle plc 900819 Consumer Goods 
45 Premier Foods plc 28961T Consumer Goods 
46 Dairy Crest Group plc 882065 Consumer Goods 
47 Devro plc 319802 Consumer Goods 
48 Uniq plc 900804 Consumer Goods 
49 Mondi plc 50629V Basic Materials 
50 Centrica plc 888276 Utilities 
51 Severn Trent plc 904373 Utilities 
52 National Grid plc 870181 Utilities 
53 Northumbrian Water Group plc 27057U Utilities 
54 United Utilities Group plc 904367 Utilities 
55 Smiths Group plc 900943 Industrials 
56 Tomkins plc 911258 Industrials 
57 Cookson Group plc 13946T Industrials 
58 Rexam plc 901065 Industrials 
59 Avon Rubber plc 900925 Industrials 
60 Marks & Spencer Group plc 901207 Consumer Services 
61 Kesa Electricals plc 29046E Consumer Services 
62 Dixons Retail plc (DSG International) 900906 Consumer Services 
63 BROWN (N) GROUP plc 914327 Consumer Services 
64 Debenhams plc 35793C Consumer Services 
65 Findel plc 905712 Consumer Services 
66 Pendragon plc 904302 Consumer Services 
67 Mothercare plc 905308 Consumer Services 
68 Smith & Nephew plc 900487 Health Care 
69 Biocompatibles International plc 135215 Health Care 
70 Consort Medical plc 926114 Health Care 
71 Corin Group plc 258023 Health Care 
72 Puricore plc 36204R Health Care 
73 Optos plc 870841 Health Care 
74 Bioquell plc 903495 Health Care 
75 Reckitt Benckiser Group plc 900484 Consumer Goods 
76 McBride plc 134982 Consumer Goods 
77 Aga Rangemaster Group plc 900737 Consumer Goods 
78 IMI plc 901704 Industrials 
79 Vitec Group plc 926712 Industrials 
80 Weir Group plc 900699 Industrials 
81 Spirax-Sarco Engineering plc 900741 Industrials 
82 Rotork plc 910649 Industrials 
83 Melrose plc 27922U Industrials 
84 Fenner plc 900575 Industrials 
85 Molins plc 900558 Industrials 
86 Hill & Smith Hldgs plc 911998 Industrials 
87 James Fisher & Sons plc 911391 Industrials 
88 BBA Aviation plc 900293 Industrials 
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89 UK Mail Group plc 319875 Industrials 
90 Photo-Me International plc 900917 Consumer Goods 
91 Games Workshop Group plc 136751 Consumer Goods 
92 Hornby plc 917541 Consumer Goods 
93 British Sky Broadcasting Group plc 135116 Consumer Services 
94 Pearson plc 914021 Consumer Services 
95 Daily Mail and General Trust plc  904283 Consumer Services 
96 ITV plc 931524 Consumer Services 
97 Aegis Group plc 917597 Consumer Services 
98 Centaur Media plc 28571L Consumer Services 
99 Vodafone Group plc 953133 Telecommunications 
100 Inmarsat plc 30877H Telecommunications 
101 BP plc 900995 Oil & Gas 
102 BG Group plc 911488 Oil & Gas 
103 Wellstream Holdings plc 50450V Oil & Gas 
104 Hunting plc 917509 Oil & Gas 
105 SSL International plc 914579 Consumer Goods 
106 PZ Cussons plc 910580 Consumer Goods 
107 Glaxo SmithKline plc 900479 Health Care 
108 Astra Zeneca plc 319608 Health Care 
109 Vectura Group plc 29100H Health Care 
110 Genus plc 296734 Health Care 
111 BTG  plc  139996 Health Care 
112 Renovo Group plc 30850M Health Care 
113 Ark Therapeutics Group plc 29295U Health Care 
114 Prostrakan Group plc 30234L Health Care 
115 Oxford Biomedica plc 870449 Health Care 
116 Vernalis plc 507526 Health Care 
117 Hikma Pharmaceuticals plc 32273L Health Care 
118 SkyePharma plc 953686 Health Care 
119 Axis-Shield plc 323592 Health Care 
120 Dechra Pharmaceuticals plc 264572 Health Care 
121 Phytopharm plc 29264D Health Care 
122 Sage Group plc 904649 Technology 
123 Invensys plc 905110 Technology 
124 Misys plc 914192 Technology 
125 Autonomy Corporation plc 269281 Technology 
126 Micro Focus International plc 30857U Technology 
127 Fidessa Group plc 897412 Technology 
128 Aveva Group plc 882839 Technology 
129 Kofax plc (Dicom ) 870805 Technology 
130 Anite plc 917534 Technology 
131 SDL plc 278833 Technology 
132 Innovation Group PLC 290355 Technology 
133 Kewill plc 910520 Technology 
134 Alterian plc 296870 Technology 
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135 Microgen plc 926005 Technology 
136 DRS Data & Research Services plc 135564 Technology 
137 Dimension Data Holdings plc 298320 Technology 
138 Gresham Computing plc 940372 Technology 
139 Electronic Data Processing plc 911389 Technology 
140 Serco Group plc 943663 Industrials 
141 Experian plc 410124 Industrials 
142 Xchanging plc 50420K Industrials 
143 G4S PLC 871674 Industrials 
144 De La Rue plc 901343 Industrials 
145 Ricardo PLC 902791 Industrials 
146 Mouchel Group plc 25718M Industrials 
147 Premier Farnell plc 905498 Industrials 
148 Fiberweb plc 413032 Industrials 
149 MITIE Group plc 910407 Industrials 
150 Hogg Robinson Group plc 412630 Industrials 
151 BSS Group plc 900578 Industrials 
152 Jarvis plc 911540 Industrials 
153 Sthree plc 32301X Industrials 
154 Tribal Group plc 255285 Industrials 
155 Rentokil Initial plc 906480 Industrials 
156 Babcock International Group plc 900552 Industrials 
157 Latchways plc 892927 Industrials 
158 Brammer plc 901815 Industrials 
159 Mears Group plc 882297 Industrials 
160 ARM Holdings plc 679297 Technology 
161 CSR plc 28541P Technology 
162 Pace plc (Pace Micro Technology )  875854 Technology 
163 Spirent Communications plc 900493 Technology 
164 Imagination Technologies Group plc 135869 Technology 
165 Wolfson Microelectronics plc 27886E Technology 
166 Psion plc 943529 Technology 
167 Sepura plc 50887P Technology 
168 Xaar plc 896457 Industrials 
169 CML Microsystems plc 974825 Technology 
170 Filtronic plc 136904 Technology 
171 Network Technology plc 882050 Technology 
172 British American Tobacco plc 901295 Consumer Goods 
173 Thomas Cook Group plc 30059W Consumer Services 
174 TUI Travel plc 911448 Consumer Services 
175 888 Holdings plc 31762D Consumer Services 
 
 
 
